第三方惩罚中的规范错觉：基于公正世界信念的解释

惩罚规范在一定程度上会影响个体的惩罚行为, 但个体对惩罚规范的感知与实际规范之间可能存在差异, 这被称为规范错觉。为了更好地从这一角度理解第三方惩罚, 我们需要回答的是：第三方惩罚中是否存在规范错觉?如果存在, 其方向如何?会对个体自身的惩罚行为产生何种影响?实验1 (N = 449)和实验2 (N = 134)的结果表明, 在违规情境中, 人们往往低估了他人的惩罚水平, 这导致自身较低的惩罚行为。实验3 (N = 164)和实验4 (N = 284)进一步发现, 较弱的公正世界信念导致人们对他人惩罚水平的低估, 从而影响了自身的惩罚行为, 而社会距离调节了公正世界信念对规范错觉的影响。上述结果表明, 规范错觉会受到内部(公正世界信念)和外部(社会距离)两个参照点的影响, 同时也在一定程度上说明第三方惩罚是一种注重维护规范的积极行为、而非注重个人收益的策略行为。     

主观社会阶层正向预测利他性惩罚

利他性惩罚是指个体自行承担成本来惩罚违规者的行为, 它受到社会阶层的影响。研究1利用2013年中国综合社会调查数据发现阶层显著正向预测利他性惩罚。研究2 (N = 450)基于真实生活事件的调查表明, 惩罚成本调节了阶层对惩罚的影响：在成本较高的直接惩罚中, 阶层正向预测惩罚; 而在成本较低的间接惩罚中, 这种作用不再显著。研究3 (N = 232)通过操纵阶层与成本进一步证实惩罚成本的调节作用：高阶层者比低阶层者更有可能做出利他性惩罚, 但两者的差距在高成本条件下更突出。研究4 (N = 125)综合考察了阶层影响惩罚的心理机制, 多层线性分析显示：惩罚成本较低时, 阶层通过公正世界信念来间接影响惩罚, 而成本较高时, 阶层直接正向影响了惩罚。上述结果意味着利他性惩罚受到个体社会阶层的影响, 同时也在一定程度上说明在利他性惩罚中基于成本-收益的策略性考虑并非完全缺席。     

拥挤影响消费者情绪和购物反应的元分析

拥挤是由社会(人群)运动空间和物理空间受限引发的一种主观感受和客观状态。随着消费者所处的环境越来越拥挤, 近些年来消费者行为领域对拥挤的关注逐渐增多, 但目前的研究结论并不一致。本文通过元分析方法获得了38个研究、81个样本的149个效应值, 分别探讨了两类拥挤对消费者情绪和购物反应(趋近型购物反应与回避型购物反应)的影响, 并尝试找出以往研究结果表现出异质性的原因。从情绪层面来看, 社会拥挤正向影响消费者的消极情绪, 负向影响自主感知; 空间拥挤负向影响消费者积极情绪, 正向影响消极情绪。从购物反应层面来看, 社会拥挤会显著增强消费者的趋近型购物反应(ρ = 0.208, N = 28624), 增加风险规避, 并负向影响消费者的购物态度和意愿(ρ = -0.135, N = 10094); 空间拥挤对消费者趋近型购物反应的影响并不显著, 但能负向影响回避型购物反应(ρ = -0.409, N = 3223)。进一步的调节分析发现, 购物环境类型、研究情境的真实性、是否为学生样本、以及样本来源于西方国家还是东方国家等能够调节拥挤对消费者部分情绪和购物反应的影响。本文最后讨论了研究结果, 并对管理实践和未来研究提供了建议。     

道德与关系惩罚对初中生公共物品困境中合作行为的影响

本研究模拟公共物品两难困境范式,以初中生为被试,通过两个实验分别考察道德惩罚和关系惩罚对不同性别和社会价值取向个体合作行为的影响。结果发现:(1)两种惩罚条件下初中生的合作水平均显著高于无惩罚条件,但当惩罚撤除后只有关系惩罚条件下的效应还存在;(2)初中女生在两种惩罚条件下的合作水平均显著高于无惩罚条件,而男生只在关系惩罚条件下出现该情况;(3)亲社会取向与亲自我取向初中生在两种惩罚阶段均表现出更高的合作水平,但在惩罚撤除后,只有亲社会取向者保持了高合作水平。这些结果表明,关系惩罚的作用较为持久,且对男生的影响更为突出,不过两种惩罚在亲社会取向者身上均显现出延后效应。     

道德外语效应及其调节变量：来自元分析的证据

同一个道德决策情景使用外语(相比母语)呈现时, 个体会表现出更强的功利性倾向, 即道德外语效应。随着研究的深入, 结论并不一致。本研究运用元分析方法首次探讨了语言类型(母语vs. 外语)对道德判断中功利性倾向的影响, 并分析了相关的调节变量。通过文献检索及梳理, 共有19篇文献46个独立样本97个效应量符合元分析标准(N = 9672)。结果显示存在较小但稳定的道德外语效应(g = 0.23); 调节效应分析表明, 道德外语效应受故事类型的影响, 在个人道德两难故事中存在较小但稳定的外语效应(g = 0.32), 但在非个人道德两难故事(g = 0.11)与日常道德评价故事中(g = 0.12)不存在外语效应; 非个人道德两难故事中的外语效应受记分方式的影响, 多点记分在该故事类型下存在效应(g = 0.27), 二点记分不存在效应(g = 0.05); 性别和语系类型没有显著的调节效应。这些结果表明语言类型对个体面对道德困境时的选择倾向有一定程度的影响, 道德故事类型和记分方式在未来的研究中需要加以考虑。     

第三方惩罚的演化与认知机制

第三方惩罚一般是指当违反社会规范的行为与自身利益无关时,个体牺牲自我利益来惩罚违规者的行为。最近的研究发现,对于个体而言,第三方惩罚是一种具有适应性的信号,包括建立良好的声誉以及威慑违规者。不同情境下第三方惩罚的功能有所差异,它是一种特殊的利他行为。第三方惩罚依赖于多个系统,涉及情绪反应、共情等社会认知能力以及认知控制等中央执行能力。探讨该行为的演化和认知机制也能贡献于个体、群体和人际层面的社会心理服务工作。     

第三方惩罚对合作行为的影响:基于社会规范激活的解释

第三方惩罚对合作行为的影响有两面性,可能与其激活的社会规范有关。通过有/无第三方的独裁者博弈范式,研究发现合作行为在有第三方时主要受命令性规范影响;在无第三方时,主要受描述性规范影响。第三方惩罚频率越高,个体在有第三方时的合作行为也越高,撤去第三方后个体合作行为的下降也越大。这可能因为第三方惩罚不仅能有效提示群体中的命令性规范(应该如何做),还能暗示出该情境下的描述性规范(大多数人如何做)。     

行为公共管理学视角下公共决策的社会许可机制：“一提两抑”

公共管理的本质是公共决策。“公共决策的社会许可”指当地民众对于公共决策的持续接受和支持程度, 是公共决策合法性的基石。本研究借助“行为公共管理学”的理论视角, 通过两个调查实验(N = 354 + 354), 一个现场调查(N = 520), 全面考察公共决策透明(过程透明和内容透明)与社会许可之间的因果关系, 进而明确这一关系的作用边界。结果发现：1) 决策过程透明与内容透明正向影响社会许可; 2) 政府信任调节决策内容透明与社会许可的关系; 3) 结果依赖调节两类透明与社会许可的关系。基于这些结果, 作者总结出正性的“决策透明效应”以及“谨慎的不介意”和“有选择的忽视”之双缓冲作用, 即“一提两抑”, 以更好地理解公共决策的社会许可机制。     

第三方情境的结果公平效应:来自ERP的证据

公平是人类社会的永恒主题。已有研究表明,个体在目睹他人遭受不公平对待时会谴责和惩罚违规者,但其神经机制尚不清楚。该研究运用第三方最后通牒博弈任务和ERP技术,在不涉及利益相关性和分配动机的情况下,考察第三方情境的结果公平效应。行为结果发现,不公平方案比公平方案引起了第三方更多的拒绝行为和更偏向负性的情绪体验。脑电结果也发现,结果公平性的不同水平诱发了不同波幅的FRN和P300,与公平方案相比,不公平方案诱发了更大的FRN和更小的P300。这表明即使与自身收益无关,个体加工他人利益分配过程中的结果信息时会受到公平准则的影响。     

一种简单有效的Q矩阵修正新方法

Q矩阵的正确性是影响题目参数估计和被试分类准确性的重要因素。针对Q矩阵修正问题, 首先提出了一种简单有效的新方法(ORDP)。然后, 模拟研究通过改变被试知识状态的分布、样本容量(N)、测验长度(L)、Q矩阵错误率(M)、项目质量(Iq)和属性层级结构, 比较了ORDP与已有方法(R、RMSEA和HD)的表现。研究表明：(1) 当知识状态服从均匀分布时, ORDP方法在所有层级结构下最优; 当知识状态服从多元正态分布时, RMSEA和ORDP表现没有明显差异, 除独立结构外, RMSEA方法均稍优于ORDP方法; (2) 各方法在多元正态分布下的修正效果不及均匀分布时的修正结果; (3) N、L、M、Iq和属性层级结构对4种方法的表现均有明显影响; (4) 基于Tatsuoka (1984)分数减法数据的修正结果表明, 采用ORDP方法修正的Q矩阵与数据拟合最优。     

支付与报复：成本形式对第三方惩罚的影响

第三方惩罚不仅对惩罚成本的数量敏感，也对成本形式敏感。在保持成本数量相等的情况下，不同形式的惩罚成本会对第三方惩罚的频率产生不同影响。相较支付形式，当惩罚成本采取报复形式时，被试的第三方惩罚频率显著下降。进一步的实验表明，惩罚频率的变化并非因为不同的成本形式所隐含的风险水平有所差异，而是因为被试对不同的成本形式赋予了不同的主观价值。进一步探索更多形式的惩罚成本是未来研究的重要方向。     

Evidential reasoning in the prisoner's dilemma

Classic game theory considers defection to be the rational choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Although defection maximizes a player's gain regardless of the opponent's choice, many players cooperate. We suggest that cooperation can be explained in part by expectations of reciprocal behavior, that is, by the belief that players facing the same situation probably will come to the same decision. In Experiment 1, expectations of reciprocity were experimentally manipulated. As predicted, cooperation increased monotonically with these expectations. In Experiment 2, experimentally manipulated expectations of opponent cooperation were not associated with higher rates of cooperation. These findings are interpreted in light of a general model of payoff maximization, and implications for other models (e.g., social value orientation) are discussed.     

“仁者”还是“智者”：第三方惩罚对惩罚者声誉的影响

第三方惩罚会对惩罚者的声誉产生显著影响, 然而就影响的方向而言, 现有文献给出了不同答案。上述问题的一个潜在原因是先前研究未能区分声誉的不同维度以及惩罚的不同动机与形式。通过将温暖-能力双维度结构引入惩罚者的声誉, 实验结果显示, 第三方惩罚从总体上降低了人们对惩罚者在温暖维度上的评价而提高了对其在能力维度上的评价。调节效应分析表明, 动机被归因为集体聚焦的惩罚进一步提升了其对能力的正面作用而减缓了对温暖的负面作用, 并且惩罚者的合作水平越高, 其动机被归因为集体聚焦的程度也越高。针对不同惩罚形式的进一步分析显示, 当惩罚动机被归因为个体聚焦时, 经济惩罚对温暖的负面作用显著高于社会惩罚, 而在集体聚焦的归因下经济惩罚对能力的正面作用显著低于社会惩罚。     

Modeling alliance activity: Opportunity cost effects and manipulations in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma with exit option

We model the two-firm alliance as an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game with an exit option and test several theoretical predictions over two experimental studies. A new major effect on alliance performance arises by including the exit option (i.e., the option to end the alliance and receive a fixed payoff that is less than the payoff for mutual cooperation but greater than the payoff for mutual defection). The opportunity cost levels of the firms either directly or indirectly influence alliance cooperation and alliance payoffs through affecting the alliance strategies that the firms choose. Implications for partner selection, alliance selection and structuring, and strategy choices along the alliance lifespan, build on these results.     

Spill‐over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas

This research investigates the role of intermittent monetary costs in restraining individuals from defection in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1, 104 car owners made fictitious choices between a slow and a fast travel mode in the context of a continuous social dilemma. There were four different conditions of monetary costs for choosing the fast mode (defection): no cost, low cost, high cost to self, or high cost to others. Participants defected most when there was no cost and least when they themselves were charged a high cost. A spill‐over effect was obtained such that when others were charged a high cost to defect, defection rates were lower than under no cost. Experiment 2 used 36 undergraduates as participants in an iterated decision task with real groups. The results replicated the major results of Experiment 1. Furthermore, whereas prosocials were strongly affected by intermittent costs for defection (i.e. showed large spill‐over effects), proselfs seemed to be unaffected. Possible explanations of this interaction effect between social value orientation and intermittent punishment for defection are provided. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings

This study aims at exploring the decision-making process involved in third-party punishment (TPP) within an economic frame, using the TPP game. We investigated altruistic punishment, that is, the behaviour of spending one's own money, with no personal gain, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation. We analysed this behaviour, in an in-group and out-group game setting, to compare how individuals behave with members of their own group (in-group) and with members of another group (out-group). In particular, groups were defined on a real nationality basis (Chinese or Italian). Our results showed altruistic punishment behaviour in both experimental groups and this tendency emerged as more prominent when faced with unfair play towards a member of one's own group. Furthermore, both groups exhibited a propensity for anti-social punishment behaviour: many participants spent small amounts of money to punish fair behaviour, regardless of national group membership.     

Simulating Personal Wealth in the Laboratory

During laboratory gambling tasks participants are not typically allowed to wager their personal wealth. Instead, wealth is simulated by telling participants they have been endowed with game tokens that will be later exchanged for money. Past research indicates that participants undervalue game tokens following this procedure, which leads to elevated risk taking compared to procedures that add saliency or realism to the monetary payoff. A between-subjects experiment tested whether showing a picture of money during the endowment instructions and repeating token-money exchange information during the session influenced participants' preference for risky and riskless options. The results showed no effect of the money picture. However, repeated token-money exchange information significantly decreased risk taking. Together with past studies, this finding suggests that endowment procedures might establish greater value in game tokens, and therefore better simulate personal wealth, when the eventual exchange between game tokens and money is made more salient to participants.     

Effects of Gender on Costly Punishment

Women are often believed to be more cooperative and less egoistic than men. In the present study, we examined whether people punish women for failing to live up to these benevolent gender stereotypes. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game with female and male partners who either cooperated or defected. Participants were offered a costly punishment option. They could spend money to decrease the payment of their partners. In Experiment 1, participants spent more money to punish the defection of female in comparison to male partners, but this effect of partner gender on punishment was indirect rather than direct: Participants were more likely to cooperate with female partners than with male partners, which gave them more opportunity for moralistic punishment. In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined the effects of the participants' own gender on cooperation and punishment of female and male partners. Female participants cooperated more with female partners than with male partners while male participants treated female and male partners equally. We conclude that the effect of facial gender on punishment are indirect rather than direct. The results also showed that women, in contrast to men, tended to make decisions that can be considered more social and less rational from an economic point of view, consistent with social‐role theory and evolutionary accounts. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Temporal Dynamics of Cooperation

Parties in real-world conflicts often attempt to punish each other's behavior. If this strategy fails to produce mutual cooperation, they may increase punishment magnitude. The present experiment investigated whether delay-reduction - potentially less harmful than magnitude increase - would generate mutual cooperation as interactions are repeated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy, cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. For half of the participants, the delay between their choice and the computer's next choice was long relative to the delay between the computer's choice and their next choice. For the other half, long and short delays were reversed. The tit-for-tat contingency reinforces the other player's cooperation (by cooperating) and punishes the other player's defection (by defecting). Both rewards and punishers are discounted by delay. Consistent with delay discounting, participants cooperated more when the delay between their choice and the computer's cooperation (reward) or defection (punishment) was relatively short. These results suggest that, in real-world tit-for-tat conflicts, decreasing delay of reciprocation or retaliation may foster mutual cooperation as effectively as (or more effectively than) the more usual tactic of increasing magnitude of reciprocation or retaliation.     

Self‐control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task

Self‐control was studied in an iterated one‐player Prisoner's Dilemma game in which students' choices affected the payoff matrix on the next trial. The frequency of self‐control responses (choice of the smaller payoff now, but with the more generous payoff matrix more likely on the next trial) and defection responses (choice of the larger payoff now, but with the less generous payoff matrix more likely on the next trial) were measured. In Experiment 1, players achieved a criterion of five consecutive self‐control responses more quickly as a positive function of trial spacing, the presence between trials of a discriminative stimulus associated with the upcoming payoff matrix, and the probability that the self‐control or defection response would be reciprocated by the computer. Experiment 2 replicated the effect of trial spacing except when there was an interfering task during the interval, suggesting that trial spacing permits better appreciation of the contingencies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.