决策任务类型与结果框架对风险决策的影响

本研究考察生命和金钱问题下,获得和损失框架中决策任务类型对风险决策的影响。采用2（任务领域：生命、金钱）×2（决策任务类型：经验、描述）×2（结果框架：获得、损失）被试间设计,使用卡方检验及logistic回归分析后发现：生命和金钱问题下,个体在直接给出方案可能结果的描述性决策中仅表现出损失框架下的风险偏好;在通过自主查看方案可能结果的经验性决策中未发现结果框架作用。描述−经验差距一致性存在于生命和金钱问题中。     

得失框架效应的分离—— 来自收益与损失型跨期选择的研究

本研究通过创设收益和损失跨期选择情境, 采用不同表征方式(得框架、失框架)的跨期选择任务, 分别探讨了收益和损失情境下的跨期选择是否存在得失框架效应, 及其是否会受任务难度的影响。结果发现：(1)收益型跨期选择只在任务容易时存在得失框架效应, 与失框架相比, 被试在得框架下选择即时获益的概率更高; 任务困难时得失框架效应消失(实验a); (2)损失型跨期选择中不存在得失框架效应(实验b)。结果表明, 得失框架效应在损、益型跨期选择中出现了分离, 收益型跨期选择中的得失框架效应的内在认知机制很可能与风险决策中的框架效应类似并且是一种较为初级的认知加工过程。     

不同乐观水平大学生的框架效应研究

采用乐观人格倾向问卷筛选乐观水平低组（96名）和高组（99名）大学生,探讨不同乐观水平大学生在生命救助、奖学金申请、娱乐金钱3种决策任务领域上的框架效应及其在性别、专业的特点。结果发现：（1）不同乐观水平大学生在不同决策任务领域上的框架效应特点不同,乐观水平低组和高组大学生在生命救助问题上表现为偏向于风险的单向框架效应,乐观水平高组大学生在娱乐金钱问题上倾向于风险寻求;（2）乐观水平高的男大学生在3种决策任务领域上均倾向于风险寻求,低乐观水平的女大学生在生命救助问题上表现为偏向于风险的单向框架效应;（3）     

青少年决策中的风险选择框架效应

以181名青少年(初二、高二、大二)为被试,探究其在不同决策领域(生命、娱乐、学业)的风险选择框架效应及其在年级、风险偏好水平上的特点.结果表明:(1)框架效应程度与决策领域有关,被试在生命和娱乐领域的决策问题上倾向于风险寻求.(2)不同年级被试的决策结果受问题框架的影响,大学生在生命问题上倾向于风险寻求,初中生在娱乐问题上倾向于风险寻求,高中生在学业领域上倾向于风险规避.(3)不同风险偏好水平被试的决策结果受问题框架的影响,风险偏好水平高的被试在生命、娱乐问题上倾向于风险寻求,风险偏好水平低的被试在学业问题上倾向于风险规避.     

认知需求和认知闭合需求对风险决策中外语效应的影响

外语效应指相比于母语背景,个体在外语背景下风险决策偏差会降低。针对影响外语效应的因素研究大多聚焦于外部因素和与个体外语水平相关的因素,少有研究探讨认知风格的作用。本研究通过524名成人被试,探索认知需求和认知闭合需求对外语效应的影响。结果表明:(1)风险决策中存在外语效应,相比于母语背景,外语背景下框架效应被削弱,且个体更偏向风险寻求。(2)对于认知需求和认知闭合需求都高或都低的个体,语言类型会影响风险决策,在母语环境下倾向于风险规避,在外语环境下倾向于风险寻求;而对于认知需求和认知闭合需求高低不一致的个体,语言类型对其风险决策倾向的影响不显著。本研究为认知风格如何综合影响风险决策提供了进一步的证据。     

得失框架下时间和风险对跨期选择的影响

本研究通过设置获得框架和损失框架下跨期选择情景,采用选择滴定法计算个体的主观值,分别探讨了跨期选择是否存在得损失框架效应,以及是否会受时间与风险的影响。结果发现:(1)跨期选择存在得损失框架效应,与损失框架相比,被试在获得框架下选择近期目标的概率更高、反应更快、主观值更小;(2)时间、风险会和得损失框架效应交互影响跨期选择。在获得框架下,随着时间点的延长,低风险时被试才更有可能做远期选择;在损失框架下,随着时间点的缩短,中高等风险时被试才更有可能做近期选择。结果表明框架效应、时间与风险可以影响跨期选择,支持了双系统评价理论。     

权力、任务框架对自我和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响

采用情境回忆任务启动被试的权力,并引入收益和损失两种任务框架,综合考察权力高低、任务框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)在为他人决策中,启动高权力被试有更强的风险偏好,而自我决策中,高、低权力启动组被试风险偏好上无显著差异;(2)在为他人决策中,被试在收益框架和损失框架下的风险偏好差异不显著,而在自我决策中,损失框架下的风险偏好显著高于收益框架;(3)低权力启动的被试,在损失框架下,为他人决策的风险偏好要小于自我决策,而在收益框架下差异不显著;高权力启动的被试无论在收益框架还是损失框架,自我-他人风险决策都不存在显著差异。     

选项框架和认知负载对风险决策的影响

本研究采用实验法探讨了选项框架和认知负载对风险决策的影响。结果发现:(1)不同的认知负载条件下,被试在正向框架下表现出风险回避,负向框架下表现出风险寻求,出现了框架效应现象;(2)相对于认知负载条件下,被试在无认知负载的负向框架下更偏好于风险选项,而正向框架下的风险偏好没有显著变化,即无认知负载条件下框架效应较强。这表明,框架效应不仅仅是启发式系统作用的结果,分析式系统也在其中发挥着重要的作用。     

眼睛注视线索对经济领域风险决策的影响：基于框架效应范式

采用基金投资框架任务,结合眼动技术考察眼睛注视线索与框架类型对风险决策的影响。结果发现：（1）消极眼睛注视线索促进了被试在损失框架下的风险寻求行为,控制组与积极、中性、消极眼睛组的行为结果无显著差异;（2）以均字注视次数为指标的眼动结果表明,积极眼睛组和中性眼睛组对确定损益的关注差异大于对风险损益的关注差异;消极眼睛组和控制组被试对损失的关注大于对收益的关注,对确定项的关注大于对风险项的关注,但两者不存在交互作用。消极眼睛注视线索可能改变了个体对风险性和确定性的感知,并因此影响了人们的风险决策行为,规避消极情绪线索可能有助于减少经济决策中的风险寻求行为。     

任务框架、损益值大小对自恋者风险偏好的影响

以234名大学生为被试,探讨了任务框架、损益值大小对显性/隐性自恋者风险偏好的影响。结果表明：(1)框架效应较稳定的出现在中等风险水平情境下,且在大损益值条件下更易出现。(2)在获益框架下,被试为小金额决策更冒险,在损失框架下,则为大金额决策更冒险。(3)在损失框架下,高显性自恋者比低显性自恋者更为冒险,在获益框架下,高隐性自恋者比低隐性自恋者更为保守;高隐性自恋者的风险偏好受到任务框架和损益值大小的共同影响。     

心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响

解释水平理论是一种解释心理距离怎样影响个体的思维决策的社会认知理论。研究基于解释水平理论,探查了心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响。实验从心理距离的四个维度入手,每个维度均采用2（解释水平高、低）×2（正框架、负框架）的被试间设计,用于检验解释水平是否调节框架对被试决策任务的选择。结果表明,当心理距离越远,解释水平越高时,被试产生明显的框架效应;而当心理距离越近,解释水平越低时,框架效应明显减弱。除了大概率情况下的框架效应削弱至不显著,其余维度的高、低解释水平下的框架效应均显著。     

The construction of risk in relationships: The role of framing in decisions about intimate relationships

Two studies examined the applicability of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) notion of “framing” to decision making in romantic relationships. Using scenarios about hypothetical relationships, the results of Study 1 demonstrated that framing objectively identical alternatives in terms of losses versus gains affected participants' preferences for risky versus cautious actions. Furthermore, adult attachment style was found to moderate the impact of this framing effect. Study 2 examined individual differences in people's spontaneous tendencies to frame their feelings about their actual relationships in terms of losses or gains. Consistent with the findings of Study 1, attachment style was reliably associated with spontaneous framing. Secure individuals were most likely to represent their feelings in terms of a “gains frame” whereas fearful individuals were most likely to represent their feelings in terms of a “loss frame.”     

Framing in terms of ‘high-risk groups’ versus ‘risky practices’ and prognoses of HIV infection

A quasi-experimental field-study (n = 314) investigated the consequences of framing the problem of HIV infection in terms of ‘risky practices’ versus ‘high risk groups’. It was reasoned that respondents in the risky practices frame would be more conscious of the risks to people in general leading them to make more pessimistic prognoses of HW spread than those for whom the issue had been framed in terms of high risk groups. This hypothesis was strongly supported on three related indices, and results also indicated more pessimistic prognoses by female than male respondents. The implications of these findings for framing AIDS related issues are discussed.     

Choice,Rating, and Ranking: Framing Effects with Different Response Modes

In a typical risky choice framing task, people have to choose among two options, which are either positively or negatively framed. Choices in the two framing conditions are then compared. However, different preferences between the conditions can be due to changes in the evaluation of the single constituent options or due to specific processes triggered by the choice task. In order to clarify the source of the framing effect, we investigate the effect with different response modes: choice, rating, and ranking. The rating and ranking findings indicate that what is commonly called a risky choice framing effect is actually a framing effect that changes the evaluation of only the riskless option, although there is little or no effect on the risky option. According to these findings, risky choice framing might be construed as a process of attribute framing, which is independent of risk preference in choice contexts. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience

Prospect theory predicts that people tend to prefer the sure option when choosing between two alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer the risky option when choosing between two alternatives framed as losses. Related research investigated the impact of emphasizing the probability of the positive outcome of a risky option versus emphasizing the probability of the negative outcome on preference. Most of these studies on the effects of "outcome salience" related their findings to prospect theory′s framing effect. It will be argued that most of these studies inaccurately applied prospect theory to explain the obtained effects and that these might be better understood in terms of salience. In four experiments we test the predictions that (1) choosing between two options in a gain problem will lead to decreased risk preference as compared to loss problems and (2) emphasizing the probability of positive outcomes of a risky option leads to increased preference for this option compared to emphasizing the probability of negative outcomes. Results confirm the impact of both prospect framing and outcome salience and indicate that these effects should be understood in terms of distinct, independent processes.     

Risky decision making across three arenas of choice: are younger and older adults differently susceptible to framing effects?

In the present study, the authors investigated the effects of framing of options on risky decision making in groups of younger adults (M = 23.8 years, n = 192) and older adults (M = 69.1 years, n = 192). The participants were assigned to one of three scenarios varying in the goods at stake (human lives, paintings, money). The authors observed a majority preference in favor of the risky options after negative, but not positive framing. They also found, as they had predicted, that the type of framing effect varied across scenarios, with a bidirectional framing effect for the life-death scenario and unidirectional (risk averse) framing effects when public property (paintings) or personal property (money) were at stake. It is important to note that these choice preference patterns were highly similar across the age groups, which reinforced the conclusion that younger and older adults are equally susceptible to framing effects.     

Do military decision makers behave as predicted by prospect theory?

Four experiments were conducted to explore the robustness of risky choice framing among military decision makers. In the first experiment the original version of the Asian disease problem was administered. In contrast to Tversky and Kahneman's ( 1981 ) original findings, military decision makers were not influenced by the gain and loss framing. They demonstrated risk‐seeking behavior in both domains. In the second experiment, we administered a military version of the Asian disease problem. We found a significant framing effect, but it was unidirectional: The decision makers were risk seeking in both domains, but significantly more risk seeking in the loss domain. To explore the strength of this risk‐seeking preference, we altered the problem in a third experiment, making the risky alternative 12.5% less attractive than the certain one. Again, we found risk‐seeking behavior in both domains. Finally, we explored reasons for these deviations from prospect theory by comparing the responses of business students and military officers. In this analysis, we observed significantly higher levels of self‐efficacy in the military sample, as compared to the civil sample, and that the self‐efficacy influenced risk seeking only in the military sample. In a post hoc analysis we also found that years of education reduced risk‐seeking preference. Implications and directions for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Protected values: No omission bias and no framing effects

Previous studies have suggested that people holding protected values (PVs) show a bias against harmful acts, as opposed to harmful omissions (omission bias). In the present study, we (1) investigated the relationship between PVs and acts versus omissions in risky choices, using a paradigm in which act and omission biases were presented in a symmetrical manner, and (2) examined whether people holding PVs respond differently to framing manipulations. Participants were given environmental scenarios and were asked to make choices between actions and omissions. Both the framing of the outcomes (positive vs. negative) and the outcome certainty (risky vs. certain) were manipulated. In contrast to previous studies, PVs were linked to preferences for acts, rather than for omissions. PVs were more likely to be associated with moral obligations to act than with moral prohibitions against action. Strikingly, people with strong PVs were immune to framing; participants with few PVs showed robust framing effects.     

On undesirable consequences of thinking: framing effects as a function of substantive processing

Three studies investigate the impact of effortful constructive processing on framing effects. The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred this option when the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, framing effects were most pronounced when conditions allowed for an effortful constructive processing style (i.e., substantive processing). This impact of decision frames varied when decision time served as an indicator for the elaboration extent (Study 1), and also when processing motivation (accountability; Study 2) and processing ability (decision time; Study 3) were manipulated. Moreover, effortful processing did not increase framing effects when contextual cues reduced the necessity for constructive thinking (Study 1). We suggest that decision frames may take on very different roles as a function of the ambiguity of the decision problem, and the degree and style of processing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.