On the role of attention and emotion in morality: attentional control modulates unrelated disgust in moral judgments

The emotion of disgust can influence people's moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants' disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system.     

A bad taste in the mouth: gustatory disgust influences moral judgment

Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought.     

厌恶情绪影响道德判断的发展研究

厌恶情绪的产生是为了回避潜在的病菌的威胁。研究发现,相比中性情绪状态下,厌恶情绪让人们更反对违背道德的行为,认为这些行为更错。目前,对于厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展还没有相关的研究。本实验以小学一年级,四年级及成人为研究对象来考察厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展。实验中被试被随机分入厌恶启动组和控制组,完成厌恶情绪任务和行为的道德判断任务。研究结果显示,在启动厌恶情绪之后,四年级和成人被试对道德违背行为的错误程度判断更为严格,同时四年级被试对行为的回避程度更高。一年级被试在厌恶情绪和控制条件下道德判断差异不显著。研究结果说明厌恶情绪对道德判断的影响是从无到有逐渐发展的。     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

The arousal model of moral condemnation

Previous research regarding the affective correlates of moral judgment has emphasized that this relation is rooted in the natural properties of discrete emotions, suggesting that specific emotions (e.g., disgust) increase moral condemnations for specific categories of moral violation (e.g. purity violations). In three experiments, we find that arousal increases the severity of moral condemnations, while emotion specificity effects remain absent. Results are compatible with constructivist approaches to emotion and the feelings as information account of social judgment.     

Consequences of agreement versus disagreement on physical disgust: How do people perceive the cleanliness and morality of someone who expresses inappropriate disgust

We examined how people perceived a person who expressed inappropriate physical disgust—a person who was either under-disgusted by physically disgusting stimuli or over-disgusted by neutral stimuli. Participants formed an impression of a target after receiving information on how s/he rated disgusting (Studies 1, 2) or neutral (Studies 2, 3) pictures, and disgusting or angering scenarios (Study 4). Studies 1, 2 and 4 found that a target person who failed to experience disgust was seen as disgusting, immoral (but only to the extent that s/he was also seen unclean), and not socially desirable. A target who rated neutral stimuli as disgusting was not judged as disgusting but was nevertheless judged as immoral and not socially desirable (Studies 2, 3). Our results show that a target whose judgments of physical disgust deviate from one's own by showing either too much or too little disgust is perceived to be immoral.     

The Good and the Gross

Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and pollution, so moral disgust tracks social contamination. I begin by examining the arguments for skepticism about disgust and show that these arguments threaten to overgeneralize and lead to a widespread skepticism about the justifiability of our moral judgments. I then look at the positive arguments for according disgust a role in moral judgment, and suggest that disgust tracks invisible social contagions in much the same way as it tracks invisible physical contagions, thereby serving as a defense against the threat of socio-moral contamination.     

Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust,anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of “contamination”. However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.     

道德判断的外语效应：心理距离的中介与外语熟练度的调节作用

结合建构水平理论,基于多项式加工树构建算法,通过3个实验验证道德外语效应,并尝试探究道德外语效应的可能机制及其边界。实验1的结果表明中文为母语、英文为外语的个体的道德判断受语言的影响。与母语条件相比,外语条件下个体的道义论道德判断更少。实验2的结果进一步表明心理距离可以完全中介语言对道德判断的影响。实验3发现外语熟练度可以调节语言对心理距离的影响。研究结果再次验证了道德外语效应,并表明心理距离的中介作用和外语熟练度的调节作用,拓展了道德外语效应发生机制的可能解释。     

The response model of moral disgust

The philosophical debate over disgust and its role in moral discourse has focused on disgust’s epistemic status: can disgust justify judgments of moral wrongness? Or is it misplaced in the moral domain—irrelevant at best, positively distorting at worst? Correspondingly, empirical research into disgust has focused on its role as a cause or amplifier of moral judgment, seeking to establish how and when disgust either causes us to morally condemn actions, or strengthens our pre-existing tendencies to condemn certain actions. Both of these approaches to disgust are based on a set of assumptions that I call, in what follows, the evidential model of disgust. This paper proposes an alternative model, which I call the response model. Instead of looking at disgust as a cause and justification of judgments of moral wrongness, I will argue that disgust is better understood as a response to wrongness. More precisely, I argue that disgust is a response to norm violations, and that it is (sometimes) a fitting response insofar as norm violations are potentially contagious and therefore pose a threat to the stability and maintenance of norms.     

The divergent effects of fear and disgust on unconscious inhibitory control

Previous studies have shown that negative emotional distracters impair conscious inhibitory control. Recent research has shown that inhibitory control can be triggered unconsciously; therefore, in Experiment 1, we aimed to investigate whether negative emotional distracters affect unconscious inhibitory control. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined whether fearful and disgusting distracters have differential effects on unconscious inhibitory control. Participants were instructed to perform a masked Go/No-Go task superimposed on a negative or neutral image cue (Experiment 1) or on a fearful, disgusting or neutral image cue (Experiment 2). Results showed that negative emotional distracters impaired unconscious inhibitory control; furthermore, disgusting distracters impeded unconscious inhibitory control when compared to fearful ones. This study is the first to provide evidence that fear and disgust may affect unconscious inhibitory control differently. These results expand the understanding of the relationship between emotions and inhibitory control.     

特征整合与加工深度对道德概念容器隐喻联结的影响

提出了隐喻提取假说将隐喻联结的形成和提取进行分离, 并通过3个实验探究了道德概念与容器空间的隐喻联结及其受知觉加工深度和特征整合程度的影响。实验1采用空间Stroop范式, 实验2a和实验2b均采用启动范式, 实验3a和实验3b均采用加入任务要求的Stroop范式。结果发现：(1)在经典Stroop范式中未发现道德概念与容器空间的隐喻联结; (2)在启动范式中发现, 较深知觉加工深度下道德概念与容器空间存在较弱的隐喻联结; (3)在较高特征整合程度的Stroop任务中, 道德概念与容器空间存在较强的隐喻联结。结果表明：道德概念与容器空间存在道德为内、不道德为外的隐喻联结, 这种隐喻联结在映射上表现为双向性, 并且受到特征整合程度和知觉加工深度的影响, 同时也为隐喻提取假说提供了证据支持。     

意图信息在物权判断和道德判断中的作用

意图会影响人们的道德判断，但尚不清楚意图在物权判断中的作用。本研究以156名非法学专业的大学生为被试，通过包含不同意图（恶意/善意/无意）的故事情景，考察了在损失求偿和获益分享情境中人们的物权判断和道德判断。结果发现，在损失求偿情境中，不管是出于善意、恶意还是无意，被试均判断行为者应当赔偿他人损失，但不认为善意和无意的行为者应受谴责。在获益分享情境中，被试仅认为善意的行为者应当分享给他人带来的收益且应当受赞扬，但不认为恶意和无意的行为者应当受到赞扬。综合来看，意图对常人物权判断和道德判断的影响不一致，物权判断比道德判断较少受意图信息的影响，涉及更多的理性思维，反映其具有领域特异性。     

心真的会“软”吗?软硬感受与语义改变道德判断

近年来诸多研究发现,物理变量对心理变量尤其是道德会产生影响,而其机制通常是具身认知与隐喻语言两种。本研究意在通过软硬的具身感受以及软硬的隐喻式意义联系来探讨它对于道德判断的影响。实验一通过操纵被试的软硬身体感受,发现感受到软的被试会比感受到硬的被试更倾向于作出义务论判断。而实验二通过启动被试的软硬语义联接,发现在启动了软的意义之后,对比与启动了硬的意义来说,被试体验到了更少的厌恶情绪,并对同样的道德错误表现得更宽容。这表明软与硬这对物理变量在具身认知与隐喻语言两种机制上都对道德判断起到了影响。     

Mortality salience and morality: thinking about death makes people less utilitarian

According to the dual-process model of moral judgment, utilitarian responses to moral conflict draw on limited cognitive resources. Terror Management Theory, in parallel, postulates that mortality salience mobilizes these resources to suppress thoughts of death out of focal attention. Consequently, we predicted that individuals under mortality salience would be less likely to give utilitarian responses to moral conflicts. Two experiments corroborated this hypothesis. Experiment 1 showed that utilitarian responses to non-lethal harm conflicts were less frequent when participants were reminded of their mortality. Experiment 2 showed that the detrimental effect of mortality salience on utilitarian conflict judgments was comparable to that of an extreme concurrent cognitive load. These findings raise the question of whether private judgment and public debate about controversial moral issues might be shaped by mortality salience effects, since these issues (e.g., assisted suicide) often involve matters of life and death.     

Mad and glad: Musically induced emotions have divergent impact on morals

Moral judgments can be positive or negative: we can judge action as good or wrong. Here we show that good judgments and wrong judgments are influenced by incidental emotions. Using instrumental music as an induction method, we show that anger, but not happiness, increases the tendency to judge actions as wrong (Experiment 1). We also show that happiness increases the tendency to praise actions as both good and obligatory, while anger reduces these judgments (Experiment 2). These findings extend the literature on emotions and moral judgment by demonstrating impact of anger and happiness, and by contrasting goodness and wrongness in their emotional valence. The findings also show that music can have a significant impact on moral judgment. This is important because music is a highly prevalent situational variable. The use of instrumental music may have advantages over other induction techniques because it does not carry specific semantic cues that might encourage people to think about morality.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.