概率判断中的合取谬误

概率判断中的合取谬误是指违反事件发生概率的合取规则而认为包含多个独立事件的复合事件的发生可能性大于其中某些事件的发生可能性的一种概率判断偏差现象。合取谬误的界定存在一定争议, 相关的解释机制有因果模型理论、确认理论、惊奇理论等, 影响合取谬误的因素有频率效应、训练效应以及个体差异等等。未来研究应联系逆转合取谬误的心理机制来完善已有的理论, 同时注意应用研究以及其非理性的探讨。     

不同历史时期谬误研究的特点

本文主要讨论了不同时期逻辑学家对逻辑谬误研究的特点。古希腊时期对谬误作出全面系统研究的是亚里士多德。亚里士多德对谬误的解决方法一般地说是经验的,没有形成一套行之有效的规则。文艺复兴时期,培根等人批判经院哲学,探讨了人类产生谬误的根源。这时期的谬误研究特点是：一是重视在归纳法的应用中产生的谬误;二是突出逻辑问题。现代逻辑学家如柯比等人则在前人的基础上,对谬误作出了更全面、更精确的分类,并且对各种谬误的解释和举例也更确切,从而使谬误理论更好地为实践服务。     

个体证券投资者自我效能感对赌徒谬误的影响

赌徒谬误指当某一独立随机事件发生后,人们倾向认为这一结果再次出现的概率降低。如果一连串的随机事件呈现出一定的趋势,人们倾向于认为随机事件将呈现系统性反转。证券市场中的赌徒谬误指在股票上涨（下跌）序列中做出股价将要下跌（上涨）的判断。本研究探讨股票市场特征（趋势长度及方向）及投资者的人格特征（自我效能感）对赌徒谬误的影响。以83名股票投资者为对象,采用多层线性模型进行分析,结果发现：趋势长度主效应显著,短线情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;趋势方向主效应显著,下跌情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;二者交互作用显著,在短线下跌情境下,赌徒谬误频次更高;投资者的自我效能感对股票趋势长度具有调节作用,高自我效能的投资者在短线情境下更容易出现赌徒谬误。     

热手谬误？赌徒谬误？ ——随机序列知觉中近因效应的格式塔现象研究

通过两个实验来探讨随机序列中的近因效应。在实验1中,采用传统实验范式,让被试进行一系列的抛掷硬币结果的猜测并给予反馈,结果发现：（1）在最近连续几次硬币呈现的结果不同时,人们通常把各个结果分别作为独立的单元来看待,大部分情况下做出随机性的预期;（2）在最近连续几次硬币呈现的结果相同时,人们通常把连续几次相同的结果作为一个认知单元来看待,在最近猜测对错两种情况下分别出现了截然相反的两种近因效应。当最近1次猜对时,对下一结果的预期出现正近因效应即热手谬误,但是最近几次连续猜对时谬误减少乃至消失;当最近1次猜错时,对下一结果的预期出现负近因效应即赌徒谬误,并且最近几次连续猜错时负近因效应并未受到太大影响。实验2在实验1范式的基础上,把硬币抛掷的结果人为分组,发现被试对每一组的第一个结果做出预期时,实验1中的各种效应均消失,该现象支持关于随机序列知觉的“格式塔理论”。     

随机思维中基率谬误的实验研究

随机思维研究中基率谬误已成为最基本的也是最有争论的讨论内容之一。本研究试图通过不同年龄和文化教养的被试解决不同基率的概率评估问题来了解我国被试是否存在基率谬误以及解决基率问题中哪些因素影响被试的行为,此外还试图对人们在解决这类随机思维活动中的信息加工过程作初步的探讨。得到如下结果:1.本研究表明在解决随机思维问题时被试明显存在基率谬误。2.基率种类影响人们的反应行为,极端基率条件下的谬误与偏差较小些。3.年龄与教育水平影响反应行为,较年轻的高一学生组在解决基率问题时所犯的错误相对小些。4.在解决基率问题时被试运用的策略有:择一策略,综合策略和折衷策略,同时还存在着直觉思维。     

判断与决策中的规划谬误

规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。     

约翰·伍兹谬误思想研究:1972—2014

首先,本文将伍兹的谬误思想划分为前、近两个时期:前期谬误研究的基本原则诉诸于形式的方法,具有多元主义特征;近期思想则转向了基于实践推理与认知经济的谬误观,并在此基础上形成了自然化的逻辑理论,带有心理和认知色彩。其次,本文搜集、整理学界近年来对伍兹不同时期谬误思想的研究情况,对它们给予批判性地比较和评价。最后,本文对伍兹谬误思想的历史意义、最新发展以及未来走向做一般性总结,着重指出显现于伍兹新近理论中的逻辑"自然转向"思想。     

给谬误面子

对与错、好与坏、真理与谬误，并不总是截然对立、水火不容的。有则寓言说得很形象，说谬误邀真理去河边游泳，真理不知是计就跟着下水了，结果谬误跑上来穿上真理的衣服走了。真理被搞得很狼狈，它要么得一直躲在水里不出来，受冻感冒，伤及身体；要么只能赤身裸体地在人们面前出现，惹得四处大声惊叫；甚至还会招来围观殴打。     

Linda问题：“齐当别”抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理。Tversky和Kahneman（1983）使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因。然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清。该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li（1994,2004）提出的不确定情形下决策理论——“齐当别”抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释     

谬误的本质:蒙塔古与桑塔亚那

威廉·P.蒙塔古(William Pepperell Montague)与乔治·桑塔亚那(George Santayana)分别是美国新实在论和批判的实在论学派的两个主要人物.本文旨在通过考察他们对谬误的本质的讨论,厘清新实在论的理论旨趣,并探究实在论作为一种认识论的可行性.本文首先讨论了蒙塔古的“生存对象的领域”(realm of subsistence)和桑塔亚那的“本质的领域”(realm of essence)这两个概念.这两个概念是他们思考谬误的本质的重要理论工具.在此之后,本文又对两位哲学家关于谬误的起源以及如何避免谬误的思考进行了深入的探讨.     

Explaining High Conjunction Fallacy Rates: The Probability Theory Plus Noise Account

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge the conjunctive probability P(A ∧ B) to be greater than a constituent probability P(A), contrary to the norms of probability theory. This fallacy is a reliable, consistent and systematic part of people's probability judgements, attested in many studies over at least 40 years. For some events, these fallacies occur very frequently in people's judgements (at rates of 80% or more), while for other events, the fallacies are very rare (occurring at rates of 10% or less). This wide range of fallacy rates presents a challenge for current theories of the conjunction fallacy. We show how this wide range of observed fallacy rates can be explained by a simple model where people reason according to probability theory but are subject to random noise in the reasoning process. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reductionism in Fallacy Theory

(1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (4) the exact criteria for (argumentatively) valid and adequate arguments of the 'practical theory of argumentation' of the author are expounded. These criteria will be used as the positive basis for the following reduction. (5) In the main part of the paper a systematization, definition and explanation of the main types and many subforms of fallacies of argumentative validity and (6) adequacy is developed, following the list of positive conditions of validity and adequacy. In addition to many new types of fallacies, this systematization contains the most important of the traditionally known and named fallacies; these are explained and the criteria for some of them are corrected or put more precisely.     

The blaze of her splendors: Suggestions about revitalizing fallacy theory

Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make fallacy theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies.     

Reconsidering Contentious Argument: Augustus DeMorgan on Fallacy

This essay examines Augustus DeMorgan's chapter on fallacy in his Formal Logic (1847) in order to show how DeMorgan's treatment represents an expansion and advance upon Aristotle. It is important that Aristotle clearly distinguishes among dialectical, didactic, demonstrative, and contentious types of argument, based upon the acceptability of premises and the aims of participants. Appropriating Aristotle's list of fallacies, DeMorgan discusses examples that reveal how the charge and countercharge of fallacy function in contentious argument, which is more widespread than Aristotle imagined. DeMorgan's treatment of fallacy is in the spirit of Aristotle because of its focus on dialogue arguments, but it represents an advance because it expands the possible scenes of contention and shows how unshared premises and the will to win inform many argument situations. The emphasis on contention in natural-language argument puts DeMorgan in the company of his l9th century peers, Mill and Whately.     

认知需要和警告类型对合取谬误的影响

合取谬误是一种常见的判断偏差,它指的是在不确定条件下,个体评估合取事件及其简单事件发生的概率时,对合取规则系统性偏离的一种现象.实验1 就认知需要类型对合取谬误的影响进行探讨,结果发现高认知需要的被试较不易表现出双重合取谬误和单合取谬误.实验2 探讨了警告类型对合取谬误的影响,结果发现无警告时个体最易表现出单合取谬误,其次是间接警告,最后是直接警告;此外,认知需要与警告类型的交互作用显著,高认知需要的被试在直接警告和间接警告时更少表现出双重合取谬误,在直接警告时更少表现出单合取谬误.     

Exploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework

The literature presents two major theories on the cause of the conjunction fallacy. The first attributes the conjunction fallacy to the representativeness heuristic. The second suggests that the conjunction fallacy is caused by people combining p(A) and p(B) into p(A&B) in an inappropriate manner. These two theories were contrasted in two category‐learning experiments. As predicted by the latter theory, data showed that participants that could assess p(A&B) directly made fewer conjunction fallacies than participants who had to compute p(A) and p(B) separately and then combine them into p(A&B). Least conjunction fallacies were observed in the cases where the representativeness heuristic was applicable. Overall, data showed that an inability to appropriately combine probabilities is one of the key cognitive mechanisms behind the conjunction fallacy. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nonfallacious Rhetorical Strategies: Lyndon Johnson’s Daisy Ad

The traditional concepts of rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy cannot be readily reconciled. Doing so requires escaping the following argument: All argumentation involves rhetorical strategies. All rhetorical strategies are violations of logical or dialectical ideals. All violations of logical or dialectical ideals are fallacies. Normative pragmatics provides a perspective in which rhetorical strategies can be seen to have the potential for constructive contributions to argumentation and in which fallacies are not simply violations of ideals. One kind of constructive contribution, framing moves, is illustrated with the case of Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 TV campaign commercial known as the Daisy ad.