Linda问题：“齐当别”抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理。Tversky和Kahneman（1983）使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因。然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清。该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li（1994,2004）提出的不确定情形下决策理论——“齐当别”抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释     

Linda问题:"齐当别"抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理.Tversky和Kahneman(1983)使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因.然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清.该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li(1994,2004)提出的不确定情形下决策理论--"齐当别"抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释.     

认知需要和警告类型对合取谬误的影响

合取谬误是一种常见的判断偏差,它指的是在不确定条件下,个体评估合取事件及其简单事件发生的概率时,对合取规则系统性偏离的一种现象.实验1 就认知需要类型对合取谬误的影响进行探讨,结果发现高认知需要的被试较不易表现出双重合取谬误和单合取谬误.实验2 探讨了警告类型对合取谬误的影响,结果发现无警告时个体最易表现出单合取谬误,其次是间接警告,最后是直接警告;此外,认知需要与警告类型的交互作用显著,高认知需要的被试在直接警告和间接警告时更少表现出双重合取谬误,在直接警告时更少表现出单合取谬误.     

任务情境与概率知识经验对中学生合取判断的影响研究

本研究采用了一套由不同任务情境(数字情境和日常情境)组成的合取判断问卷与一套概率基础知识问卷,对106名中学生的合取判断情况进行调查,结果显示:(1)无论在哪种任务情境下,概率知识经验均未对合取判断成绩产生显著影响。(2)不同概率知识经验的被试在数字任务情境下采用的策略有所不同。     

个体证券投资者自我效能感对赌徒谬误的影响

赌徒谬误指当某一独立随机事件发生后,人们倾向认为这一结果再次出现的概率降低。如果一连串的随机事件呈现出一定的趋势,人们倾向于认为随机事件将呈现系统性反转。证券市场中的赌徒谬误指在股票上涨（下跌）序列中做出股价将要下跌（上涨）的判断。本研究探讨股票市场特征（趋势长度及方向）及投资者的人格特征（自我效能感）对赌徒谬误的影响。以83名股票投资者为对象,采用多层线性模型进行分析,结果发现：趋势长度主效应显著,短线情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;趋势方向主效应显著,下跌情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;二者交互作用显著,在短线下跌情境下,赌徒谬误频次更高;投资者的自我效能感对股票趋势长度具有调节作用,高自我效能的投资者在短线情境下更容易出现赌徒谬误。     

概念范畴情境化视角下的Linda问题初探

摘 要：本文首先提出了Linda问题的概念范畴情境化视角。该视角认为,Linda问题中的T与F的范畴与分别同T&F中T与F的范畴并不一定相同,当T&F中的T和F至少有一者的范畴较相应的T或F有较大的扩大,且同时另外一者至少较相应T或F有略微的扩大时,就有可能导致T&F>T或T&F>F为合理判断而非谬误的情形,因而至少不能将所有的T&F>或T&F>F的判断都归为谬误。本文通过三项研究发现,被试对T&F中T与F和T与F的专业性判断并不完全相同;排除女权的专业性合取事件<女权的专业性独立呈现且出纳的专业性合取事件<出纳的专业性独立呈现者,所谓谬误水平显著下降;对Linda问题的排序项增加“专业的或职业的”限定词,以增加相应概念范畴的稳定性,显著减少合取谬误。这些结果说明,Linda问题的概念范畴情境化视角获得了支持。     

热手谬误和赌徒谬误心理机制研究述评

在知觉随机序列时,人们倾向于把序列中实际上各自独立的相邻结果看作是存在正相关或负相关的,而出现热手谬误或赌徒谬误,又称为随机序列中的正负近因效应。有关这两谬误最早的心理机制的探索中,Kahneman 和Tversky采用局部代表性启发法对此进行了解释。但是这种解释也存在诸多不足,因此近期的一些模型（因果模型、Urn模型、记忆模型、适应模型和两阶段格式塔模型）分别从不同角度对两种谬误提出了新的解释。最后文章指出研究方法、神经机制、个体差异以及生活中的应用是该领域研究的几个未来发展方向     

判断与决策中的规划谬误

规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。     

不同历史时期谬误研究的特点

本文主要讨论了不同时期逻辑学家对逻辑谬误研究的特点。古希腊时期对谬误作出全面系统研究的是亚里士多德。亚里士多德对谬误的解决方法一般地说是经验的,没有形成一套行之有效的规则。文艺复兴时期,培根等人批判经院哲学,探讨了人类产生谬误的根源。这时期的谬误研究特点是：一是重视在归纳法的应用中产生的谬误;二是突出逻辑问题。现代逻辑学家如柯比等人则在前人的基础上,对谬误作出了更全面、更精确的分类,并且对各种谬误的解释和举例也更确切,从而使谬误理论更好地为实践服务。     

关于虚构对象的合取创造主义

关于虚构对象的作者创造主义是创造主义的主要形式,而作者创造主义信条隐含个体创造主义信条。本文论证个体创造主义者面临判定难题,并提出一种新型的创造主义观点,即合取创造主义,并论证合取创造主义者不面临判定难题,最后为合取创造主义做进一步辩护,说明合取创造主义是一种更有前途的创造主义观点。     

Fallacies in probability judgments for conjunctions and disjunctions of everyday events

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunction B‐and‐A as more probable than a constituent B, contrary to probability theory's ‘conjunction rule’ that a conjunction cannot be more probable than either constituent. Many studies have demonstrated this fallacy in people's reasoning about various experimental materials. Gigerenzer objects that from a ‘frequentist’ standpoint probability theory is not valid for these materials, and so failure to follow the conjunction rule is not a fallacy. This paper describes three experiments showing that the conjunction fallacy occurs as consistently for conjunctions where frequentist probability theory is valid (conjunctions of everyday weather events) as for other conjunctions. These experiments also demonstrate a reliable correlation between the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy and the disjunction fallacy (which arises when a disjunction B‐or‐A is judged less probable than a constituent B). This supports a probability theory + random variation account of probabilistic reasoning. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining High Conjunction Fallacy Rates: The Probability Theory Plus Noise Account

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge the conjunctive probability P(A ∧ B) to be greater than a constituent probability P(A), contrary to the norms of probability theory. This fallacy is a reliable, consistent and systematic part of people's probability judgements, attested in many studies over at least 40 years. For some events, these fallacies occur very frequently in people's judgements (at rates of 80% or more), while for other events, the fallacies are very rare (occurring at rates of 10% or less). This wide range of fallacy rates presents a challenge for current theories of the conjunction fallacy. We show how this wide range of observed fallacy rates can be explained by a simple model where people reason according to probability theory but are subject to random noise in the reasoning process. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunctive statement B‐and‐A to be more probable than a constituent B, in contrast to the law of probability that P(B ∧ A) cannot exceed P(B) or P(A). Researchers see this fallacy as demonstrating that people do not follow probability theory when judging conjunctive probability. This paper shows that the conjunction fallacy can be explained by the standard probability theory equation for conjunction if we assume random variation in the constituent probabilities used in that equation. The mathematical structure of this equation is such that random variation will be most likely to produce the fallacy when one constituent has high probability and the other low, when there is positive conditional support between the constituents, when there are two rather than three constituents, and when people rank probabilities rather than give numerical estimates. The conjunction fallacy has been found to occur most frequently in exactly these situations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type

Two experiments used within-subject designs to examine how conjunction errors depend on the use of (1) choice versus estimation tasks, (2) probability versus frequency language, and (3) conjunctions of two likely events versus conjunctions of likely and unlikely events. All problems included a three-option format verified to minimize misinterpretation of the base event. In both experiments, conjunction errors were reduced when likely events were conjoined. Conjunction errors were also reduced for estimations compared with choices, with this reduction greater for likely conjuncts, an interaction effect. Shifting conceptual focus from probabilities to frequencies did not affect conjunction error rates. Analyses of numerical estimates for a subset of the problems provided support for the use of three general models by participants for generating estimates. Strikingly, the order in which the two tasks were carried out did not affect the pattern of results, supporting the idea that the mode of responding strongly determines the mode of thinking about conjunctions and hence the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy. These findings were evaluated in terms of implications for rationality of human judgment and reasoning.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework

The literature presents two major theories on the cause of the conjunction fallacy. The first attributes the conjunction fallacy to the representativeness heuristic. The second suggests that the conjunction fallacy is caused by people combining p(A) and p(B) into p(A&B) in an inappropriate manner. These two theories were contrasted in two category‐learning experiments. As predicted by the latter theory, data showed that participants that could assess p(A&B) directly made fewer conjunction fallacies than participants who had to compute p(A) and p(B) separately and then combine them into p(A&B). Least conjunction fallacies were observed in the cases where the representativeness heuristic was applicable. Overall, data showed that an inability to appropriately combine probabilities is one of the key cognitive mechanisms behind the conjunction fallacy. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The conjunction fallacy and the many meanings of and

According to the conjunction rule, the probability of A and B cannot exceed the probability of either single event. This rule reads and in terms of the logical operator wedge, interpreting A and B as an intersection of two events. As linguists have long argued, in natural language "and" can convey a wide range of relationships between conjuncts such as temporal order ("I went to the store and bought some whisky"), causal relationships ("Smile and the world smiles with you"), and can indicate a collection of sets rather than their intersection (as in "He invited friends and colleagues to the party"). When "and" is used in word problems researching the conjunction fallacy, the conjunction rule, which assumes the logical operator wedge, therefore cannot be mechanically invoked as a norm. Across several studies, we used different methods of probing people's understanding of and-conjunctions, and found evidence that many of those respondents who violated the conjunction rule in their probability or frequency judgments inferred a meaning of and that differs from the logical operator wedge. We argue that these findings have implications for whether judgments involving ambiguous and-conjunctions that violate the conjunction rule should be considered manifestations of fallacious reasoning or of reasonable pragmatic and semantic inferences.     

Religious versus reflective priming and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

The effect of religious priming has been studied in relation to a number of variables, most extensively with prosocial behavior. The effects of priming on cognitive domains, however, are relatively understudied. The present study examined the effects of religious priming, compared with reflective and neutral priming, on the conjunction fallacy. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of the 3 priming conditions. Priming was presented through the scrambled sentence task in which participants were required to rearrange words of a religious (e.g., pray), reflective (e.g., reason), or neutral (e.g., paper) content. The conjunction fallacy was measured by a task containing 1 problem. Results indicated that those undergoing the religious prime were significantly more likely to commit the conjunction fallacy compared with those in the reflective priming group. Situations in which reasoning is integral may benefit from knowing the immediate effects of religious versus reflective stimuli in the environment.