"哲学"东来与"中国哲学"建构

中国思想的现代叙述方式正在经历着一场严肃的拷问和危机中的变革. 从19世纪末"哲学"一语传人我国,严复、梁启超、蔡元培、王国维等人尝试将中国传统思想与西方哲学相联通;到五四时代(1915-1928),经西学全盘输人之暴风骤雨般的洗礼,胡适写出<中国哲学史大纲>,冯友兰完成<中国哲学史>之后,"中国哲学"就渐成为中国思想之现代叙述的通行表达方式,"中国哲学史"也在现代中国制度化的学术体系和学科建构当中确立了不摇之地位.这一切的发生都显得是那么的顺"理"成章,含具了相当充分的历史合理性.但是,就在我们早已经习以为常、鯈然其间而浑不自知之时,被公认是当代最大"哲学家"之一的德里达(Jacques Derrida)发话了:"说中国的思想、中国的历史、中国的科学等等没有问题,但显然去谈这些中国思想、中国文化穿越欧洲模式之前的中国‘哲学',对我来说则是一个问题."他解释说:"哲学本质上不是一般的思想,哲学与一种有限的历史相联,与一种语言、一种古希腊的发明相联:它首先是一种古希腊的发明,其次经历了拉丁语与德语‘翻译'的转化等等,它是一种欧洲形态的东西,在西欧文化之外存在着同样具有尊严的各种思想与知识,但将它们叫做哲学是不合理的."因此,中国仅可以说有思想,而绝无严格意义上的"哲学".     

宋代歌唱艺术成熟的标志——“善过渡”

宋代沈括在<梦溪笔谈>中谈到"字"与"声"的关系时,提出了中国歌唱艺术的一条重要规律:"古之善歌者有语,谓当使声中无字,字中有声'.凡曲,止是一声清浊高下如萦缕耳,字则有喉唇齿舌等音不同.当使字字举本皆轻圆,悉融入声中,令转换处无磊块,此谓‘声中无字',古人谓之‘如贯珠',今谓之‘善过度'是也.     

艺术风格的"有我"与"无我"之境

<人间词话>指出:诗词"有‘有我'之境,有‘无我'之境".李煜<相见欢>"无言独上西楼,月如钩,寂寞梧桐深院锁清秋",为"有我"之境;张先<木兰花>"中庭月色正清明,无数杨花过无影",为"无我"之境.艺术创作也有"有我"之境与"无我"之境之分.郑板桥一竹画,曾题"些小吾曹州县吏,一枝一叶总关情",为"有我"之境;旧俄罗斯列宾的油画<伏尔加河上的纤夫>为"无我"之境.<人间词话>还说,"有我之境,以我观物,故物皆著我之色彩;无我之境,以物观物,故不知何者为我,何者为物."这对"有我"之境与"无我"之境的概念作了更深一步的论述.     

对"吾与我"的思考

问题的缘起 陈静先生在"吾丧我--<庄子·齐物论>解读"一文中认为:解读<庄子·齐物论>的关键在吾丧我,并且对"吾与我"的含义进行了辨析.①她认为"我"是形态的我:"这个‘形态的我'处于与外物纠缠的状态之中,被外物裹携着、冲击着,踉跄于人生之途而没有片刻止息,终生劳碌却不见得有什么成就,疲惫不堪却不知归属何处.‘形态的我'展示了‘人'作为‘物'的存在状态,这样的‘我',实在是被动而无奈的."而"吾"是丧我之吾,"‘吾,不是‘形态的我',也不是‘情态的我',所以在任何极端的情景下都不为所动.……超越了形态和情态的‘吾,,‘乘云气,骑日月,而游乎四海之外'.‘游'是<庄子·逍遥游>的基本概念,它展示的是一个自由的境界.‘我'被外物裹携且陷溺于角色的序列之中,与‘游'无缘,‘吾'才能‘游,,‘吾'的‘游'展示了一个自由自在的人生境界.有了这个境界,‘人'就从‘物'的和‘角色'的存在状态中超脱出来了."     

"《易》之微言,莫要于'艮止'"——黄绾"艮止"易学研究

黄绾一生为学三变,早年宗承程朱,后归王学,晚年自揭"艮止"之学.在易学上,黄绾以"圣人之学、忧患之枢"释<易>,认为<易>之微青,莫要于‘艮止'",目"艮止"为"体用俱全"之"存心之法",以"艮止"为"圣门开示切要之诀"的"圣圣相承"之道统本旨,终则以"收拾精神、归缩在腔子内"为"艮止"之修养工夫.其为学注重"经理世务",反对陷入"空疏支离"的宋明诸儒及王学末流,成为王学中具有自觉和批判精神的"异端".     

论"学而时习"对孔子哲学的奠基意义——对《论语》首章的尝试性解读

作为整部<论语>开篇的"学而时习",传统注疏都关注于"学"字,而且以"记诵或诵习传统经典"来界定其内容.这一传统诠释路径遮蔽了"学而时习"的真意.其实,"学"作为"觉或悟"、"习"作为"行",从注目于"行"本身的角度,"学而时习"的首要意蕴在于强调了人自身源初行动与对此行动之主体性觉悟的统一:一方面是不间断的行动中的觉悟,一方面是觉悟着的不间断的行动之展开.这一源初状态及其后续展开,具有一种不可诘问的源初肯定性,所以为深沉而内在的"悦";后文朋友相与之外在的乐、一般他者不知的无动于衷(不愠),就是在一种递减的意义上昭示"学而时习"的这一奠基意义.如此,它奠定着整个<论语>哲学或孔子哲学的基石.     

“哲学”译名演变

古之“哲”字,本义为智、知、明。《尔雅》:“哲,智也。”由“哲”字组成的双音词,有哲夫、哲妇。《诗经·大雅·瞻卬》:“哲夫成城,哲妇倾城。”含贤能或机巧之义。又有“哲人”之称,《史记·孔子世家》:“哲人     

谈谈《水浒传》中"替天行道"与反不反皇帝问题——与周汝昌先生商榷

周汝昌先生是著名的红学家,他不但对<红楼梦>有很深的研究,而对<水浒传>、<三国演义>都有其独到的见解.他在中央电视台<百家讲坛>讲<水浒传>的艺术成就很有见地.尤其是他已是九十岁高龄的学者,头脑却异常敏捷,他随意拈来皆成珠玑.令人赞叹.但是他认为<水浒传>中"替天行道"的"天"字是指"天子'而言,笔者认为欠妥.他又进一步阐释0K水浒传>是只反贪官不反皇帝的".为此笔者愿以此文与周先生商榷.     

他者的镜像:西方哲学对现代中国哲学研究的影响

中国传统中本无“哲学”的概念。虽然日本哲学家西周在用“哲学”这两个汉字翻译philosophy时特意指出, 它与东方固有的种种思想形态有别, 但中国人却不太在意西周的这个声明, 就像几乎将西方文化所有的主要成果都当作具有无可置疑的普遍性一样, 很快就在中国展开了对哲学的研究。1914年, 北京大学成立了哲学门。1916年, 谢无量出版了第一本中国哲学史。这两件事标志着现代中国哲学的自觉和哲学研究的开始。然而, 一个无可争辩的事实却是, 我们是在西方哲学的影响下才有这自觉和开始的。这就决定了, 不管我们愿不愿意, 现代中国哲学研究不可…     

中西时间哲学比较视野下的易哲学——方东美、程石泉论中西时间哲学

从中西哲学比较的观点看,中国哲学原本富含历程思想.因此在中西文化接触的初期,中国学者十分欢迎博格森(Henri Bergson)、詹姆士(William James)、杜威(John Dewey)、怀特海(A.N.Whitehead)等人的思想.中国哲学的历程思想最早渊源于<易经>.<易>视宇宙为创进不已的场域,所谓"生生之谓易",可说是最早论及"时间"概念的古代经典.当代中国哲学家方东美首先指出怀氏的机体哲学与中国的<易经>思想颇为接近.认为<易经>提供了儒家一套自然形上学,其中"宇宙"是基于时间迁流、生生不已的创化历程,而个人则是参赞化育、践形尽性的"时际人".方东美之后,程石泉先生踵其学.深究<易经">,进一步发挥其中的时间哲学.简而言之.方、程二先生均认为<易>之为书,广大悉备,贯通天人,实为儒家形而上学之本源.     

"Psychotherapy" versus "treatment"

Presents a comment on "Psychological treatments" by D. H. Barlow. Barlow proposed that we distinguish between the terms "treatment" and "psychotherapy." The author believes that not only is the distinction unnecessary, but that its implications could have negative consequences for the field of clinical psychology. It is the proposed distinguishing feature that treatments are "specifically tailored to the pathological process that is causing the impairment and distress" that is most problematic. Clinical psychology does not need a distinction that further exacerbates the split between researchers and practitioners.     

"Enmeshment" and "Fusion"

The paper examines two related concepts utilized by two different schools of family therapy. Any family seen to be "enmeshed" is also seen as "fused," and vice versa. The difference in the level of focus, on the "system containing the individuals" (structural) or the "individual in the system" (fusion), determines the difference in therapeutic approach of these two schools.     

"本体论"与"伦理学"--形而上学的两个向度

形而上学有两个密切相关的内在向度,就是本体论向度与伦理学向度.在哲学史上,哲学家们之所以在"追求形而上学"的同时,又总是"反形而上学",并非是人们的形上本性出了问题,而是因为人们总是将形而上学视为单纯的"一维性",总是用一个向度来取代或遮蔽另一个向度.而所谓的"后形而上学思想",也并不是消解了形而上学,而是指形而上学从"本体论向度"转向了"伦理学向度".     

“对的”与“好的”

什么是“对的”,和对它的证立,是道德哲学中具有争议性的核心问题,也是效用主义和道义论间的主要差异之所在。统合效用主义对于“好的就是对的”这个陈述有一套完整周延的说法。而道义论对这个问题的证立不够周延或没有足够的说服力。     

PREFERRING "HOUSEWIVES" TO "FEMINISTS"

Four studies are described outlining the favorability of attitudes toward women. In Study 1, participants indicated their attitudes toward women and men and their construal of the term "women". The results revealed that women were evaluated more favorably than men, but that male right-wing authoritarians (RWAs) who construed women as referring primarily to feminists were least favorable in their attitudes. In Study 2, participants indicated their attitudes toward both "housewives" and "feminists". The results revealed that feminists were evaluated less favorably than housewives, and that the most negative attitudes toward feminists were expressed by authoritarian men. Study 3 revealed that high-RWA males held more negative symbolic beliefs concerning feminists (i.e., beliefs that feminists failed to promote participants'values) and that these beliefs accounted for variation in attitudes among high RWAs and much of the RWA-attitude relation. Finally, Study 4 revealed that high RWAs perceived greater value dissimilarity between them-selves and feminists. The implications of the findings for future research are discussed.     

"石狮"、"风水"与"吉祥"

谁都知道,在古老的中国,不管是衙门、宫殿、庙宇的门前,还是豪宅、大户人家的门口,人们都能看到摆着一对石狮。据说,这对石狮子在许多中国人的心目中,它不但是一种气派的象征,而且还是一种被人认为是好的“吉祥物”。如今,旧时的衙门没有了,但遗留下来的宫殿、庙宇的门前,其中有些石狮仍有保存。然而,想像不到的是,这号称“吉祥物”的石狮今天却开始“走”进某些党政机关的大门口,它们(石狮)在那里时时都在保护着这些政府要员“平平安安”、“吉祥如意”。这不仅使我联想起一些极端的报道,有些政府官员为升迁,请算命先生定位,用风水术为政府…     

"Us" and "Them":

Abstract: In the Aristotelian tradition, politics is a matter of public deliberation over questions of justice and injustice. The Bush administration's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been uniformly hostile to this notion, and it has instead promoted a jingoistic politics of self‐assertion by an America largely identified with the executive branch of its government. This is doubly disturbing, as the executive branch has sought to free itself from international law, multinational commitments, and domestic judicial regulation, even as it has sought to validate itself by demonizing its enemies. This essay draws out the disturbing echoes here of Carl Schmitt's work of the 1920s, in particular of Schmitt's conception of the sovereign as the ungrounded ground of the law and the political as the site of mortal conflict between friend and enemy. The essay argues that Schmitt's position in the twenties, for all of its evident problems, is superior to that of Bush, Wolfowitz, and Ashcroft in at least two senses: Schmitt condemns the idea of waging war for profit and recognizes that such wars will often be disguised as moral crusades waged against the “inhuman”; and he acknowledges that claiming to fight a war for humanity denies one's enemies their humanity, leaving them open to torture and even extermination.     

从"管制"到"平衡"--政府与公众理想关系模式的构建及其制度化

论文从行政民主的角度探讨政府与公众之间的理想关系模式及其制度化构建过程 ,将我国在改革之前的政府与公众模式概括为管制模式。论文指出 ,在制度变迁的过程中 ,这一模式日益受到挑战。而在新的制度环境下 ,我国政府与公众的关系模式应该是平衡模式。这一模式的制度化措施包括培育自主的市民社会 ,赋予公众以独立的活动空间 ;促进行政公开 ,建立一个开放负责的政府 ;推进行政法建设 ,抑制行政恣意     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.