最后通牒博弈中提议者情绪预测偏差对公平决策的影响:公平感知的作用

为探讨提议者情绪预测偏差对公平决策的影响以及其中介机制,采用了两轮最后通牒博弈提议者实验任务,第一轮测量分配方案被接受和拒绝的情绪预测偏差,第二轮测量提议者的分配方案。研究结果表明:(1)提议者情绪预测偏差影响公平决策;(2)公平感知在提议者情绪预测偏差与公平决策间起部分中介作用。研究认为,提议者对积极结果的情绪预测偏差,会降低其公平感知,进而降低其分配方案公平性; 提议者对消极结果的情绪预测偏差,会提高其公平感知,进而增加其分配方案公平性。     

行为意图信息对广义互惠行为的影响

广义互惠是指个体以他人对待自己的方式去对待其他陌生人。本研究通过独裁者博弈任务,考察了行为意图信息对广义互惠的影响。结果发现:(1)在慷慨分配情境中,行为有意条件下被试分配给陌生人的金钱显著多于无意图条件,而自私分配情境则相反;(2)只有负性意图条件下的被试,分配的金钱显著少于无意图条件,而后者与正性意图条件分配数额差异不显著。这表明行为意图信息能够调节广义互惠行为,且负性意图作用强于正性意图。     

不同分配情境下儿童公平行为的发展

为探究儿童在不同利益对比情境以及与己利益无关情境中的公平行为,研究呈现了自我任务的劣势博弈、优势博弈、冲突博弈以及第三方任务博弈四种分配情境。自我任务中儿童需要为自己与另一名匿名儿童迫选方案,第三方任务中则需为两名匿名儿童迫选方案。结果发现:(1)劣势博弈中所有年龄组均倾向于选择公平方案,而非劣势方案;(2)优势博弈中,8岁、10岁组选择公平方案的人显著多于优势方案,而4岁、6岁组均无显著差异;(3)冲突博弈中,4岁、6岁组选择优势方案的人显著多于劣势方案,而8岁、10岁组均无显著差异;(4)第三方博弈中, 8岁、10岁组选择公平方案的人显著多于不公平方案,而4岁、6岁组均无显著差异。这表明,4岁~6岁儿童尚未真正获得公平观念,且以获得个人利益为主;而8岁是真正获得公平观念的转折年龄,8~10岁儿童对人对己均坚持公平原则,且表现出利他倾向。     

行为意图与行为结果的匹配关系对儿童道德情绪判断及归因影响的实验研究

运用故事情境的临床访谈方法,考察了不同匹配情境对4-6岁儿童道德情绪判断及归因的影响.结果表明(1)当行为意图与行为结果匹配时,即便4岁幼儿也能做出正确的道德和情绪判断;当两者非匹配时,儿童的道德判断和情绪判断都不稳定;(2)在情绪归因过程中,年幼儿童以结果定向为主,年长儿童以意图定向为主;(3)4-6岁儿童在情绪判断任务中不存在年龄差异;(4)道德情境的冲突性因素影响了幼儿的道德情绪判断及归因.     

4-6岁儿童公平意图的发展研究

公平行为是儿童道德发展的重要内容。本研究采取博弈实验范式来考察学龄前儿童公平意图的发展情况。以往对儿童公平意图的博弈研究中,选取的儿童年龄跨度大且研究范式并不适应学龄前儿童的认知特点,而学龄前期可能正是公平意图开始发生及发展的时期。因此本研究选取108名4-6岁学龄前儿童,在实验一中采用独裁者博弈(DG),实验二中改进mini-最后通牒博弈(mini-UG),分别从提议者和回应者的角度考察学龄前儿童公平意图的发展情况。结果表明:4岁儿童已经能初步辨识对方的公平意图,但分配结果的公平性在他们行为决策时占的比重更大;5到6岁期间公平意图的影响更大,是儿童公平意图发展的一个关键时期。     

身体姿势启动的内隐权力感对公平决策的影响

已有研究表明, 扩张身体姿势可启动个体的权力感。基于具身认知的视角, 实验1考察身体姿势对免惩罚游戏的提议者进行金钱分配时的影响, 实验2和实验3分别考察最后通牒游戏、免惩罚游戏的回应者在蜷缩和扩张姿势下对各种分配类型方案的拒绝率。结果表明, 与蜷缩姿势相比, 扩张姿势使个体更倾向于在免惩罚游戏提议者角色时做出更多的利己不公平分配, 同时使个体更倾向于拒绝最后通牒游戏和免惩罚游戏中的不公平分配。本研究证明了扩张姿势启动的权力感可影响个体的公平决策。     

不同社会情境对儿童奖惩分配公平性的影响

为探讨社会排斥和社会接纳情境下儿童奖惩分配公平性,研究采用个体-偶然排斥范式和第三方奖惩分配范式,对8~9岁儿童奖惩分配公平性行为和奖惩分配公平性判断进行研究,结果发现：（1）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于社会接纳组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于社会接纳组。9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于8岁组;（2）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于社会接纳组,9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性判断显著低于8岁组。结论：社会情境影响儿童的奖惩分配公平性,在排斥情境下,8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性明显提升;8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性随年龄增长有上升趋势。     

分配对象和分配情境对4～6岁幼儿分配行为的影响

为了考察分配对象和分配情境对4～6岁儿童分配行为的影响,向儿童呈现合作和竞争两种分配情境,对150名4～6岁儿童在合作和竞争情境中面向不同分配对象的分配行为进行了研究。研究结果发现：(1)5～6岁儿童比4～5岁儿童能够主动分配给他人更多的资源;(2)分配对象和分配情境对4～6岁儿童分配行为具有显著影响;(3)分配情境和分配对象具有交互效应,即相比竞争情境,儿童在合作情境中表现出了更强的朋友偏向效应;(4)在不同的分配情境中,儿童的分配行为理由具有显著差异。     

2~3岁儿童在分配情境下的公平敏感性

公平敏感性是指个体对感知到的公平和不公平的稳定而个性化的反应, 其表现为个体对公平的不同偏好。本研究旨在考察2~3岁儿童公平敏感性发展特点, 并进一步探究分配情境、分配数量和分配结果等因素对儿童公平敏感性的影响。实验1采用VOE范式, 在第三方任务情境下, 考察130名2~3岁儿童公平敏感性的发展特点, 结果发现在VOE范式下, 2~3岁儿童公平敏感性随着年龄增长而上升, 3岁~3岁3个月儿童的公平敏感性发展最明显。实验2, 选取60名处于公平敏感性发展最明显的3岁~3岁3个月的儿童比较其在不同分配情境、分配数量以及分配结果下的注视时间差异。结果表明, 在有接受者情境下儿童公平敏感性显著高于无接受者情境下的公平敏感性, 并且公平敏感性受分配数量的影响。     

儿童在不同卷入情境下基于资源价值的分配行为特点：内群体偏爱的作用

为探究不同卷入情境下儿童基于资源价值的分配行为特点以及内群体偏爱在其中的作用, 呈现给儿童两种实验情境：实验1, 134名5~8岁儿童在第一方情境下与来自内、外群体的一名儿童分配不同价值的物品, 结果发现7~8岁儿童公平分配比例与5~6岁儿童无显著差异; 实验2, 130名5~8岁儿童在第三方情境下给来自特定群体的两名儿童分配资源, 结果发现7~8岁儿童公平分配比例显著高于5~6岁儿童。两个实验均发现儿童的分配行为表现出内群体偏爱, 5~6岁儿童比7~8岁儿童更明显。并且, 5~6岁女生比男生有更明显的内群体偏爱, 但在7~8岁组无性别差异。此外, 只有7~8岁儿童的公平分配行为表现出卷入情境上的差异, 他们在第三方情境比第一方情境下更能做出公平分配, 但5~6岁儿童的公平分配行为并无情境差异。综上可见, 比起年幼儿童, 年长儿童基于资源价值的公平行为发展得更好, 并且在两种卷入情境下受内群体偏爱的影响均更小。     

Gut feelings and the reaction to perceived inequity: The interplay between bodily responses, regulation, and perception shapes the rejection of unfair offers on the ultimatum game

It has been robustly demonstrated using the ultimatum game (UG) that individuals frequently reject unfair financial offers even if this results in a personal cost. One influential hypothesis for these rejections is that they reflect an emotional reaction to unfairness that overrides purely economic decision processes. In the present study, we examined whether the interplay between bodily responses, bodily regulation, and bodily perception ("interoception") contributes to emotionally driven rejection behavior on the UG. Offering support for bodily feedback theories, interoceptive accuracy moderated the relationship between changes in electrodermal activity to proposals and the behavioral rejection of such offers. Larger electrodermal responses to rejected relative to accepted offers predicted greater rejection in those with accurate interoception but were unrelated to rejection in those with poor interoception. Although cardiovascular responses during the offer period were unrelated to rejection rates, greater resting heart rate variability (linked to trait emotion regulation capacity) predicted reduced rejection rates of offers. These findings help clarify individual differences in reactions to perceived unfairness, support previous emotion regulation deficit accounts of rejection behavior, and suggest that the perception and regulation of bodily based emotional biasing signals ("gut feelings") partly shape financial decision making on the UG.     

从博弈游戏看儿童经济决策行为的发展

国外有研究借助最后通谍（UG）和独裁者博弈（DG）探查了儿童的决策行为,他们发现,随着儿童年龄的增长,他们分配给对方的金额呈上升趋势,即公平和分享行为随年龄增加。儿童的经济决策行为和社会化不可避免要受文化影响。研究探查了中国文化下小学三、六年级、初二、大学一年级四个年龄组学生在最后通谍（UG）和独裁者博弈（DG）中的经济决策行为发展。研究同时比较了个体决策和群体决策的差异。结果发现：儿童在两个博弈中的提议金额都显示出公平和分享行为,随着儿童年龄的增长,儿童在UG和随后进行的DG中的提议分配金额呈减少趋势。这个发现与以往国外研究结果明显不同。两个博弈的顺序对UG没有影响,但对DG有影响;儿童的个体决策和群体决策结果没有显示显著差异     

社会距离和性别对公平关注的影响

本研究使用单次匿名最后通牒博弈任务，采用2（性别: 男性, 女性）×3（社会距离: 自我决策, 替朋友决策, 替他人决策）×5（提议类型: 1/9, 2/8, 3/7, 4/6, 5/5）的混合实验设计，通过操作反应者的不同社会距离，考察资产分配情境下自我-他人决策的性别差异。研究结果发现：（1）相比于自我决策和替朋友决策，女性被试替他人决策时更愿意接受提议1/9，2/8和3/7，而提议4/6和5/5的接受率不受社会距离的影响；男性被试中社会距离和提议类型的交互作用不显著；（2）不平等提议的反应时随社会距离增加而逐渐降低，而平等提议的反应时不受社会距离的调节；（3）替他人决策时女性的接受阈限显著低于男性，而自我决策及替朋友决策时接受阈限不存在性别差异。     

The role of Social Value Orientation in response to an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game

Two studies examined the influence of Social Value Orientation (SVO) on the decision to accept or reject an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game (UG). In both studies, participants with different SVOs (Prosocials, Individualists and Competitors), measured about 3 weeks prior to the UG, responded to an offer of “$8 for Proposer, $2 for Participant”, believing it came from a human Proposer. In both studies Prosocials accepted the offer more frequently than Individualists and Competitors, who did not differ. Further, we found that SVO differences in positive emotions in response to the offer (Study 1), and positive cognitions toward the offer and the proposer (Study 2) underlie the SVO effect on UG decision, suggesting a role for SVO differences in the utilization of emotion regulation strategies. Implications of the present findings for “altruistic punishment” and “emotions/self-regulation” accounts as motivators of UG decisions are discussed.     

Why do people reject unintended inequity? Responders' rejection in a truncated ultimatum game

Rejection of an inequitable and yet unintended outcome in a truncated ultimatum game was examined in an experiment with 46 undergraduate students (27 men and 19 women) from a large national university in Japan. In an ultimatum game, one of two players, the proposer, makes an offer to divide a fixed-sum of money. The other player, the responder, decides whether to accept or reject the offer. When the responder rejects the proposer's offer, neither of the two players receives a reward. Previous work examining the behavior of participants in the truncated ultimatum game employed strategy method in their experimental design. We examined whether these previous findings would be replicated in an experimental design that did not use the strategy method and instead used the standard one-shot game. Seven out of 46 responders given an inequitable offer rejected it, replicating prior results with the strategy method. We further found that subjects who rejected an offer that was involuntary and yet inequitable did not over-attribute intentions to the proposer's involuntary behavior more strongly than did acceptors. These findings strongly suggest that aversion to inequity is the explanation for the subjects' rejection of the inequitable offer.     

Framing decisions: Hypothetical and real

This paper addresses the general issue of whether the practice of investigating human decision making in hypothetical choice situations is at all warranted, or under what conditions. A particularly relevant factor that affects the match between real decisions and hypothetical decisions is the importance of a decision’s consequences. In the literature experimental gambles tend to confound the reality of the decision situation with the size of the payoffs: hypothetical decisions tend to offer large payoffs, and real decisions tend to offer only small payoffs. Using the well-known framing effect (a tendency of risk-aversion for gains and of risk-seeking for losses) we find that the framing effect depends on payoff size but hypothetical choices match real choices for small as well as large payoffs. These results appear paradoxical unless size of incentive is clearly distinguished from the reality status of decision (real versus hypothetical). Since the field lacks a general theory of when hypothetical decisions match real decisions, the discussion presents an outline for developing such a theory.     

孤独症个体的公平决策：心理理论和自我/他人情绪识别的作用

研究通过最后通牒任务,考查孤独症儿童在公平任务中的决策,以及心理理论和识别自我/他人情绪对决策的影响。29名孤独症儿童和三组对照组儿童参加实验结果发现,孤独症儿童在任务中面对不同分配比例的接受率（2:8、3:7）与对照组之间存在显著差异。心理理论能力和自我情绪识别都与决策存在相关：当处于不公平的情况下（1:9、2:8、3:7）,通过心理理论任务的孤独症儿童才会拒绝接受不公平分配,儿童也会感觉到不高兴并且做出拒绝的决定。     

Conflict and the Stochastic-Dominance Principle of Decision Making

One of the key principles underlying rational models of decision making is the idea that the decision maker should never choose an action that is stochastically dominated by another action. In the study reported in this article, violations of stochastic dominance frequently occurred when the payoffs produced by two actions were negatively correlated (in conflict), but no violations occurred when the payoffs were positively correlated (no conflict). This finding is contrary to models which assume that choice probability depends on the utility of each action, and the utility for an action depends solely on its own payoffs and probabilities. This article also reports, for the first time ever, the distribution of response times observed in a risky decision task. Both the violations of stochastic dominance and the response time distributions are explained in terms of a dynamic theory of decision making called multiattribute decision field theory.     

议价博弈决策的权利认知效应

在议价博弈中,决策者可能存在因对自己及其他参与者拥有权利的认识程度不同,从而影响其策略选择及决策行为的现象。为验证该“权利认知效应”的存在,用实验法考察了240名不同年龄被试在两种议价博弈任务——最后通牒和纳什议价中的决策表现,结果发现：（1）6到12岁儿童和大学生中均存在权利认知效应;（2）随着年龄增长,受权利认知影响的人数呈现逐渐减少的趋势;（3）在议价博弈中,儿童对分配权的认识程度高于对否决权的认知。     

Rapid decisions from experience

In many everyday decisions, people quickly integrate noisy samples of information to form a preference among alternatives that offer uncertain rewards. Here, we investigated this decision process using the Flash Gambling Task (FGT), in which participants made a series of choices between a certain payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. For each choice, participants experienced the distribution of payoffs via rapid samples updated every 50 ms. We show that people can make these rapid decisions from experience and that the decision process is consistent with a sequential sampling process. Results also reveal a dissociation between these preferential decisions and equivalent perceptual decisions where participants had to determine which alternatives contained more dots on average. To account for this dissociation, we developed a sequential sampling rank-dependent utility model, which showed that participants in the FGT attended more to larger potential payoffs than participants in the perceptual task despite being given equivalent information. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of computational models of preferential choice and a more complete understanding of experience-based decision making.