道德困境研究的范式沿革及其理论价值

通过评述道德困境研究范式的发展过程, 系统阐释了经典两难法、加工分离法、CNI模型法和CAN算法的优缺点和理论价值。后来的研究范式均在一定程度上克服了之前研究范式的局限。加工分离法克服了经典两难法的加工纯粹性假设等局限, CNI模型法在加工分离法基础上进一步分离了道德困境决策的多种心理过程, CAN算法则修正了CNI模型法的序列加工的不恰当预设。研究范式的沿革启示研究者综合应用新方法来解决研究争议和重新审视以往道德理论, 合理应用新方法来探索其他具有潜在冲突性的研究议题。总之, 本文为道德困境及相关研究提供了方法学参考。     

权力感对道德困境判断的影响：基于CNI模型的分析

采用道德困境判断的CNI（consequence, norm, inaction）模型，通过两个实验考察权力感对道德困境判断的影响。实验1探讨个人权力感对道德困境判断的影响，结果显示高个人权力感显著增加被试对规则的敏感，促使个体做出道义论的道德判断。实验2考察回忆任务启动的权力感对道德困境判断的影响，发现相对于低权力感启动的被试，高权力感启动的被试在进行判断时更关注行为的结果，对规则更不敏感，这说明启动的权力感促进功利主义的道德判断，抑制道义论的道德判断。结果表明，不同类型的权力感对道德困境判断的影响存在差异。     

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差:现象与测量

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应是指在道德困境中,当作为和不作为都会造成消极结果的情况下,个体认为作为导致的消极结果比不作为导致的消极结果更不道德,从而使人们在道德决策时更倾向于不作为的现象。由于传统道德决策研究范式存在义务论决策倾向性和一般性不作为反应倾向相混淆的局限,道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应尚未做进一步探索。本文梳理了道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的表现,通过CNI模型提出甄别和测量道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的策略:创设研究情景; 分离不作为倾向性和忽略偏差效应; 综合探索忽略偏差效应的群体和个体特征。针对CNI模型的局限性,结合CAN算法和漂移扩散模型对未来的研究方向进行了展望。     

CNI模型在道德决策研究中的应用

道德决策是指个体面临两种或两种以上道德观或道德需求之间的冲突时, 对行为和行为结果进行利弊权衡并做出最终选择。道德两难困境是研究道德决策的经典范式, 而传统道德两难困境范式受到诸多质疑, 道德两难困境的不现实性及缺乏有效指标量化功利论和道义论倾向, 无法对道德决策进行准确解释。针对传统道德两难困境范式不足, 道德决策CNI模型通过多项式建模的方法, 分别计算个体对结果(Consequences)的敏感性、对道德规范(moral Norms)的敏感性以及个体的行为反应偏好(Inaction versus action), 能够更清晰的识别影响道德决策的重要因素。未来研究应围绕影响道德决策的其他因素、道德情境的生态效度以及跨文化适用性等方面继续完善CNI模型, 并进一步探索道德决策的潜在心理机制。     

Biases in children's and adults' moral judgments

Two experiments examined biases in children's (5/6- and 7/8-year-olds) and adults' moral judgments. Participants at all ages judged that it was worse to produce harm when harm occurred (a) through action rather than inaction (omission bias), (b) when physical contact with the victim was involved (physical contact principle), and (c) when the harm was produced as a direct means to an end rather than as an unintended but foreseeable side effect of the action (intention principle). The youngest participants, however, did not incorporate benefit when making judgments about situations in which harm to one individual resulted in benefit to five individuals. Older participants showed some preference for benefit resulting from action (commission) as opposed to inaction (omission). The findings are discussed in the context of the theory that moral judgments result, in part, from the operation of an inherent, intuitive moral faculty compared with the theory that moral judgments require development of necessary cognitive abilities.     

高校学生道德困境研究:日常德性的视角

以45位本科生和硕士研究生为对象, 采用日常德性的视角, 考察高校学生在日常生活中亲历的道德困境, 重点探讨个人日常道德困境的内容, 以及他们对个人日常道德困境的解读和处理。结果表明(1)个人日常道德困境多数不同于假设性的公正取向的道德困境。人们对各类个人日常道德困境的解读和阐释存在个体差异。道德内容主要取决于人们所强调的问题。(2)人们所主张的有助于处理日常道德困境的策略与他们在生活中实际采用的策略是有差异的。在真实的道德选择和决定中, 会有更多利己和实用的考虑。此外, 人们对道德行为的判断多倚重对行为后果(特别是伤害性后果)的考虑。     

Differences in the justification of choices in moral dilemmas: effects of gender, time pressure and dilemma seriousness

The effects on moral reasoning of gender, time pressure and seriousness of the issue at hand were investigated. In Experiment 1, 72 university students were presented with moral dilemmas and asked what actions the actors involved should take and to justify this. Women were found to be more care-oriented in their reasoning than men, supporting Gilligan's moral judgment model. Both time pressure and consideration of non-serious as opposed to serious moral dilemmas led to an increase in a justice orientation compared with a care orientation in moral judgments. In Experiment 2, a similar task was given to 80 persons of mixed age and profession, and the participants' moral reasoning was coded in terms of its being either duty-orientated (duty, obligations, rights) or consequence-oriented (effects on others). Men were found to be more duty-oriented than women, and time pressure to lead to a greater incidence of duty orientation.     

Competing Conceptions of Justice: Faculty Moral Reasoning About Affirmative Action

College faculty (N = 115) were recruited to investigate the influence of moral reasoning on hiring decisions about affirmative action dilemmas. Participants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a standard test of moral reasoning, a measure that presented two hypothetical moral dilemmas about affirmative action that manipulated candidates' race and moral issues, and a scale evaluating the use of external norms versus self-chosen principles. Results indicated that moral issue but not race of a minority candidate affected hiring decisions. Faculty used greater percentages of principled reasoning when solving the more salient affirmative action dilemmas than when solving the hypothetical dilemmas of the DIT. Higher scores on the DIT were related to the use of principles rather than norms when making hiring decisions. Findings suggest that faculty decisions about hiring a hypothetical affirmative action candidate are more influenced by moral reasoning level and competing conceptions of justice than racial bias or ambivalence.     

Social media reduce users' moral sensitivity: Online shaming as a possible consequence

In this study, we propose that social media reduce users' moral sensitivity through the mediation of the perceived moral intensity of hostile comments, which leads to behavioral consequences for online shaming. Three separate studies were conducted to explore this statement. Study 1 (N = 160) compared moral sensitivity between participants in simulated social media situations and a control group. Study 2 (N = 412) tested the mediating role of perceived moral intensity through self-rated questionnaires. Study 3 (N = 295) examined the behavioral consequences of reduced moral sensitivity on online shaming by manipulating social media and perceived moral intensity. Across these three studies with their different methodologies, we found consistent support for our prediction that social media reduce users' moral sensitivity. Also, our findings shed light on perceived moral intensity as a mediator. As expected, less perceived moral intensity and less moral sensitivity (as serial mediators) induced by social media led to a higher tendency to participate in online shaming. In addition, our research suggests that the harmful effects of social media could be restricted by improving users' perceived moral intensity in the form of reminders. These findings provide novel insights into the underlying mechanism of cyberviolence on social media and also contribute to the literature on the antecedents and consequences of moral sensitivity.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

Standard and alternative error theories about moral reasons

An error theory about moral reasons is the view that ordinary thought is committed to error, and that the alleged error is the thought that moral norms (expressing alleged moral requirements) invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons (for action). In this paper, I sketch two distinct ways of arguing for the error theorist's substantive conclusion that moral norms do not invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons. I am primarily interested in the somewhat neglected way, which I call the alternative route. A reason for this is because it seems a genuine question whether the alternative route towards the substantive conclusion need be as troubling to the moralist as the standard route. My hunch is that it is not. Though the alternative error theory denies justification from genuinely moral acts, it also does so from acts born out of self-interest or immorality. If the alternative theory is true, the moralist can at least hold on to the claim that if genuinely moral considerations fail to provide agents with reasons for action, nothing else (of the sort) does.     

Reason and emotion,not reason or emotion in moral judgment

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question assumes that reason and emotion are two fully independent cognitive faculties, whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics.     

道德本能与道德判断

Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language. Translated by Yu Xin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (12): 72–78     

A New Set of Moral Dilemmas: Norms for Moral Acceptability,Decision Times,and Emotional Salience

At the present time, the growing interest in the topic of moral judgment highlights the widespread need for a standardized set of experimental stimuli. We provide normative data for a sample of 120 undergraduate students using a new set of 60 moral dilemmas that might be employed in future studies according to specific research needs. Thirty dilemmas were structured to be similar to the Footbridge dilemma (“instrumental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a means to save more people), and thirty dilemmas were designed to be similar to the Trolley dilemma (“incidental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the action aimed at saving more people). Besides type of dilemma, risk‐involvement was also manipulated: the main character's life was at risk in half of the instrumental dilemmas and in half of the incidental dilemmas. We provide normative values for the following variables: (i) rates of participants' responses (yes/no) to the proposed resolution; (ii) decision times; (iii) ratings of moral acceptability; and (iv) ratings of emotional valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and arousal (activation/calm) experienced during decision making. For most of the dependent variables investigated, we observed significant main effects of type of dilemma and risk‐involvement in both subject and item analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

道德判断的外语效应：心理距离的中介与外语熟练度的调节作用

结合建构水平理论,基于多项式加工树构建算法,通过3个实验验证道德外语效应,并尝试探究道德外语效应的可能机制及其边界。实验1的结果表明中文为母语、英文为外语的个体的道德判断受语言的影响。与母语条件相比,外语条件下个体的道义论道德判断更少。实验2的结果进一步表明心理距离可以完全中介语言对道德判断的影响。实验3发现外语熟练度可以调节语言对心理距离的影响。研究结果再次验证了道德外语效应,并表明心理距离的中介作用和外语熟练度的调节作用,拓展了道德外语效应发生机制的可能解释。     

Freedom,moral responsibility,and the failure of universal defeat

Proponents of manipulation arguments against compatibilism hold that manipulation scope (how many agents are manipulated) and manipulation type (whether the manipulator intends that an agent perform a particular action) do not impact judgments about free will and moral responsibility. Many opponents of manipulation arguments agree that manipulation scope has no impact but hold that manipulation type does. Recent work by Latham and Tierney (2022, 2023) found that people's judgments were sensitive to manipulation scope: people judged that an agent was less free and responsible when a manipulation was existential (impacting at least one but not all agents) than when the manipulation was universal (impacting every agent). This study examines people's judgements about existential and universal manipulation cases that involve both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. We found that manipulation scope also affects people's free will and responsibility judgments in manipulation cases involving both intentional and non-intentional outcomes. Interestingly, we also found that manipulation type influences the effect that manipulation scope has on people's free will judgments but not their moral responsibility judgments, which indicates that people's free will and responsibility judgments can come apart. This puts pressure on the prevalent assumption that judgments about free will and moral responsibility are conceptually bound together.     

Two types of moral dilemmas

In recent years the question of whether moral dilemmas are conceptually possible has received a fair amount of attention. In arguing for or against the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas authors have been almost exclusively concerned with obligation dilemmas, i.e., situations in which more than one action is obligatory. Almost no one has been concerned with prohibition dilemmas, i.e., situations in which no feasible actions is permissible. I argue that the two types of dilemmas are distinct, and that a much stronger case can be made against the conceptual possibility of obligation dilemmas than against the conceptual possibility of prohibition dilemmas.     

Moral kinematics: The role of physical factors in moral judgments

Harmful events often have a strong physical component??for instance, car accidents, plane crashes, fist fights, and military interventions. Yet there has been very little systematic work on the degree to which physical factors influence our moral judgments about harm. Since physical factors are related to our perception of causality, they should also influence our subsequent moral judgments. In three experiments, we tested this prediction, focusing in particular on the roles of motion and contact. In Experiment 1, we used abstract video stimuli and found that intervening on a harmful object was judged as being less bad than intervening directly on the victim, and that setting an object in motion was judged as being worse than redirecting an already moving object. Experiment 2 showed that participants were sensitive not only to the presence or absence of motion and contact, but also to the magnitudes and frequencies associated with these dimensions. Experiment 3 extended the findings from Experiment 1 to verbally presented moral dilemmas. These results suggest that domain-general processes play a larger role in moral cognition than is currently assumed.     

Time and moral judgment

Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.     

Effects of dilemma type,language, and emotion arousal on utilitarian vs deontological choice to moral dilemmas in Chinese–English bilinguals

The present study examines how dilemma type (personal or impersonal moral dilemma), language (native or foreign) and emotion arousal to a dilemma could affect Chinese–English bilinguals' deontological vs utilitarian moral choices regarding 39 moral dilemmas. How emotion arousal plays a mediating role in the effects of dilemma type and language on moral choices is also investigated. As shown in multilevel analyses, participants made fewer utilitarian choices for personal dilemmas than impersonal dilemmas. Although emotion arousal of dilemmas significantly mediated this effect of dilemma type, the indirect effect of dilemma type through arousal on moral choices was inconsistent with the direct effect of dilemma type on moral choices. For the effect of language, participants made more utilitarian choices in the Footbridge (personal) dilemma that was presented in foreign language than in native language. However, this effect was not mediated by arousal, suggesting that it could not be attributed to the emotion‐reducing effect of foreign language. Moreover, there was no language effect on moral choices in analyses that included all 39 dilemmas or only 22 personal dilemmas, indicating the need in future research for further identifying the potential mediators that trigger the foreign language effect on moral choices.