从道德自律到道德自然

道德需要自律,自律无疑优于他律.但自律仍然带有强制性,只不过是用内在强制取代了他律的外在强制.因此,道德不能以自律为极限,而应当超越自律,即由道德自律走向道德自然.道德自然通过对道德自律的扬弃,否定了道德自律中的内在强制因素,但将道德的本质属性予以存留,且将其自由升华至极致,这就造就了没有任何强制的道德以及道德选择中充分的、完全的个体自由.与道德自律相比较,道德自然具有非强制、无意识、不造作等特征.道德自然是一种最高的道德境界,这种道德境界是在人的原初心理基础上,经过实践、反思与情感升华的长期过程而逐渐生成的.     

"日常生活世界"的道德秩序建构:先秦儒家的尝试

日常生活世界的道德秩序对于大多数人而言是理所当然的,但这种道德秩序是如何可能呢?本以先秦儒家的努力来尝试回答此问题：从先秦儒家对传统社会的伦理结构的认识,道德秩序的建构所应对的“欲”、“恶”的基本焦虑,以及传统道德秩序的“仁”—“礼”运行模式等方面来见证日常生活世界道德秩序的稳定性和规范化并非自然而然的,而是有一个自觉努力的建构的过程。     

生活秩序与道德生活的构建

理想的道德生活能否建立,不仅仅在于理想的道德理论的建构,更为重要的是理想的道德理论能否转化为现实的生活秩序。因此,道德是否得到充分重视,道德在社会生活中能否发挥现实的作用,将会直接影响到我们生活的品质。不良生活秩序的存在在一定程度上会消解生活的道德意义,使我们的生活     

道德自觉·道德自信·道德自强

文化三自的提出和阐述对思考道德三自,即道德自觉、道德自信、道德自强有重要启示。道德自觉是指道德对于时代的伦理使命和教化责任要有一个自觉的担当和深切的认同,道德要努力地构建时代的精神高地。道德自信源于对中华文化的自信,表现为在内涵上,相信并坚守着自己道德文化的优势和优越;在外延上,相信并扩大自己道德文化的实力和魅力。道德自强源于它立足于人性内部,来自于人性自身,即道德可以自强是因为道德可以从人性自身汲取永恒的力量。与法律相比道德自身拥有一种自强的力量,拥有一种内在约束力和内在的驱动力。     

道德的博弈:一种伦理学的诠释

当人们借用博弈模型来分析人类活动时,所隐喻的是博弈境遇中凸现出来的人类行为及其合作秩序出现的伦理问题.从霍布斯的"傻子"到休谟的"农夫困境",无不体现伦理语境中对博弈问题的关注,而以协定道德来诠释合作秩序的实现,却又存在着理论上的症结.面对诚实不足和伪装难题,道德的博弈何以可能?诚实不只是作为一种合作性实践的最优策略,更是一种人们意愿践行正义的美德.     

论孔子耻感的道德品性

孔子道德哲学体系中的耻感具有他律与自律相统一的道德品性.当耻感与"礼"相联系时,它注重的是社会的道德评价,以个人与他人的关系为条件,具体表现为道德他律;当耻感与"仁"相关照时,它注重的是主体的道德自觉,以自我行为与道德要求的关系为条件,具体表现为道德自律.在进行社会主义荣辱观教育的过程中,解读孔子自律与他律相统一的耻感品性,对于人们按照社会主导价值观自觉地趋荣避耻具有重要的启迪意义.     

道德焦虑:一种不可或缺的道德情感

道德焦虑在本质上是一种道德情感.道德焦虑与羞耻感以及内疚感相比是更为基本的道德情感,它所需的条件更少.根据人类在远古时期以及幼年时期的情形,我们发现道德焦虑在产生与维持伦理秩序的过程中有重要作用.当进入伦理世界之后,道德焦虑则在主体行为净化和人格升华等方面具有重要的价值.     

道德的法律强制探析

由于存在着道德仅靠自身力量所无法解决的问题 ,而这些问题因其对社会秩序和社会生活的重要性又必须获得解决 ,使得道德的法律强制成为必要。多元背景下道德共识的存在 ,道德与法律共同的问题域以及现代社会的立法民主化机制 ,为道德的法律强制提供了可能。道德法律强制的合理性 ,只有通过对于应当予以法律强制的道德的性质、可强制的道德的范围以及道德法律强制的立法和司法程序的学理分析 ,方可予以证成。     

人性与道德

中西方伦理思想史上关于人性争论的关键,在于没有弄清人性的内涵及其与人的本质之间的关系,从而在从人性到道德的逻辑过渡上出现了问题.本文通过对历史上人性论的批判分析,将人性划分为"实然"与"应然"两个层次,并指出:人性的两个层次都是道德的基础,二者分别从不同的层面为道德的产生准备了条件.     

科技工作者角色道德意识及其培育

科技工作者的角色道德意识既是对其角色责任、伦理期待和道德规范认知的前提和基础,又是对科技行为进行伦理调控和道德人格塑造的内在动力.因此,在角色扮演过程中,科技工作者必须深刻理解和把握自己所扮演角色的伦理道德要求,形成对以权利和责任为核心的道德原则和道德规范的自觉意识.只有对自身角色的道德要求有明确认知与觉解,才能自觉按照与角色要求相适应的道德规范、道德原则进行道德实践,进而养成角色道德自觉.     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.