论政府推动企业履行道德责任的有效路径

如何发挥政府的促进作用,有效地推动企业履行道德责任,实现企业的可持续性发展,是当前我国企业在转型过程中不得不面对的一个重大课题.政府应当根据企业道德责任的不同层次,准确把握我国企业当下发展的特点,从四个方面推进企业道德责任的自律:一是塑造宽松生存环境,为企业践行道德责任奠定和谐空间;二是推进道德立法,促企业基本道德责任从他律走向自律;三是建立健全道德激励机制,确保企业道德责任自我选择;四是给予企业自由意志空间,实现企业崇高道德责任的持续超越.     

企业生态道德责任浅析

本文分析了企业生态道德责任提出的原因,指出了企业承担生态道德责任是建设社会主义生态文明的内在要求,也是企业迎接国际挑战、增强企业核心竞争力的保证,更是企业自身建设伦理文化的需要.企业要具有生态道德责任,则必须从企业确立生态道德责任的价值目标、培养员工生态道德素质、建立企业生态道德责任的系统工程这几个方面入手.只有这样,我们的企业才能将经济活动、生态智慧和伦理关怀融为一体,最终才有可能实现与社会经济相协调发展.     

论企业道德责任的依据、表现与内化

企业道德责任的含义大体有广义和狭义两个方面,从较为广泛和普遍的意义上,我们认为企业的道德责任是体现在企业的经济责任、法律责任和精神文化责任之中的,同时又是同企业伦理建设密切相关的诸种责任的有机统一。而从狭义的视角来看,企业的道德责任是企业所肩负的对自己、对同道和对社会的道德义务的自觉承担和精神担纲,它在其精神实质上可以用“敬业求精、贵和乐群”来概括。企业道德责任的内化即为企业良心。企业良心就是企业道德责任的自我意识和自我评价。它由企业爱心、企业诚心和企业义心或公正之心所构成。     

企业社会责任的道德考察

企业作为影响社会财富的创造积累、社会利益的分配格局和社会需求的有效供给的基本经济细胞,需要擢升其企业公民意识、关怀利益相关者以及尊重社会及其成员道德尊严的企业社会责任的履行能力,以向社会传递一种荻取企业自我价值实现的社会道德认同境界.     

论市场经济主体的道德责任

改革开放30多年,我国逐步实现了从计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转型,但这种转型还不完善,其重要表现之一是个人、企业、政府等市场经济主体的道德责任感还没有普遍确立起来。道德责任是市场经济主体的应然之责。如果市场经济主体缺乏应有的道德责任感,以不合乎道德的方式参与市场经济活动,那么市场经济内在具有的道德维度无法得到张扬,市场经济体制的运行必然要与人本身的根本利益需要和价值诉求撞车,市场经济体制的道德合理性也会遭到质疑。我国经济伦理学应以激发和强化市场经济主体的道德责任感为使命。     

解读\"道德责任\"

本文从理论和历史的角度,对道德责任内涵、道德责任归因、道德责任的前提条件、道德责任的谅解、道德责任冲突的解决进行了分析和探讨.其中道德责任归因理论和责任冲突解决理论具有可操作性和重要的现实意义.     

道德责任在道德建设中的作用

道德是一种特殊的社会意识形态和行为规范,作为实践精神的道德来源于实践,又必须向实践转化。无论是从社会道德意识的形成还是从社会道德意识向实践转化来说,都离不开道德责任的特殊作用。     

论技术主义对人类道德责任的消解

技术主义流行于 2 0世纪的工业社会之中 ,成为支配人们思维方式和生活方式的意识形态。“知识就是力量”的技术主义知识立论 ,在学理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;技术意志取代人的自由意志 ,在伦理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;社会生产领域和政治领域的标准化和科层制 ,在操作层面上颠覆了人的道德责任 ;人与自然关系问题上的人类中心主义拒斥了对自然的道德责任。     

企业道德的两个基本问题

企业道德的两个基本问题是:企业为什么要讲道德和企业怎么样讲道德.本文通过对否认企业道德重要性的自由主义模式的批判,以及对强调企业道德重要性的权力--责任模式、利益相关者模式、"伦理回报"模式和伦理价值模式的分析,为第一个问题的回答提供了一套较为完整的理论解释.而在企业怎么样讲道德这一问题上,本文强调为了使企业从"知"转而"行",在企业内部必须追求企业的道德认知、道德情感和道德意志的合而为一;在企业外部则应站在民主体制改革的高度,对"财产权神圣不可侵犯"这一理念提出质疑,以期从根本上改变企业的概念与性质,使企业的社会责任真正成为企业存在的合法性依据.     

论企业的慈善责任

慈善既体现了人们对构建美好社会以及美好生活的愿望,也蕴涵了人们对社会对他人所应承担的社会责任的一种自觉意识.而企业作为一种营利性组织,其社会责任体系中乃包含着慈善责任.慈善责任在企业社会责任体系中举最高层次,是企业主观意识到的自主自愿承担的责任,它不具有其他责任与义务如经济和法律责任的强制性特征.企业承担社会慈善责任,符合社会的倡导与公众的期望,但其对慈善责任的承担是有限度的,即企业承担社会慈善责任应与自身的承受能力和企业自身的正常生产以及可持续发展相适应,应量力而行.     

青少年责任感缺失的认知维度分析——学校责任感教育合理性追问

目前对青少年社会责任感缺失原因的分析多从社会、家庭、时代等方面着手,对学校范围内进行责任感教育并无多大帮助。本文从认知维度分析了青少年责任感缺失的三种情形及其原因,并以此为基础阐明了学校范围内责任感教育的合理性,提出在学校范围内开展的应是以责任知识、责任思维和责任实践为主要内容的责任感教育。     

Fischer’s Way: The Next Level

I present an analogy between analytic philosophy and a particular sort of computer game, and analyze some aspects of John Martin Fischer's My Way in the light of this analogy. I set out the different levels of the free will question, and explore how well Fischer does on them. On the compatibility level, he succeeds, in my view, in confronting the "metaphysical challenge" and the "manipulation challenge", but does less well with the "moral arbitrariness challenge". The compatibilist perspective captures only part of the moral and personal truth on the compatibility issue, and is shown to be inherently shallow. On the next levels we see that Fischer confronts particular dangers: the very virtues that make his minimalist position so resilient on the second (compatibility) level, render it too impoverished when it comes to the third, which asks about the very importance of taking moral responsibility seriously. Connecting to other positions (such as P.F. Strawson's version of naturalism) may be an imperative, but would also be risky. Likewise, on the fourth level, where we confront the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the previous conclusions, it is doubtful how well Fischer can do, given his previous philosophical commitments.

Technological Delegation: Responsibility for the Unintended

This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility.

Human moral responsibility is moral responsibility enough: A reply to F. Allan Hanson

Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular, adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary, for not adopting this stance.     

Defense

This paper is an exploration of the nature of what is perhaps the most widely recognized justification for inflicting harm on human beings: the appeal to defense (self-defense and other-defense). I develop and defend a rights-based account of the appeal to defense that takes into account whether and to what degree both the aggressor and his potential victim are morally responsible for the relevant threat. However, unlike most extant rights-based accounts, mine is not a forfeiture account. That is, I do not attempt to explain the permissibility of defense in terms of the aggressor’s loss of a right not to be harmed. Instead I appeal directly to the fact that defense in the relevant cases prevents the aggressor from infringing upon the rights of his potential victim. Accordingly, I call my account a “prevention account.”

Igniting the Flicker of Freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt Scenario

This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility.

Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument

The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.