A haphazard reading of McHugh and Barlow (2010)

Replies to comments on Do haphazard reviews provide sound directions for dissemination efforts? (see record 2010-24768-012) by Eileen Gambrill and Julia H. Littell on the current authors' article The dissemination and implementation of evidence-based psychological treatments: A review of current efforts (see record 2010-02208-010) by Kathryn R. McHugh and David H. Barlow. In their commentary, Gambrill and Littell (2010, this issue) suggested that we provided misleading guidance on the selection of treatments for dissemination in our recent article (McHugh & Barlow, February- March 2010) on the dissemination and implementation of evidence-based treatments. These authors misread our article as an affirmation of the evidence base of the treatments involved in the dissemination and implementation efforts we described. In fact, we explicitly disclaimed in the third paragraph that "we do not revisit controversies surrounding the identification or appropriateness of [evidence-based psychological treatments] . . . rather, we focus on the status and adequacy of [dissemination and implementation] efforts currently under way (McHugh & Barlow, 2010, p. 73). Thus, our review was not intended as a guideline for which treatments to disseminate, nor was it a thorough review of the evidence base for the treatments included in the efforts we reviewed. We chose several programs for illustrative purposes as representative efforts from three general domains: national, state, and investigator initiated.     

Nursing and psychological treatments

Presents a comment on "Psychological Treatments" by D. H. Barlow. In his article, Barlow pointed to the need "to solidify the identification of psychology as a health care profession" by changing the terminology of practice in the health care context from psychotherapy to psychological treatments and suggested that the only persons qualified to carry out such interventions are doctoral-level psychologists. Unfortunately, there was no discussion of the health care professionals who already provide psychological treatments in health care settings and their contribution to the evidence base supporting such treatment. The authors find several aspects of the article to be problematic. Overall, the authors feel that suggesting that psychology should claim treatment of psychological disorders and psychological components of physical disorders in health care settings as exclusively its own domain ignores the research and clinical contributions of others.     

"In Search of Token Women in Academia": Some Definitions and Clarifications

This article makes an important distinction between two definitions of "token woman." In the first definition, a token woman is one of few women in a predominantly male setting. The second meaning of "Token Woman" identifies that subset of such women who have made the distinctive psychological adaptation described by Laws (1975). The methodological decisions in Young, MacKenzie, and Sherif's (1980) research are justified as based on that definitional distinction. Constantinople's critique is shown to be appropriate as an alternative to Laws' theory, but not as a criticism of our research. Alternative generational explanations for previous findings about Token Women are not supported by existing data.     

Speaking of the value of life

The phrase 'the value of life' is important in bioethics, particularly for those who hold the traditional views that life has intrinsic value and that the distinction between killing and allowing to die is valid. Ambiguities in the meaning of 'the value of life,' however, can lead to errors in medical ethical analysis by those who hold these traditional views. This essay notes three sources of such ambiguity: (1) three senses of the verb 'is,' (2) the difference between the transcendent and the transcendental, and (3) the difference between the transcendental and the empirical. On the basis of these distinctions, several conclusions are drawn: that the value of life is transcendental, not transcendent, both finite and priceless, that decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments are always judgments about the qualities of a person's life, so one cannot universally condemn "quality of life judgments," that the traditional distinction between killing and allowing to die tracks the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical, that "life itself" is not a benefit of treatment, and that foregoing treatments that are not futile can be consistent with respect for the value of life.     

Do haphazard reviews provide sound directions for dissemination efforts?

Comments on The dissemination and implementation of evidence-based psychological treatments: A review of current efforts (see record 2010-02208-010) by Kathryn R. McHugh and David H. Barlow. The lead article in the February–March issue by McHugh and Barlow (2010) emphasized the need for “dissemination and implementation of evidence-based psychological treatments.” The authors identified a number of intervention programs as evidence based and in need of dissemination. One is multisystemic therapy (MST). They claimed that this program is among “the most successful dissemination efforts...pursued by treatment developers” (p. 79). McHugh and Barlow’s (2010) discussion of the implementation of MST in Hawaii is troubling, because it neglected to mention concerns about the perceived lack of cultural sensitivity of the MST program in that state.     

"I-I" AND "I-ME": TRANSPOSING BUBER's INTERPERSONAL ATTITUDES TO THE INTRAPERSONAL PLANE

Hermans' polyphonic model of the self proposes that dialogical relationships can be established between multiple I-positions1 (e.g., Hermans, 2001a). There have been few attempts, however, to explicitly characterize the forms that these intrapersonal relationships may take. Drawing on Buber's (1958) distinction between the "I-Thou" and "I-It" attitude, it is proposed that intrapersonal relationships can take one of two forms: an "I-I" form, in which one I-position encounters and confirms another I-position in its uniqueness and wholeness; and an "I-Me" form, in which one I-position experiences another I-position in a detached and objectifying way. This article argues that this I-Me form of intrapersonal relating is associated with psychological distress, and that this is so for a number of reasons: Most notably, because an individual who objectifies and subjugates certain I-position cannot reconnect with more central I-positions when dominance reversal (Hermans, 2001a) takes place. On this basis, it is suggested that a key role of the therapeutic process is to help clients become more able to experience moments of I-I intrapersonal encounter, and it is argued that this requires the therapist to confirm the client both as a whole and in terms of each of his or her different voices.     

Evidence-based treatment of stuttering: IV. Empowerment through evidence-based treatment practices

Assertion-based treatments for stuttering have historically been more popular than evidence-based treatments. In this paper it is argued that the use of evidence-based treatments for stuttering is professionally empowering for clinicians, but that the use of assertion-based treatments is a circular process that inhibits professional development. The arguments in favor of evidence-based treatment are elaborated under headings of "professional investment," "professional development and diversity," and "optimizing treatment efficacy." EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: The reader will understand and be able (1) to describe the distinction between assertion-based and evidence-based treatment practices (2) to present a series of arguments that evidence-based treatment practices are professionally empowering.     

Autonomic and behavioral evidence of "implicit" memory in amnesia

A profoundly amnesic patient with a left retrosplenial-fornix lesion was tested on a recognition task that evaluated both verbal and electrodermal aspects of new learning. In addition, "implicit memory" tasks (mirror reading and perceptual identification) were given. The patient displayed strong evidence of learning on all tasks although the results of this learning were not represented in explicit recall or recognition. These findings suggest that autonomic as well as behavioral evidence can index spared memory functions in amnesia. The specific meaning of electrodermal recognition and its possible place in the distinction between implicit and explicit memory is discussed.     

On the possibility of "smart" perceptual mechanisms

Abstract.— A basic feature of some modem theories of perception is the notion of complex or higher order variables which are considered basic for perception. A distinction between "rote" and "smart" mechanisms is introduced and it is suggested that perception consists of smart mechanisms which directly register complex variables. A model of a perceiver, based on the smart polar planimeter, is constructed and used to illustrate the possible consequences of smart perceptual mechanisms for research in areas such as psychophysics, cognition, attention, and perceptual development and learning.     

Processing "d-linked" phrases

Linguists draw a distinction between two types of interrogatives: discourse linked (d-linked) phrases such as which man, which implies the existence of a set of contextually determined entities (men) from which the speaker is asking for a choice, and non–d-linked interrogatives such as who, which carry no such implication. Two questionnaires and an on-line reading study showed that readers prefer a d-linked phrase more than a non–d-linked phrase as the antecedent for a pronoun, suggesting that d-linked phrases are immediately instantiated in a discourse representation that is checked during the process of pronoun interpretation. Comparable difficulty is not observed for non–d-linked interrogatives. A questionnaire and an on-line listening study also showed that readers and listeners were more willing to accept a grammatical island violation containing a pronoun when the pronoun's antecendent was a d-linked interrogative than when the antecedent was non–d-linked, suggesting that they check a discourse representation for the pronoun antecedent. All results suggest that d-linked phrases are immediately interpreted in a discourse representation, not just in a syntactic representation.     

"Near" and "far" in language and perception.

A major interest in cognitive science is the relationship between linguistic and perceptual representations of space. One approach to exploring this relationship has been to investigate aspects of the linguistic encoding of space that correspond closely to aspects of the visual system. Another approach, which does not contradict the first but rather complements it, is to investigate ways in which linguistic and visual representations of space are different. This paper pursues the second approach by arguing that the distinction between proximal and distal demonstratives (e.g. this vs. that, here vs. there) does not correspond to an independently established distinction between near and far space in the visual system but is instead based on language-internal factors. Recent neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies suggest that the brain contains separate mechanisms for representing, on the one hand, near or peripersonal space which extends roughly to the perimeter of arm's reach and, on the other hand, far or extrapersonal space which expands outward from that boundary. In addition, crosslinguistic research suggests that it is very common for languages to have two basic types of demonstrative terms - proximal and distal. This parallelism raises the possibility that the linguistic distinction may derive from the perceptual distinction. However, several arguments support the contrary view that the two distinctions are independent of one another. A substantial proportion of languages in the world have demonstrative systems that divide space into three or more egocentrically-grounded regions, thereby violating the two-way perceptual contrast. Even more importantly, empirical studies of how demonstratives are used in ongoing discourse in different languages suggest that they do not encode quantitative spatial information such as within vs. beyond arm's reach; instead, they specify abstract semantic notions that, when combined with the unique pragmatic features of communicative contexts, allow speakers to make a virtually unlimited range of spatial distance contrasts. Thus, demonstratives constitute an interesting case of divergence between linguistic and perceptual representations of space.     

Beyond "objective" and "projective": a logical system for classifying psychological tests: comment on Meyer and Kurtz (2006)

I present a formal system that accounts for the misleading distinction between tests formerly termed objective and projective, duly noted by Meyer and Kurtz (2006). Three principles of Response Rightness, Response Latitude and Stimulus Ambiguity are shown to govern, in combination, the formal operating characteristics of tests, producing inevitable overlap between "objective" and "projective" tests and creating at least three "types" of tests historically regarded as being projective in nature. The system resolves many past issues regarding test classification and can be generalized to include all psychological tests.     

Exploring unique roles for psychologists

Presents a comment on "Psychological Treatments" by D. H. Barlow. Barlow highlighted unique roles that psychologists can play in mental health service delivery by providing psychological treatments--treatments that psychologists would be uniquely qualified to design and deliver. In support of Barlow's position, the authors draw from their own clinical practice with special psychiatric populations, such as adults with severe and persistent mental illness and behaviorally disordered youths, to illustrate some potential unique roles for psychologists. The authors believe psychologists are uniquely trained to design such individualized functional behavioral analysis protocols because of their training in research design, behavior analysis, learning theory, and behavior change. Psychologists may also be uniquely qualified to design, implement, and evaluate many specialized therapy techniques, as Barlow has outlined and suggested.     

Masquerading Toronto Through Caribana: Transnational Carnival Meets the Sign "Music Ends Here"

The title of this article aims to stage an engagement between what I am calling "Caribana's Toronto" (a masked Toronto, defined in opposition to a stereotyped Toronto the Good) and "Toronto's Caribana," for which the sign posted at the parade's finishing point (Music Ends here) is a fitting emblem. They keep each other in check, I argue, but not in stasis. I will bring these formulations together by way of a theory of "cultural remittance," and what I have found to be a useful distinction between two modes of desire, nostalgia, and yearning. I mean cultural remittance to encompass gestures to an elsewhere (home, often), but also to a beyond, a new set of possibilities for the place of diasporic residence.     

"Knowledge by acquaintance" and "Knowledge-about": A psychometrical demonstration

In two studies, students were asked to rate their knowledge of a number of different topics, extracurricular as well as drawn from their textbooks of the history of psychology and philosophy. The score distributions on a scale from "unknown" to "well known" were in all cases distinctly U-formed, as if knowledge were a question of either/or, rather than one of degree. However, when knowledge was rated on a scale from "know nothing about" to "know much about", the U-pattern failed to appear, and the students tended generally to give more cautious ratings. The differences are interpreted as evidence for the philosophical and linguistic distinction between "knowledge by acquaintance" (German: "kennen", French: "connaître") and "knowledge-about" (German: "wissen", French: "savoir").     

Affect is a form of cognition: A neurobiological analysis

In this paper, we suggest that affect meets the traditional definition of "cognition" such that the affect-cognition distinction is phenomenological, rather than ontological. We review how the affect-cognition distinction is not respected in the human brain, and discuss the neural mechanisms by which affect influences sensory processing. As a result of this sensory modulation, affect performs several basic "cognitive" functions. Affect appears to be necessary for normal conscious experience, language fluency, and memory. Finally, we suggest that understanding the differences between affect and cognition will require systematic study of how the phenomenological distinction characterising the two comes about, and why such a distinction is functional.     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.     

A New Unified Treatment Approach for Emotional Disorders Based on Emotion Science

ABSTRACT— Research on the nature of emotional disorders points toward a common set of diatheses (underlying psychological vulnerabilities) and functionally (but not superficially) similar expression of pathological emotional responding (e.g., Barlow, 2002 ). Successful drug treatments for different emotional disorders are very similar, with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors or related compounds in wide use. Successful psychological treatments, on the other hand, are currently specifically targeted to each individual disorder. Distilling common principles among existing empirically supported psychological treatments, and giving attention to new findings on emotion regulation and dysregulation from emotion science, we propose and describe a new unified psychological treatment for emotional disorders.     

How many kinds of consciousness?

Ned Block's influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that have qualitative character plainly differ from those with no mental qualities, a mental state's being conscious is the same property for both kinds of mental state. For one thing, as Block describes access consciousness, that notion does not pick out any property that we intuitively count as a mental state's being conscious. But the deeper problem is that Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness, or phenomenality, is ambiguous as between two very different mental properties. The failure to distinguish these results in the begging of important theoretical questions. Once the two kinds of phenomenality have been distinguished, the way is clear to explain qualitative consciousness by appeal to a model such as the higher-order-thought hypothesis.