哲学和元哲学

在我们这个信息(包括科学信息)爆炸已成为规律的时代,作为哲学知识观念组成部分的各个概念的命运,是千差万别的。在这些概念中,有一些有充分根据列为哲学的范畴手段,另一些则由于不能经受时间、哲学实践和方法论实践的考验,会丧失哲学意义,并会像它们引进来的时候那样轻而易举地从哲学概念体系中消失。在今天哲学的各种新概念中,“元哲学”这个概念占有特殊的地位。这种特殊性,是由某些哲学家赋予“元哲学”对于未来哲学知识所起的作用决定的。不错,那些强烈要求引进元哲学概念的作者们思想上还没有统一,虽然美国出版以《元哲学》命名的专门杂志已经十五年了。还不止是杂志,可以举出许多书,它们的书名中就有《元哲学》这     

迈向哲学的哲学

几十年前我开始哲学玄想的时候,就想当然地认为:任何人只要竭尽全力研攻哲学,他就能够创立一种哲学体系,以后他就要坚持这种哲学并为捍卫自己的哲学而与论敌进行有说服力的论战,这种哲学时时会有小的变化,但并不需要大的修改。我周围的哲学家们好象也是这么设想的。但是事实逐渐推翻了这样的设想。我现在的哲学之所以形成,主要是由于这种设想破灭的结果。如果我未曾改变那种把哲学研究看成是建立一种似乎坚定不移的体系的话,那就会导致而且肯定会使     

哲学与哲学教育

一 关于哲学,黑格尔说,哲学的意义就在于引导人们"尊敬他自己,并自视能配得上最高尚的东西",因此学习哲学也就是使"心灵沉入于这些内容,借它们而得到教训,增进力量".     

理解哲学--元哲学视域中的哲学

哲学究竟是什么 ?在追问存在的同时 ,哲学总是难以回避这一元哲学意义上的问题。以智慧的追求和探索为指向 ,哲学之思奠基于知和行的过程 ,展开于世界之“在”和人自身存在的内在统一 ,并具体化为对“性与天道”的绵绵沉思。作为对世界总体上的把握 ,哲学试图达到的 ,是真实、具体的存在。在“是什么”、“意味着什么”、“应当成为什么”等追问中 ,哲学从类和个体的层面 ,不断地引导人们走向真、善、美的统一和自由的境界     

逻辑哲学和语言哲学

从哲学研究着重点说,西方哲学的发展经历了三个阶段两次转折:当古希腊哲学家们孜孜探求世界的本原、始基时,他们是在从事一种本体论的研究;而从笛卡尔开始,经由贝克莱、休谟、康德等人,近代哲学发生了认识论转向,它以认识的主体和认识的客体之间的二元对立为出发点,着重探讨了诸如主体是否可能获得关于客体的知识,如何可能获得关于客体的知识等问题。自弗雷格等人开始,现代西方哲学又发生了所谓的“语言学转向”,也就是说,在哲学研究中把语言问题提到了首要地位,甚至把全部哲学问题都归结为逻辑—语言问     

阿拉伯哲学和希腊哲学

勿庸置疑,阿拉伯哲学有多种来源,其中有希腊的,波斯的,印度的,叙利亚的……。但在我们看来,在这些来源中有两个是最重要的,即希腊的和伊斯兰教的。我们将在本书的第三章探讨柏拉图和亚里士多德的哲学是如何翻译成阿拉伯文的,最重要的译著是什么,最著名的翻译家是谁。一、伊斯兰教以前的阿拉伯理智阿拉伯人在他们与希腊文明接触以前,没有专门的哲学,甚至没有哲学的概念。这就说明,阿拉伯哲学的原则     

哲学和今日各派哲学

今日世界上哲学思想的主流应如何以适应本研究精神的方式得到确定呢? 本介绍的目的是要说明这些领域或loci(地域)的地志学,并建立可用来检验它们的方法。为做到这一点,我们应首先用最概括的语言规定和区分各学派哲学家自己所形成的哲学的主要概念体系,其哲学的本质渴望和方向,以及在我们时代的文化中     

市场哲学与哲学市场

随着市场经济的孕育和发展,给哲学提出了一系列的新课题。这些新课题主要有:市场经济的基本要素、组织结构、组织性质、基本功能、活动条件;市场经济的活力、生命力、优势、劣势;市场经济与生产力发展、与计划经济的关系等等问题,从而形成了市场哲学。在这种条件下,哲学的生存和发展,就要适应市场经济的要求,面向市场,研究市场,指导市场,使哲学在新的经济形式上获得新的活力和生命力。     

哲学教学的哲学思考

为了改革当前的哲学教学,大有研究教学法之必要。哲学教学不同于一般的教学,它具有其自身的特殊性。哲学本身就是理论与方法的一致,世界观与方法论的统一,我们就应当努力做到用哲学的方法进行哲学教学。在哲学教学中,既要讲授马克思主义哲学的基本原理,也要重视培养学生进行特殊思维的能力,即不断提高学生分析问题和解决问题的能力。基本原理和辩证思维方法两     

医学哲学:从意识哲学走向身体哲学

我国医学哲学以西方意识哲学作为元哲学并藉此建构了医学哲学的理论体系。在意识哲学的言说中,没有为身体感受留下空间。身体哲学关注身体本身和身体感受,更具有适合作为医学哲学之元哲学的学术身份和地位。身体范畴是标志生命体整体存在的最基本的、最深刻的医学哲学范畴。健康和疾病的一般问题本质上是属于身体哲学场域的话语,病患感受是患者身份的标志,对身体感受的诉求是患者的基本表征。身体健康与身体感受的一般问题是医学哲学研究的基本问题。     

Rival creator arguments and the best of all possible worlds

‘Rival creator’ arguments suggest that God must have created the best of all possible worlds. These arguments are analyzed and evaluated, and Leibniz’s position defended.     

Wittgenstein’s ‘Non-Cognitivism’ – Explained and Vindicated

The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’. The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular, hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary, in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical work, at the level of both aims and methods.     

What is the Philosophy of Information?

Computational and information-theoretic research in philosophy has become increasingly fertile and pervasive, giving rise to a wealth of interesting results. In consequence, a new and vitally important field has emerged, the philosophy of information (PI). This essay is the first attempt to analyse the nature of PI systematically. PI is defined as the philosophical field concerned with the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. I argue that PI is a mature discipline for three reasons: it represents an autonomous field of research; it provides an innovative approach to both traditional and new philosophical topics; and it can stand beside other branches of philosophy, offering a systematic treatment of the conceptual foundations of the world of information and the information society.     

An Ontological Critique of the Trans-Ontology of Enrique Dussel

Enrique Dussel has developed a sweeping philosophical critique of the eurocentricity of Western habits of thought and action, with the aim of articulating an ‘ethics of liberation’ that takes the part distinctively of ‘the victims’ of the world system. The heart of Dussel’s effort is an ostensibly new method, ‘analectic’ or ‘anadialectic,’ which comes about through the ‘revelation’ of the other, and goes beyond the self-enclosure that, Dussel asserts, typifies dialectic in Western ontology. Thus, he takes his position to have gone beyond ontology: it is a trans-ontology, a genuine meta-physics. I question whether analectic does go beyond Western thinking of being, and propose an ontological critique that is classically Western or, as I would prefer to say, historically Western yet (along with its analogues in other philosophical traditions) classically relevant even in our ‘age of globalization and exclusion.’     

Erkenntnistheorie der Zahldefinition und philosophische Grundlegung der Arithmetik unter Bezugnahme auf einen Vergleich von Gottlob Freges Logizismus und platonischer Philosophie (Syrian, Theon von Smyrna u.a.)

The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate ‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary, is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

哲学的困境和黑格尔的幽灵——关于"中国无哲学的反思"

When Western science was introduced to modern China, more translated words were used to express fundamental concepts and terms than borrowed words. The process of academic translation, commensuration, and communication between Western and Chinese philosophy is a process of comparative philosophical research. Nowadays, however, it seems that Chinese philosophy is evaluated by a Western Hegelian criterion. This leads to the debate over whether or not China has philosophy. But it is meaningless to argue about whether or not China has the name of philosophy. The key issue is whether or not China has the actuality of philosophy. Looking at the history of Western philosophy, it seems that the Hegelian definition of philosophy was the only one that existed in Europe. However, during the last 200 years after Hegel that the two main philosophical trends of positivism (scientism) and irrationalism developed from anti-Hegelianism or “Spurning Metaphysics.” As metaphysics is being reconstructed, the ghost of Hegel has reappeared. It is clear that in the future, philosophy will evolve from the development of human metaphysics or cultural philosophy. It is a process of the “negation of negation”: from traditional metaphysics to the spurning of metaphysics, and then to human metaphysics. Translated by Wu Bo from Wenshizhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2005, (3): 18–25     

Returning to experience – Dewey’s second mission to China

ABSTRACT

In this essay, as a philosophical exercise in exploring some of the underlying assumptions that serve as an interpretive context for classical Chinese philosophy, I will first follow Dewey’s philosophical turn from a ‘knowledge paradigm’ to an ‘experience paradigm’ in which he seeks to overcome the dualism between subject and object. Secondly, I will interpret Dewey’s Darwinian challenge to the notions of Aristotelian ‘species’ (eidos) and ‘teleology’ (telos) and their ‘universality.’ In so doing, Dewey sought to restore time, change, relationality, and particularity to our philosophical agenda, ideas that are all recommended by the cosmology of the first among the Chinese philosophical canons, the Book of Changes (Yijing易经). And finally, I will try to offer an interpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy as a science in a Deweyan sense.     

What is Classical and Non-Classical Knowledge?

Mamardašvili’s ‘classical’ paradigm of knowledge is seen to be minimally based on extrapolations from Descartes’ classical philosophy to which Mamardašvili attributes features that rather anticipate his own post-classical ontology. The latter is oriented towards the primacy of perception as a subjective process, in which the self-conscious subject constructs the world, not as illusion, but as a ‘picture’ or ‘model’ (Wittgenstein’s Bild). By examining Mamardašvili’s definition of the ‘phenomenon’ against the␣background of Husserl’s ‘reduction’, Wittgenstein’s ‘object’ and the Freudian and post-structuralist psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, the paper arrives at the inference that Mamardašvili is essentially a post-Structuralist thinker who appropriates concepts from various critical and philosophical disciplines to construct his own multi-disciplinary theory of consciousness and perception.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wissenschaftslogik</Emphasis>: The role of logic in the philosophy of science

Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine.     

Disputes over Philosophical Views in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and Development of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy

To explore the development of contemporary Chinese philosophy, fundamentally, is to explore the development of Marxist philosophy in contemporary China. The disputes over philosophical views in Chinese academic circles during the first half of the twentieth century have been focused on understanding Marxist philosophy from such aspects as “what kind of philosophy Chinese society needs,” “the relation of philosophy to science,” and “philosophy as an idea to reflect on one’s life.” These explorations have provided us a significant ideological insight into the development of Marxist philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy; that is, in contemporary China, Marxist philosophy, as a doctrine of the liberation and all-round development of human beings, exists not only as a kind of “doctrine” or “academy” but also as a kind of widely accepted “xueyuan (academic cultivations)” among people. Translated by Zhao Zhiyi from Jourmal of Jilin University (Social Sciences), 2005:1