从康德到黑格尔：罗伯特·布兰顿的语用学语言哲学

哈贝马斯在本文中系统评价了布兰顿在《清晰阐释》中所阐发的语言哲学,称之为理论哲学中的里程碑.哈贝马斯认为布兰顿在形式语用学与推理语义学之间实现了富有创新性的关联,清晰地阐明了自我理解.这里选录的两节首先在总体上描述布兰顿方法的特征,讨论了他将形式语用学和推理语义学的富有创新性的结合,其次讨论了这样一个问题:为什么我们会对我们言说的内容要求客观有效性--此问题被布兰顿视为核心问题.     

Kant and Hegel on freedom: Two new interpretations

Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary ‘incompatibilist’ terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the ‘compatibilist’ sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations ‐ notably including Hegel's and Wood's ‐ of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory.     

From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of "moral marriage" based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ.     

Rethinking Sellars’ Myth of the Given: From the Epistemological to the Modal Relevance of Givenness in Kant and Hegel

ABSTRACT

Here, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from the epistemological role it also played for him. It is argued that Kant’s approach to modality in the Critique of Pure Reason can best be understood as a transcendental variation on Leibniz’s earlier ‘possibilist’ approach that treated the actual world as just one of a variety of possible alternative worlds. In this context, empirical intuitions seem to work like the mythical Givens subject to Sellars’ critique. This Kantian possibilism is then contrasted with an ‘actualist’ alternative approach to modality found in the contemporary work of Robert Stalnaker, but also recognizable in Hegel. In particular, the role of immediate perceptual judgments in Hegel is likened to that played by ‘witness statements’ in Robert Stalnaker’s attempt to distinguish the logic of judgments about the actual world from those about its alternate possibilities.     

论布兰顿之规范性实践概念

布兰顿（R．Brandom）的规范性实践概念有三项主要内涵：（1）默会地遵行实践传统孕育的“隐性规则”是遵从具有明确阐释的“显性规则”的前提;（2）规范性意涵独立于因果性,是基于意向性之主客体不同方面的模态关系的差异,不可相互取代;（3）那些作为默会信念的“隐性规则”本质上并不是迥异于“显性规则”的东西,它们仍以话语推论关系为范型,仍需具备概念阐释的可能性。特纳（S．Turner）和劳斯（J．ROUSe）分别从“还原论的”与“非还原论的”自然主义立场批评布兰顿的观点。对这些批评的回应将会表明,为什么上述三项意涵对规范性实践概念而言是同时必要的。     

The Representation of an Action: Tragedy between Kant and Hegel

Hegel's theory of tragedy has polarized critics. In the past, many philosophers have claimed that Hegel's theory of tragedy removes Kant's critical insights and returns to pre‐critical metaphysics. More recently, several have argued that Hegel does not break faith with tragic experience but allows philosophy to be transformed by tragedy. In this paper I examine the strength of this revised position. First I show that it identifies Hegel's insightful critique of Kant's theoretical assumptions. Yet I then argue that it fails to note the practical importance of Kant's separation of knowledge and aesthetics. I propose an alternative approach to tragedy that builds from the revised view and yet maintains the autonomy of aesthetics. Tragedy represents an action, a set of events that are internally unified and yet cannot be reduced to theory. This is to say that tragedy confronts us with an aesthetic sphere of making and doing that, while constrained, is incessantly open and free.     

From Gegenstand to Gegenstehenlassen: On the Meanings of Objectivity in Heidegger and Hegel

ABSTRACT

One of Heidegger’s enduring concerns was to develop an original meditation on the meaning of (the presence of) the present. Integral to this attempt is his critique of the understanding of the being of beings in terms of the objectivity of the object. In this paper, I trace Heidegger’s analyses of objectivity, through which Heidegger consistently establishes objectivity as non-primordial and derivative. In order to do this, however, Heidegger had to identify a specific, narrow (spatio-temporalized) conception of objectivity (in terms of Gegenstehenlassen and Vorstellen) as the hallmark of modern philosophy. I show that it is unclear whether that conception is a justified result or rather an unjustified presupposition of his approach. I then suggest what meanings of objectivity might be lost after Heidegger, by pointing to several aspects of Hegel’s notion of objectivity that are incompatible with Heidegger’s account, to wit: the lack of ‘subject-object’-terminology in his definitions of objectivity; the special language of ‘forms of’ objectivity; Hegel’s critique of representation; his notion of Gegenstand as a content with a categorical form, and, finally, that Aristotle’s notion of hypokeimenon might provide a clue as to how Hegel’s notion of object can be understood.     

From Kant to Heidegger. On the path from self-consciousness to self-understanding

In this article I explore the idea that Heidegger's lectures on The Basic Problems of Phenomenology are of particular importance to our understanding of the relationship between Heidegger and Kant. These lectures can be read as a “historical” commentary on Being and Time. Of course, Heidegger does not present himself as a historian of philosophy, but acts as a philosophical reader of Kant in order to expound the principal ideas of his own philosophy. My central claim is that it is through Kant's philosophy of self-consciousness that Heidegger attempts to provide us with a better understanding of his own conception of self-understanding.     

From Kant to Post-Kantian Idealism: German Idealism: Paul Franks

German idealists regard Spinozism as both the realism that outflanks Kant's idealism and the source of the conception of systematicity with which to fortify idealism. But they offer little argument for this view. To fill the gap, I reconstruct arguments that could underlie Jacobi's and Pistorius's tentative but influential suggestions that Kant is or should be a Spinozist. Kant is indeed a monist about phenomena, but, unlike Spinoza, a pluralist about noumena. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Third Antinomy can be solved by a more thoroughgoing Spinozistic monism. The resulting Spinozism outflanks Kant by acknowledging Jacobi's charge that philosophy annihilates immediacy and individuality, whereas Kant's commitment to things in themselves can seem a half-hearted attempt to avoid the charge. However, the German idealist contention is that only a synthesis of such a Spinozism with Kantian idealism can retrieve immediacy and individuality, thus overcoming nihilism.