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1.
合取谬误是一种常见的判断偏差,它指的是在不确定条件下,个体评估合取事件及其简单事件发生的概率时,对合取规则系统性偏离的一种现象.实验1 就认知需要类型对合取谬误的影响进行探讨,结果发现高认知需要的被试较不易表现出双重合取谬误和单合取谬误.实验2 探讨了警告类型对合取谬误的影响,结果发现无警告时个体最易表现出单合取谬误,其次是间接警告,最后是直接警告;此外,认知需要与警告类型的交互作用显著,高认知需要的被试在直接警告和间接警告时更少表现出双重合取谬误,在直接警告时更少表现出单合取谬误.  相似文献   

2.
本研究采用了一套由不同任务情境(数字情境和日常情境)组成的合取判断问卷与一套概率基础知识问卷,对106名中学生的合取判断情况进行调查,结果显示:(1)无论在哪种任务情境下,概率知识经验均未对合取判断成绩产生显著影响。(2)不同概率知识经验的被试在数字任务情境下采用的策略有所不同。  相似文献   

3.
规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。  相似文献   

4.
本文分析论据不足、心理相关和语言歧义等类型的谬误与诡辩 ,认为谬误与诡辩有其产生的必然性 ,也有其在一定条件下的可避免性。  相似文献   

5.
条件推理与概率判断   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
邱江  张庆林 《心理科学》2007,30(2):301-304
选取6个具体内容的条件命题和1个纯形式的条件命题作为实验材料,以大学生为被试,深入探讨了条件推理的认知加工机制。结果发现,大学生被试对四种推理形式的认可程度主要与范畴前提的概率值成正比,条件推理似乎是一种基于概率判断的直觉而高效的认知加工过程,进一步证实了Oaksford(2000)以及Evans(2003)等人的观点。  相似文献   

6.
移情的心理机制及其影响因素概述   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
移情是心理学的重要研究领域之一.文章从发展心理学有关移情的研究人手,对移情的定义、所涉及的心理机制和影响因素进行了梳理.并概述了发展心理学在该领域研究的主要研究成果和最新的研究动态.  相似文献   

7.
大学生迷信心理的形成及其影响因素   总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6  
在全面总结近三十年来国内外相关研究成果的基础上,对大学生迷信心理的形成及其影响因素做了深入探讨。文章首先梳理了迷信的概念;其次从观察学习、归因和自我认同三个方面反思了大学生迷信心理形成的心理机制;并从性别、人格控制点、自尊和自我效能、认知风格和受暗示性、不确定性情境、压力情境等方面分析了大学生迷信心理的影响因素;最后指出了以往研究中存在的局限,并对未来的相关研究做出了展望  相似文献   

8.
儿童早期经验在心理发展中的作用   总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6  
缪小春 《心理科学》2001,24(3):319-322
儿童早期经验在心理发展中的作用受一系列条件的影响:儿童的个人特点,所涉及的心理和行为领域,早期经验发生的时间,早期经验的性质和种类以及儿童以后的环境和经验。不能笼统地说早期经验对心理发展的影响是不可逆转的,出生后的最初几年是心理发展的关键期。对这个问题需进行进一步的研究。  相似文献   

9.
青少年社会交往:影响因素及其干预研究述要   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
宋振韶  金盛华 《心理科学》2001,24(6):713-716
社会交往是青少年生活中的一个重要部分,对青少年心理发展有着重要影响。青少年时期的社会交往以及由此而习得的交往技能,对青少年的社会性和情感发展具有深远的影响。研究青少年社会交往以及父母、同伴和教师在其中担当的角色,可以更好地认识青少年社会交往的本质,引导青少年通过积极的社会交往得到更好的发展和适应,使青少年社会交往成为系统教育的重要补充。  相似文献   

10.
判断校准及其影响因素   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
文章从决策过程的角度, 提出了判断校准的系统模型。结合以往的相关研究, 分析了专长、任务结构、反馈和决策支持等因素与判断校准之间的关系, 同时, 还对这些因素之间的相互关系、判断策略的作用等进行了深入探讨  相似文献   

11.
    
The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunction B‐and‐A as more probable than a constituent B, contrary to probability theory's ‘conjunction rule’ that a conjunction cannot be more probable than either constituent. Many studies have demonstrated this fallacy in people's reasoning about various experimental materials. Gigerenzer objects that from a ‘frequentist’ standpoint probability theory is not valid for these materials, and so failure to follow the conjunction rule is not a fallacy. This paper describes three experiments showing that the conjunction fallacy occurs as consistently for conjunctions where frequentist probability theory is valid (conjunctions of everyday weather events) as for other conjunctions. These experiments also demonstrate a reliable correlation between the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy and the disjunction fallacy (which arises when a disjunction B‐or‐A is judged less probable than a constituent B). This supports a probability theory + random variation account of probabilistic reasoning. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

12.
    
It has recently been found that episodic memory displays analogues of the well-known disjunction and conjunction fallacies of probability judgement. The aim of the present research was, for the first time, to study these memory fallacies together under the same conditions, and test theoretical predictions about the reasons for each. The focus was on predictions about the influence of semantic gist, target versus context recollection, and proactive versus retroactive interference. Disjunction and conjunction fallacies increased in conditions in which subjects were able to form semantic connections among list words. In addition, disjunction fallacies were increased by manipulations that minimised proactive interference, whereas conjunction fallacies were increased by manipulations that minimised retroactive interference. That pattern suggests that disjunction fallacies are more dependent on target recollection, whereas conjunction fallacies are more dependent on context recollection.  相似文献   

13.
    
Psychological inoculation has proven effective at reducing susceptibility to misinformation. We present a novel storytelling approach to inoculation against susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (dmeta-analysis = 0.82), a known cognitive predictor of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1 (Pilot; N = 161), a narrative inoculation (vs. control) reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and in turn, conspiracy beliefs regarding government malfeasance. In Study 2 (main experiment; N = 141; pre-registered), two separate narrative inoculations (vs. control) directly reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and indirectly reduced conspiracy beliefs regarding extra-terrestrial cover-ups. In addition, the inoculation messages improved detection of both real and fake news (‘truth discernment’). We discuss theoretical and practical implications, including the use of inoculation to induce critical thinking styles, and tailoring inoculations that may suit storytelling mediums.  相似文献   

14.
    
The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge the conjunctive probability P(AB) to be greater than a constituent probability P(A), contrary to the norms of probability theory. This fallacy is a reliable, consistent and systematic part of people's probability judgements, attested in many studies over at least 40 years. For some events, these fallacies occur very frequently in people's judgements (at rates of 80% or more), while for other events, the fallacies are very rare (occurring at rates of 10% or less). This wide range of fallacy rates presents a challenge for current theories of the conjunction fallacy. We show how this wide range of observed fallacy rates can be explained by a simple model where people reason according to probability theory but are subject to random noise in the reasoning process. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

15.
Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

16.
    
The literature presents two major theories on the cause of the conjunction fallacy. The first attributes the conjunction fallacy to the representativeness heuristic. The second suggests that the conjunction fallacy is caused by people combining p(A) and p(B) into p(A&B) in an inappropriate manner. These two theories were contrasted in two category‐learning experiments. As predicted by the latter theory, data showed that participants that could assess p(A&B) directly made fewer conjunction fallacies than participants who had to compute p(A) and p(B) separately and then combine them into p(A&B). Least conjunction fallacies were observed in the cases where the representativeness heuristic was applicable. Overall, data showed that an inability to appropriately combine probabilities is one of the key cognitive mechanisms behind the conjunction fallacy. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

17.
大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理。Tversky和Kahneman(1983)使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因。然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清。该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li(1994,2004)提出的不确定情形下决策理论——“齐当别”抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释  相似文献   

18.
Two experiments tested predictions derived from the Probability Theory + Variation (PTV) model. PTV model assumes that judgments follow probability theory, but systematic errors arise from noise in the judgments. Experiment 1 compared the PTV model to a configural weighted averaging model in joint probability judgment and found more support for the PTV model in diagnostic cases. Specifically, noise was negatively correlated with semantic coherence and conjunction and disjunction fallacies increased when order effects produced more noise in conjunctions and disjunctions. Consistent with both models, judgments adhered stochastically to the addition law. Contrary to the integration rules of the PTV model, we failed to find increased noise in disjunctions compared to conjunctions. Experiment 2 tested predictions of the PTV model for conditional probability judgment. Consistent with the PTV model, noise was negatively correlated with semantic coherence in conditional probabilities and judgments adhered stochastically to Bayes' theorem. Conversion errors were generally more prevalent than conditional reversals, a finding that is not fully consistent with the PTV model. In general, the quantitative fit of the PTV model was relatively better for overlapping and subset problems compared to identical, independent and mutually exclusive problems, especially for semantic coherence. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

19.
大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理.Tversky和Kahneman(1983)使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因.然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清.该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li(1994,2004)提出的不确定情形下决策理论--"齐当别"抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释.  相似文献   

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