From Gegenstand to Gegenstehenlassen: On the Meanings of Objectivity in Heidegger and Hegel |
| |
Authors: | Johan de Jong |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Institute for Philosophy, Leiden University , Leiden, The Netherlands j.e.de.jong@phil.leidenuniv.nlhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5121-1348 |
| |
Abstract: | ABSTRACT One of Heidegger’s enduring concerns was to develop an original meditation on the meaning of (the presence of) the present. Integral to this attempt is his critique of the understanding of the being of beings in terms of the objectivity of the object. In this paper, I trace Heidegger’s analyses of objectivity, through which Heidegger consistently establishes objectivity as non-primordial and derivative. In order to do this, however, Heidegger had to identify a specific, narrow (spatio-temporalized) conception of objectivity (in terms of Gegenstehenlassen and Vorstellen) as the hallmark of modern philosophy. I show that it is unclear whether that conception is a justified result or rather an unjustified presupposition of his approach. I then suggest what meanings of objectivity might be lost after Heidegger, by pointing to several aspects of Hegel’s notion of objectivity that are incompatible with Heidegger’s account, to wit: the lack of ‘subject-object’-terminology in his definitions of objectivity; the special language of ‘forms of’ objectivity; Hegel’s critique of representation; his notion of Gegenstand as a content with a categorical form, and, finally, that Aristotle’s notion of hypokeimenon might provide a clue as to how Hegel’s notion of object can be understood. |
| |
Keywords: | Heidegger hegel object objectivity time presence |
|
|