Actor-observer differences in realism in confidence and frequency judgments

Taking a social psychological approach to metacognitive judgments, this study analyzed the difference in realism (validity) in confidence and frequency judgments (i.e., estimates of overall accuracy) between one's own and another person's answers to general knowledge questions. Experiment 1 showed that when judging their own answers, compared with another's answers, the participants exhibited higher overconfidence, better ability to discriminate correct from incorrect answers, lower accuracy, and lower confidence. However, the overconfidence effect could be attributable to the lowest level of confidence. Furthermore, when heeding additional information about another's answers the participants showed higher confidence and better discrimination ability. The overconfidence effect of Experiment 1 was not found in Experiment 2. However, the results of Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 1 in terms of discrimination ability, confidence, and accuracy. Finally, in both experiments the participants gave lower frequency judgments of their own overall accuracy compared with their frequency judgments of another person's overall accuracy.     

Confidence in own and others' knowledge

A person's confidence judgement of a statement reflects his/her degree of belief in the correctness of that statement. Deficient ability to assess the correctness of statements (or beliefs) can have serious consequences in many situations. This study compares the realism (calibration) of subjects' confidence ratings in two situations ( n = 64). The first situation was when the subjects confidence rated their own answers to general knowledge questions. The second was when the subjects gave confidence ratings of another person's answers to general knowledge questions. The results show that subjects were more poorly calibrated and were more overconfident in the second situation, i.e. when they gave confidence ratings of answers given by another person, compared with when they rated their own answers. The data further indicates that the results can not be explained in terms of the amount of cognitive processes invested when making the confidence judgements. For example, the subjects rated the other person's answers to questions they had answered themselves, and to questions they had not seen before. No differences in confidence or in calibration and other measures of judgmental realism were found between these two categories of questions. Nor did instructions to imagine the thought process of the other person improve any of these measures. The subjects disagreed with the other person's answer on 23% of all occasions. Significantly poorer calibration was shown where subjects disagreed with the other person than where they agreed. Contents of a social nature attended to by the subjects may have affected the results. The results, when related to previous research in the area, give rise to the question of how the social situation can be arranged to achieve the best calibration.     

Priming virtue: Forgiveness and justice elicit divergent moral judgments among religious individuals

Forgiveness and justice are related virtues but they may exert divergent effects on moral judgments. Participants were primed with either forgiveness or retributive justice and made moral judgments of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that religious participants recalling an experience of forgiveness reported more favorable attitudes toward moral transgressors than did those recalling an experience of retributive justice. Experiment 2 replicated the priming effect on moral judgments using a subtle prime of either forgiveness or justice (word search) and a different dependent measure. Experiment 3 employed a more religiously diverse sample and revealed the moderating role of religious commitment. These results suggest that salience of forgiveness leads to more favorable evaluations of moral transgressors compared to retributive justice for religious individuals.     

Early understanding of perception as a source of knowledge

Two studies investigated preschool children's ability to infer another person's knowledge or ignorance on the basis of that person's recent perceptual experience. In Experiment 1 children were questioned about their own and a puppet's knowledge of a hidden object's color and about their own and the puppet's ability to see the hidden object. Three- and 4-year-olds attributed knowledge and perceptual experience to the person (either themselves or the puppet) who had viewed the hidden object, but not to the person who did not view it. Experiment 2 further investigated 3-year-olds understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. Children were asked to indicate which of two puppets, one who had viewed a hidden object and one who had not, would be able to tell them the object's color. Children chose the correct puppet more often than would be predicted by chance. The results of these experiments suggest that understanding of perception as a source of knowledge is present by the age of 3 years.     

Power and perspectives not taken

Four experiments and a correlational study explored the relationship between power and perspective taking. In Experiment 1, participants primed with high power were more likely than those primed with low power to draw an E on their forehead in a self-oriented direction, demonstrating less of an inclination to spontaneously adopt another person's visual perspective. In Experiments 2a and 2b, high-power participants were less likely than low-power participants to take into account that other people did not possess their privileged knowledge, a result suggesting that power leads individuals to anchor too heavily on their own vantage point, insufficiently adjusting to others' perspectives. In Experiment 3, high-power participants were less accurate than control participants in determining other people's emotion expressions; these results suggest a power-induced impediment to experiencing empathy. An additional study found a negative relationship between individual difference measures of power and perspective taking. Across these studies, power was associated with a reduced tendency to comprehend how other people see, think, and feel.     

自我参照和环境参照整合过程中的主方位判断

通过三个实验证明,自我参照和环境参照转化与整合过程中的主方位判断受拍摄方向和目标位置的影响。二者对主方位判断的作用模式不会随主方位判断任务的改变而改变,拍摄方向效表现为：朝北效应（匹配效应）和主方位效应,体现的是自我参照和环境参照整合过程中环境参照对主方位的影响;目标位置效应的认知加工时间模式可表示为：前-后轴<左-右轴<其他位置,体现的是自我参照和环境参照整合过程中自我参照对主方位的影响。本文以规范轴和规范方向为框架对数据结果进行了分析和解释。     

Influences on current mood of eliciting life-satisfaction judgments

Subjective well-being (SWB) has attracted a plethora of cross-disciplinary research in recent years. As measured in this research, SWB includes a cognitive and an affective component. We hypothesize that eliciting the cognitive component by means of life-satisfaction judgments activates thoughts about positive and negative life circumstances that influence the affective component (current mood or memory of the frequency of past positive and negative affects). Experiment 1 demonstrates an expected asymmetrical carryover effect in that current mood correlates higher with life-satisfaction judgments performed before than after the measurements of current mood. In Experiment 2, it is found that inducing current mood by means of rewarding performance does not influence the life-satisfaction judgments. In contrast and consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 3 shows such an influence when current mood is induced by thinking about positive and negative life circumstances.     

Getting it right generally,but not precisely: learning the relation between multiple inputs and outputs

In real-world situations, people are often faced with the complex task of deciding which of many potential variables are affecting their own or others’ behavior, as well as noting which specific aspects of behavior are being affected. Although it is common for professionals who encounter such conditions to claim that they acquire accurate and specific knowledge from their experience, it is unclear that such confidence is justified. Using a managerial task, we examined participants’ ability to learn how various interventions affect various aspects of their employees’ performance. The results of three experiments reveal that although participants appear to avoid prescribing an intervention that has a positive effect on a primary performance measure and a negative side effect on a secondary measure, when asked directly about the impact of the intervention, they respond by reducing their judgments of its positive impact. This was true regardless of whether participants indicated clear knowledge of its negative side effect (Experiment 3) or did not (Experiments 1 and 2). Thus, participants appear to be automatically integrating across the effects on different outcome measures.     

What's in a Forename? Cue Familiarity and Stereotypical Thinking

Recent research has characterized categorical thinking as an essential component of the person perception process. Yet relatively little is known about the myriad factors that moderate the accessibility of this mode of thought. With regard to this we hypothesized that the subjective familiarity of a person's forename may play an important role in triggering categorical thinking. Specifically, category-based knowledge may be more accessible when triggered by familiar than unfamiliar forenames. We report the results of three experiments that supported this prediction. Relative to unfamiliar names, participants required less time to verify the gender of familiar forenames (Experiment 1) and semantic priming was more pronounced when stereotype-related material followed the presentation of familiar than unfamiliar items (Experiment 2). Also, familiar forenames attracted more extreme gender-based evaluations than their unfamiliar counterparts (Experiment 3). We consider the theoretical and methodological implications of these findings for a variety of issues in person perception.     

面孔再认及学习程度判断中的同龄效应

同龄效应指个体对自己年龄段面孔的记忆成绩显著高于其他年龄面孔.实验采用3×3混合设计,考察不同年龄被试对面孔再认及学习程度判断中的同龄效应,探讨同龄效应的发展规律.结果显示,青年和老年人对同龄面孔的再认显著好于异龄面孔,儿童对同龄与异龄面孔的再认成绩差异不显著;各组被试对不同年龄的面孔学习程度判断准确性之间的差异没有区别.这表明:青年和老年人在面孔再认中出现了同龄效应,儿童没有表现出同龄效应;个体学习程度判断中不存在同龄效应,且这种特点与年龄无关.     

Prior knowledge is more predictive of error correction than subjective confidence

Previous research has demonstrated that, when given feedback, participants are more likely to correct confidently-held errors, as compared with errors held with lower levels of confidence, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Accounts of hypercorrection suggest that confidence modifies attention to feedback; alternatively, hypercorrection may reflect prior domain knowledge, with confidence ratings simply correlated with this prior knowledge. In the present experiments, we attempted to adjudicate among these explanations of the hypercorrection effect. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants answered general knowledge questions, rated their confidence, and received feedback either immediately after rating their confidence or after a delay of several minutes. Although memory for confidence judgments should have been poorer at a delay, the hypercorrection effect was equivalent for both feedback timings. Experiment 2 showed that hypercorrection remained unchanged even when the delay to feedback was increased. In addition, measures of recall for prior confidence judgments showed that memory for confidence was indeed poorer after a delay. Experiment 3 directly compared estimates of domain knowledge with confidence ratings, showing that such prior knowledge was related to error correction, whereas the unique role of confidence was small. Overall, our results suggest that prior knowledge likely plays a primary role in error correction, while confidence may play a small role or merely serve as a proxy for prior knowledge.     

When Sociopolitical Events Strike Cultural Beliefs: Divergent Impact of Hurricane Katrina on African Americans' and European Americans' Endorsement of the Protestant Work Ethic

Three experiments address how people react to a sexual abuse victim compared to a nonvictim when a justification for negative evaluation is available or not available. A harm-doing victim was rated lower on expected job performance and higher on desired social distance than a harm-doing nonvictim. When subsequent harm-doing was absent, judgments of a victim and nonvictim did not differ on expected job performance or social distance. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 and revealed that the order in which victimization history and harm-doing information were presented had no effect. Experiment 3 showed that participants desired greater social distance from a harm-doing victim compared to a non-harm-doing victim to the extent they thought the target should have derived benefits from the childhood victimization. Implications for judgments of harm-doers—depending on whether their victimization history is known or not—are considered.     

How do people react to negative procedures? On the moderating role of authority’s biased attitudes

The authors focus on the effects an authority’s apparent inconsistency between persons on judgments of relational treatment and procedural justice following negative procedures (i.e., procedures that people commonly regard as unfair). In Experiment 1, participants responded most negatively following a procedure that denied them, but granted another participant, an opportunity to voice an opinion when the intergroup context raised suspicions of bias (i.e., when both the experimenter and another participant were outgroup members). In Experiment 2, participants responded most negatively when the experimenter had expressed biased attitudes in favor of another participant, but this effect occurred only following procedures that denied participants a voice opportunity. We conclude that authority’s biased attitudes help people to make sense of negative procedure information.     

Changing explicit and implicit attitudes: The case of self-esteem

Three experiments investigated predictions concerning asymmetrical patterns of implicit and explicit self-esteem change. Specifically, we investigated the influence of knowledge about the own self that is momentarily salient as well as the influence of affective valence associated with the self in memory on implicit and explicit self-esteem. The latter was induced by evaluative conditioning, the former by directed thinking about oneself. We found that while evaluative conditioning changed implicit but not explicit self-esteem (Experiment 1), thinking about the own self altered explicit but not implicit self-esteem (Experiment 2). Moreover, in a third experiment, it could be shown that the effect of evaluative conditioning can spill over to the explicit level when participants are asked to focus on their feelings prior to making their self-report judgements (Experiment 3). Implications of our results are discussed in terms of recent controversies regarding dual-process models of attitudes and associative versus propositional modes of information processing.     

What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?

Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features (e.g., requiring reasoning). We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible in a deterministic universe. Experiments 1 and 2 found that people's judgments about whether a behavior was compatible with determinism were not predicted by their judgments about whether that behavior relies on physical processes in the brain and body, is uniquely human, is unpredictable, or involves reasoning. Experiment 3, however, found that a distinction between what we call “active” and “passive” behaviors can explain people's judgments. Experiment 4 extended these findings, showing that we can measure this distinction in several ways and that it is robustly predicted by two different cues. Taken together, these results suggest that people carve up mentally guided behavior into two distinct types—understanding one type to be compatible with determinism, but another type to be fundamentally incompatible with determinism.     

Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.     

Ease-of-learning judgments are based on both processing fluency and beliefs

Processing fluency influences many types of judgments. Some metacognitive research suggests that the influence of processing fluency may be mediated by participants’ beliefs. The current study explores the influence of processing fluency and beliefs on ease-of-learning (EOL) judgments. In two experiments (Exp 1: n?=?94; Exp 2: n?=?146), participants made EOL judgments on 24 six-letter concrete nouns, presented in either a constant condition (high fluency) with upper-case letters (e.g., BUCKET) or an alternating condition (low fluency) with mixed upper- and lower-case letters (e.g., bUcKeT). After judging words individually, participants studied the words and completed a free recall test. Finally, participants indicated what condition they believed made the words more likely to be learned. Results show constant-condition words were judged as more likely to be learned than alternating condition words, but the difference varied with beliefs. Specifically, the difference was biggest when participants believed the constant condition made words more likely to be learned, followed by believing there was no difference, and then believing the alternating condition made words more likely to be learned. Thus, we showed that processing fluency has a direct effect on EOL judgments, but the effect is moderated by beliefs.     

Multisensory temporal order judgments: when two locations are better than one

In Experiment 1, participants were presented with pairs of stimuli (one visual and the other tactile) from the left and/or right of fixation at varying stimulus onset asynchronies and were required to make unspeeded temporal order judgments (TOJs) regarding which modality was presented first. When the participants adopted an uncrossed-hands posture, just noticeable differences (JNDs) were lower (i.e., multisensory TOJs were more precise) when stimuli were presented from different positions, rather than from the same position. This spatial redundancy benefit was reduced when the participants adopted a crossed-hands posture, suggesting a failure to remap visuotactile space appropriately. In Experiment 2, JNDs were also lower when pairs of auditory and visual stimuli were presented from different positions, rather than from the same position. Taken together, these results demonstrate that people can use redundant spatial cues to facilitate their performance on multisensory TOJ tasks and suggest that previous studies may have systematically overestimated the precision with which people can make such judgments. These results highlight the intimate link between spatial and temporal factors in determining our perception of the multimodal objects and events in the world around us.     

个体关于加工流畅性的信念对字体大小效应的影响

本研究考察个体关于加工流畅性的信念对学习判断(Judgment of learning, 简称JOL)的影响, 探讨字体大小效应的产生机制。研究通过两个实验分别考察个体关于“字体大小影响加工流畅性” (实验1)以及“加工流畅性影响记忆效果” (实验2)等信念对字体大小效应的影响。结果发现: 1)当人们相信大字体更流畅(实验1)或者越流畅越好记(实验2)时, 他们在大字体项目上的JOL值显著高于小字体项目上的JOL值; 2)当人们相信小字体更流畅(实验1)或者流畅性与记忆无关(实验2)时, 他们在大字体和小字体项目上的JOL值无显著差异, 字体大小效应消失。上述结果表明, 个体关于加工流畅性的信念是字体大小效应产生的重要原因, 是人们进行学习判断的重要线索。     

Mental control and visual illusions: Toward explaining race-biased weapon misidentifications

People are biased to misidentify harmless objects as weapons when the objects are associated with African Americans (Payne, 2001). Two studies examined the processes underlying this bias. The illusory perception hypothesis argues that stereotypes alter the subjective construal of the object. In contrast, the executive failure hypothesis argues that even when perception of the item is intact, misidentifications can result from failures to control responses. Immediately after making an error, participants were able to accurately express that they had made a mistake via confidence ratings (Experiment 1) and by correcting their judgment (Experiment 2). Subjective confidence judgments were extremely well calibrated to accuracy, and participants virtually never believed their own mistakes. Conditions likely to create errors through both illusions and control failures are discussed.