The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.     

No postnatal maternal effect on male aggressiveness in wild-derived strains of house mice

Male aggressiveness is a complex behavior influenced by a number of genetic and non-genetic factors. Traditionally, the contribution of each of these factors has been established from experiments using artificially selected strains for high/low aggressive phenotypes. However, little is known about the factors underlying aggressive behavior in natural populations. In this study, we assess the influence of genetic background vs. postnatal maternal environment using a set of cross-fostering experiments between two wild-derived inbred strains, displaying high (STRA, derived from Mus musculus domesticus) and low (BUSNA, derived from Mus musculus musculus) levels of aggressiveness. The role of maternal environment was tested in males with the same genetic background (i.e. strain origin) reared under three different conditions: unfostered (weaned by mother), infostered (weaned by an unfamiliar dam from the same strain), and cross-fostered (weaned by a dam from a different strain). All males were tested against non-aggressive opponents from the A/J inbred strain. Resource-holding potential was assessed through body weight gains and territory ownership. The STRA males were shown to be aggressive in both neutral cage and resident-intruder tests. On the contrary, the BUSNA males were less aggressive in all tests. We did not find a significant effect of postnatal maternal environment; however, we detected significant maternal effect on body weight with differences between the strains, fostering type and interactions between these factors. We conclude that the aggressiveness preserved in the two strains has significant genetic component whose genetic basis can be dissected by quantitative trait loci analysis.     

Rules as the Impetus of Cultural Evolution

In this paper I put forward a thesis regarding the anatomy of “cultural evolution”, in particular the way the “cultural” transmission of behavioral patterns came to piggyback, through us humans, on the transmission effected by genetic evolution. I claim that what grounds and supports this new kind of transmission is a complex behavioral “meta-pattern” that makes it possible to grasp a pattern as something that “ought to be”, i.e. that transforms the pattern into what we can call a rule. (Here I draw especially on the philosophical insights of Wilfrid Sellars.) In this way I interlink empirical research done in evolution theory with some more speculative philosophical theories, thus shedding new light on the former and adding an empirical footing to the latter.     

Should One Be A Left or A Right Sellarsian? (And is There Really Such A Choice?)

The followers of Wilfrid Sellars are often divided into “right” and “left” Sellarsians, according to whether they believe, in Mark Lance's words, that “linguistic roles constitutive of meaning and captured by dot quoted words are ‘normative all the way down.’” The present article anatomizes this division and argues that it is not easy to give it a nontrivial sense. In particular, the article argues that it is not really possible to construe it as a controversy related to ontology, and goes on to argue that it is also not easy to construe it as one concerning the translatability of the normative idiom into the non‐normative one. The conclusion is that the only coherent interpretation of this disagreement is as a disagreement about the possibility and desirability of assuming a standpoint “inside” our linguistic practices.     

Logically Incorrect Arguments

What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful—an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong (and is such for purely logical reasons). In this paper, we show that pinpointing this stronger sense is much trickier than one would expect; but eventually we reach an explication of the notion of (strong) logical incorrectness which we find non-trivial and viable.     

Gender differences in implicit and explicit processing of emotional facial expressions as revealed by event-related theta synchronization

Emotion information processing may occur in 2 modes that are differently represented in conscious awareness. Fast online processing involves coarse-grained analysis of salient features and is not represented in conscious awareness; offline processing takes hundreds of milliseconds to generate fine-grained analysis and is represented in conscious awareness. These processing modes may be studied using event-related electroencephalogram theta synchronization as a marker of emotion processing. Two experiments were conducted that differed on the mode of emotional information presentation. In the explicit mode, subjects were explicitly instructed to evaluate the emotional content of presented stimuli; in the implicit mode, their attention was directed to other features of the stimulus. In the implicit mode, theta synchronization was most pronounced in the early processing stage, whereas in the explicit mode, it was more pronounced in the late processing stage. The early processing stage was more pronounced in men, whereas the late processing stage was more pronounced in women. Implications of these gender differences in emotion processing for well-documented differences in social behavior are discussed.     

Davidson and Sellars on “Two Images”

Davidson’s anomalous monism is based on the assumption that a human being can be described or accounted for in two very different ways, using two very different and indeed incommensurable conceptual frameworks, namely the physicalistic vocabulary of science and the mentalistic vocabulary employed by the ‘theories’ we make about each other when we interact and communicate. Also Sellars maintains that we have two alternative pictures of the world and especially of us humans as its parts, namely the scientific image and the manifest image. At first sight, the views of the two philosophers may seem quite similar; however, the true extent of this apparent similarity is worth exploring. To that end, in this paper we tackle the following questions: Are Sellars’ reasons for claiming the irreducibility of his manifest image to the scientific image the same or similar to those that Davidson has for asserting the irreducibility of his mentalistic idiom to the scientific one? Is the normativity informing Sellars’ manifest image of the same kind as that informing Davidson’s mentalistic idiom? Do the notions of rationality considered by Sellars and Davidson coincide?