从上帝到他人:论列维纳斯现象学神学的内在伦理进路

列维纳斯指出,上帝是一个道德行动,而不是抽象的宗教事件.在“上帝死了”之后要想保持上帝信仰,我们必须从伦理的维度对上帝进行重新阐释.列维纳斯从现象学的维度描述了人类的宗教经验,这种经验结构是一种伦理结构.上帝信仰并不是偶像崇拜,也不是神秘的个人体验,而是人与人伦理关系的最初结构,这种结构导向最高的善;爱上帝在根本上是爱邻人.     

论技术主义对人类道德责任的消解

技术主义流行于 2 0世纪的工业社会之中 ,成为支配人们思维方式和生活方式的意识形态。“知识就是力量”的技术主义知识立论 ,在学理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;技术意志取代人的自由意志 ,在伦理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;社会生产领域和政治领域的标准化和科层制 ,在操作层面上颠覆了人的道德责任 ;人与自然关系问题上的人类中心主义拒斥了对自然的道德责任。     

"诚"与"真"——论儒家之"诚"对当代真理论研究的启示

在儒家学说中,“诚”并不仅指人与人之间的真诚,“诚”也是一个本体论范畴。儒学认为人可以同天,“可以赞天地之化育”,这也是对人的主体性的强调。人能通过倾听自然的言说而得到一点局部真理,但永远不可能把握绝对真理,即大自然的全部奥秘。只有作为绝对主体的大自然才掌握着绝对真理。这种绝对真理是人类的信仰对象,而不是人类的认知对象。现代性的一个愚蠢错误是把这种绝对真理当作人类的认知对象。如果我们认为真理是存在或存在者的本真显现,则真并不仅是命题的属性,也是事物的属性,真理(truth)与真实性(reality)、真(true)与真实(real)密不可分。诚正体现着二者的统一。现代人将道德与自然知识截然分开,失去了诚,扭曲了德。真理论须有个伦理维度才能避免极端怀疑主义。     

面向他者的主体性——尼采与列维纳斯的伦理思想比较

表明上看来，尼采和列维纳斯的伦理思想似乎是截然对立的。因为尼采否定了一切超越性的维度，坚持内在性的原则，并且提出了主人道德和超人，而列维纳斯坚持一种面向他者的伦理学，并且试图重建伦理学的超越性维度。不过，从更深层的视角来看，尼采与列维纳斯的伦理思想并非只有纯粹的对立，而是有着很多基本的共识。首先，他们的出发点都是对于人的内在性领域的肯定。对于尼采来说，这个内在性的领域就是权力意志及其所创造的意义、价值或真理，而在列维纳斯看来，这一领域就是主体通过享受和劳动所建立的内在性世界或家。其次，他们都肯定了一种无法被内在化的外在性维度，这一外在性维度在尼采的哲学中就是“偶然性”或“命运”,而在列维纳斯的哲学中则是“他者的面容”。不同之处在于，尼采所肯定的外在性没有伦理维度，而列维纳斯则明确地强调了外在性的伦理维度，并且将它理解为一种伦理意义的超越性。     

《管子》"道"、"德"的生命特性及对当代生态伦理建设的启示

在存在论的意义上,《管子》中的“道”、“德”是被作为重要的哲学范畴运用的,指生命产生的根源和生命存在的内在根据,二者是一体共在的关系。《管子》的“道”、“德”论揭示了人与万物在自然本性层面上的内在一体性和生态伦理的存在论维度,启示我们生态伦理应超越人与自然的外在关系,建立于人与自然内在关系的基础上。     

存在之例外与无限之发生——论列维纳斯后期哲学中的主体性

与现代哲学中各式各样反主体性和解构主体性的流行做法不同,列维纳斯以保卫主体性为其哲学宗旨。但列维纳斯所保卫的主体性既不是作为存在之环节,因而可以还原为存在的主体性,也不是自身被视为原则、根据、本原的主体性,而是一种别样的主体性。在列维纳斯哲学后期,这种主体性一方面被视为“存在的例外”,体现在我对他人的说、感受、切近与替代之中;另一方面是对无限的见证,是无限由之发生的方式。如果我们把列维纳斯所说的“主体性”视为中国哲学中“心性”的对应物,而把“存在”或“无限”视为中国哲学中“道体”的对应物,那么列维纳斯这里主体性与存在以及主体性与无限的这两种不同关系,正可视为“心性与道体”在西方哲学中的两种可能。     

超越与他者——胡塞尔与列维纳斯论客观世界何以可能

在"超越性或客观性何以可能"这一问题的引导下,本文探讨了胡塞尔与列维纳斯关于"他者"之思想的异同。一方面,二人都将客观的自在世界的可能性奠基在他者的显现之上;另一方面,针对这一显现样式,胡塞尔与列维纳斯提供了不同的理解进路。本文辨析了其中的三种超越:内在中的超越、作为内在的超越和伦理的超越。     

一个新道德主义者的生命本体论

从哲学角度讲 ,人的本质即人与自然的本体差异 ,它是那种能够把人与自然的本质区别标示出来的逻辑尺度。无论传统的理性句法与审美句法 ,还是作为其现代变种的实践本体论与符号本体论 ,实际上都未能从逻辑上完成这种本体论证明。这种尺度只能是以人自然欲望为生产对象的道德尺度。从语言哲学上讲 ,只有可以从“质的分析”高度区划出人与自然之本体差异的伦理句法 ,才能捍卫“人是目的”这个基本的人性原则。然而另一方面 ,这种道德本质又不同于中国传统的那种因与自然血缘相混淆而显得不够纯粹的旧伦理学。新道德主义是一种性命之学 ,是一种在中国文化语境中展开的生命本体论 ,是一种在探索人性根本属性的基础上来解读和阐释生命存在的高明学问     

美德与人的存在

现代社会是日趋理性化、普世化的公共社会,在这样一个以公域为主的时代,规范伦理成为了现代道德的主导形态,个体美德似乎只能退回私人生活领域.然而,当我们对道德本身进行追问时,总是要面对这样的问题:美德何以必要?从人之本体论存在视阈看,美德既是人的存在方式,同时又参与了人之存在本身的实现和完善,这种实现和完善是通过人的实践获得的.因此,美德与实践是人的存在方式.     

通往自身意识的伦理之路——列维纳斯自身意识思想研究北大核心CSSCI

列维纳斯的自身意识思想为我们提供了一条通往自身意识的伦理之路。列维纳斯对自身意识的伦理性理解有其独特性:在他看来,自身意识作为一种对于自我及其存在的伦理性意识,是对自身存在之恶和对自身被他人指控从而不得不为他人负责的意识——而这很可能触及到了意识与存在的某种更为根本的特征。进而,列维纳斯认为哲学的根本问题也并不是"存在还是不存在"这样的存在论-生存论问题,或"为什么有存在而不是什么也没有"这样的传统形而上学问题,而是我如何为我的存在的权利进行辩护、如何为他人承担责任这样的伦理问题。由此,列维纳斯就为他的伦理学作为第一哲学的观念进行了论证。探讨列维纳斯的自身意识思想将不仅丰富学界对自身意识的理解,而且也有助于更深刻地理解其伦理学作为第一哲学的观念。     

"Psychotherapy" versus "treatment"

Presents a comment on "Psychological treatments" by D. H. Barlow. Barlow proposed that we distinguish between the terms "treatment" and "psychotherapy." The author believes that not only is the distinction unnecessary, but that its implications could have negative consequences for the field of clinical psychology. It is the proposed distinguishing feature that treatments are "specifically tailored to the pathological process that is causing the impairment and distress" that is most problematic. Clinical psychology does not need a distinction that further exacerbates the split between researchers and practitioners.     

"Enmeshment" and "Fusion"

The paper examines two related concepts utilized by two different schools of family therapy. Any family seen to be "enmeshed" is also seen as "fused," and vice versa. The difference in the level of focus, on the "system containing the individuals" (structural) or the "individual in the system" (fusion), determines the difference in therapeutic approach of these two schools.     

“对的”与“好的”

什么是“对的”,和对它的证立,是道德哲学中具有争议性的核心问题,也是效用主义和道义论间的主要差异之所在。统合效用主义对于“好的就是对的”这个陈述有一套完整周延的说法。而道义论对这个问题的证立不够周延或没有足够的说服力。     

"本体论"与"伦理学"--形而上学的两个向度

形而上学有两个密切相关的内在向度,就是本体论向度与伦理学向度.在哲学史上,哲学家们之所以在"追求形而上学"的同时,又总是"反形而上学",并非是人们的形上本性出了问题,而是因为人们总是将形而上学视为单纯的"一维性",总是用一个向度来取代或遮蔽另一个向度.而所谓的"后形而上学思想",也并不是消解了形而上学,而是指形而上学从"本体论向度"转向了"伦理学向度".     

"石狮"、"风水"与"吉祥"

谁都知道,在古老的中国,不管是衙门、宫殿、庙宇的门前,还是豪宅、大户人家的门口,人们都能看到摆着一对石狮。据说,这对石狮子在许多中国人的心目中,它不但是一种气派的象征,而且还是一种被人认为是好的“吉祥物”。如今,旧时的衙门没有了,但遗留下来的宫殿、庙宇的门前,其中有些石狮仍有保存。然而,想像不到的是,这号称“吉祥物”的石狮今天却开始“走”进某些党政机关的大门口,它们(石狮)在那里时时都在保护着这些政府要员“平平安安”、“吉祥如意”。这不仅使我联想起一些极端的报道,有些政府官员为升迁,请算命先生定位,用风水术为政府…     

PREFERRING "HOUSEWIVES" TO "FEMINISTS"

Four studies are described outlining the favorability of attitudes toward women. In Study 1, participants indicated their attitudes toward women and men and their construal of the term "women". The results revealed that women were evaluated more favorably than men, but that male right-wing authoritarians (RWAs) who construed women as referring primarily to feminists were least favorable in their attitudes. In Study 2, participants indicated their attitudes toward both "housewives" and "feminists". The results revealed that feminists were evaluated less favorably than housewives, and that the most negative attitudes toward feminists were expressed by authoritarian men. Study 3 revealed that high-RWA males held more negative symbolic beliefs concerning feminists (i.e., beliefs that feminists failed to promote participants'values) and that these beliefs accounted for variation in attitudes among high RWAs and much of the RWA-attitude relation. Finally, Study 4 revealed that high RWAs perceived greater value dissimilarity between them-selves and feminists. The implications of the findings for future research are discussed.     

"Us" and "Them":

Abstract: In the Aristotelian tradition, politics is a matter of public deliberation over questions of justice and injustice. The Bush administration's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been uniformly hostile to this notion, and it has instead promoted a jingoistic politics of self‐assertion by an America largely identified with the executive branch of its government. This is doubly disturbing, as the executive branch has sought to free itself from international law, multinational commitments, and domestic judicial regulation, even as it has sought to validate itself by demonizing its enemies. This essay draws out the disturbing echoes here of Carl Schmitt's work of the 1920s, in particular of Schmitt's conception of the sovereign as the ungrounded ground of the law and the political as the site of mortal conflict between friend and enemy. The essay argues that Schmitt's position in the twenties, for all of its evident problems, is superior to that of Bush, Wolfowitz, and Ashcroft in at least two senses: Schmitt condemns the idea of waging war for profit and recognizes that such wars will often be disguised as moral crusades waged against the “inhuman”; and he acknowledges that claiming to fight a war for humanity denies one's enemies their humanity, leaving them open to torture and even extermination.     

从"管制"到"平衡"--政府与公众理想关系模式的构建及其制度化

论文从行政民主的角度探讨政府与公众之间的理想关系模式及其制度化构建过程 ,将我国在改革之前的政府与公众模式概括为管制模式。论文指出 ,在制度变迁的过程中 ,这一模式日益受到挑战。而在新的制度环境下 ,我国政府与公众的关系模式应该是平衡模式。这一模式的制度化措施包括培育自主的市民社会 ,赋予公众以独立的活动空间 ;促进行政公开 ,建立一个开放负责的政府 ;推进行政法建设 ,抑制行政恣意     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.