Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology

Four basic approaches that have been used to demonstrate perception without awareness are described. Each approach reflects one of two types of experimental logic and one of two possible methods for controlling awareness. The experimental logic has been either to demonstrate a dissociation between a measure of perception with awareness and a measure that is sensitive to perception without awareness or to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the consequences of perception with and without awareness. Awareness has been controlled either by manipulating the stimulus conditions or by instructing observers on how to distribute their attention. The experimental findings based on all four approaches lead to the same conclusion; namely, stimuli are perceived even when observers are unaware of the stimuli. This conclusion is supported by results of studies in which awareness has been assessed with either objective measures of forced-choice discriminations or measures based on verbalizations of subjective conscious experiences. Given this solid empirical support for the concept of perception without awareness, a direction for future research studies is to assess the functions of information perceived without awareness in determining what is perceived with awareness. The available evidence suggests that information perceived without awareness both biases what stimuli are perceived with awareness and influences how stimuli perceived with awareness are consciously experienced.     

汉字内隐记忆的实验研究（Ⅰ）──内隐记忆存在的条件

通过四个２×２×２方差设计实验,将直接测量（再认任务）和间接测量（偏好判断任务）在形式上进行匹配,考察了汉字的注意因素,测量任务因素和时程因素经过不同组合构成的１０种情况,其中测量任务因素的间接测量根据汉字的局部加工（字形、字义、字音）和整体加工（整体特征）分为四种子任务,试图寻找汉字认知范畴里内隐记忆存在的条件。实验分学习和测验两个阶段。学习阶段的处理对所有被试都相同。测验阶段的不同指导语形成不同的测量任务。结果发现了内隐记忆存在的三个必要条件是非注意（目标）汉字,汉字的整体加工和偏好判断任务后阶段。匹配方法的使用是发现内隐记忆的保证。汉字的整体加工和局部加工具有不同的特点。     

Unconscious perception and the classic dissociation paradigm: a new angle?

Reingold and Merikle's (1988, 1990) critique of the classic dissociation paradigm identified the exhaustiveness, exclusiveness, null sensitivity, and task comparability issues as inherent problems that severely undermine the utility of this paradigm. Snodgrass, Bernat, and Shevrin (2004) attempt to provide solutions to these problems and claim to propose a novel conceptual and methodological framework for the study of unconscious perception. Unfortunately, the present analysis indicates that the approach proposed by Snodgrass et al. involves the same problems as do previous implementations of the classic dissociation paradigm.     

Confidence and accuracy of near-threshold discrimination responses.

This article reports four subliminal perception experiments using the relationship between confidence and accuracy to assess awareness. Subjects discriminated among stimuli and indicated their confidence in each discrimination response. Subjects were classified as being aware of the stimuli if their confidence judgments predicted accuracy and as being unaware if they did not. In the first experiment, confidence predicted accuracy even at stimulus durations so brief that subjects claimed to be performing at chance. This finding indicates that subjects's claims that they are "just guessing" should not be accepted as sufficient evidence that they are completely unaware of the stimuli. Experiments 2-4 tested directly for subliminal perception by comparing the minimum exposure duration needed for better than chance discrimination performance against the minimum needed for confidence to predict accuracy. The latter durations were slightly but significantly longer, suggesting that under certain circumstances people can make perceptual discriminations even though the information that was used to make those discriminations is not consciously available.     

Measurement error in subliminal perception experiments: simulation analyses of two regression methods

A. G. Greenwald, M. R. Klinger, and E. S. Schuh (1995) investigated subliminal perception using a regression-based test for a dissociation between direct and indirect measures of perceptual ability. Direct and indirect measures were obtained for each observer, and a regression analysis was used to predict the amount of indirect perception at the point where the direct measure showed zero sensitivity. A significant positive intercept, obtained with both standard regression and a modified regression developed by K. C. Klauer, S. C. Draine, and A. G. Greenwald (1998), was used to argue for the key dissociation. When the assumptions of these methods are not met, however, simulations indicate that significant positive intercepts can often be obtained even if there is no dissociation. Moreover, the assumptions are theoretically implausible and inconsistent with some aspects of the results. Thus, the significant positive intercept is not strong evidence of the key dissociation.     

Revisiting the metacontrast dissociation: comparing sensitivity across different measures and tasks

In the metacontrast dissociation procedure, presenting a masked shape prime prior to a visible shape target leads to reaction-time effects of the prime in an indirect measure, although participants cannot consciously detect prime shapes in a direct measure (Klotz & Neumann, 1999). This has been taken as evidence for the processing of unconscious input. The results of the present metacontrast dissociation study indicate that although participants are unable to consciously report the shape of the prime, they can consciously perceive motion between masked primes and visible targets in a hybrid direct/indirect measure (Experiments 1 and 3). This indicates that former tests did not provide an exhaustive measure for residual conscious perception of the prime in the metacontrast dissociation procedure. Further tests, however, reveal that residual motion perception cannot account for performance in the indirect measure (Experiments 2 and 3). Although the results thus leave the conception of processing of unconscious input intact, they may prompt a revision of its criteria.     

The role of physiological arousal in time perception: psychophysiological evidence from an emotion regulation paradigm

Time perception, crucial for adaptive behavior, has been shown to be altered by emotion. An arousal-dependent mechanism is proposed to account for such an effect. Yet, physiological measure of arousal related with emotional timing is still lacking. We addressed this question using skin conductance response (SCR) in an emotion regulation paradigm. Nineteen participants estimated durations of neutral and negative sounds by comparing them to a previously memorized duration. Instructions were given to attend either to temporal or to emotional stimulus features. Attending to emotion with negative sounds generated longer subjective duration and greater physiological arousal than attending to time. However, a shared-attention condition showed discrepancy between behavioral and physiological results. Supporting the idea of a link between autonomic arousal and subjective duration, our results however suggest that this relation is not as direct as was expected. Results are discussed within recent model linking time perception, emotion and awareness.     

Dissociation of processing time and awareness by the inattentional blindness paradigm

Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness (i.e., explicit versus implicit processes). The inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the critical stimulus. This reveals a dissociation between processing time and awareness, consistent with the possibility of separate processing streams for explicit and implicit visual perception.     

Relative and absolute duration judgments under prospective and retrospective paradigms

A dual-process contingency model of short duration judgment is proposed and tested. The first process, or P(t), is a timer that uses cognitive capacity to keep track of units of time. If capacity is directed toward other tasks, P(t) will record fewer units and produce lower time judgments than when capacity is not directed toward other tasks. This timing process is most likely to affect performance when people know in advance (prospective judgments) that time judgments will be required and when absolute, rather than relative, judgments are made. The second process, or P(m), which is used for retrospective and relative judgments, judges duration on the basis of the number of remembered high priority events (HPEs) occurring during the interval. When this process is used, time judgments increase with the amount of HPEs that can be retrieved at the moment of judgment. Two experiments are reported. Tactual stimuli were presented, and nontemporal information processing load (simple or complex stimuli), type of judgment (absolute or relative), and judgment paradigm (prospective or retrospective)were manipulated. The results obtained support the proposed dual-process contingency model.     

Criteria for unconscious cognition: three types of dissociation

To demonstrate unconscious cognition, researchers commonly compare a direct measure (D) of awareness for a critical stimulus with an indirect measure (I) showing that the stimulus was cognitively processed at all. We discuss and empirically demonstrate three types of dissociation with distinct appearances in D-I plots, in which direct and indirect effects are plotted against each other in a shared effect size metric. Simple dissociations between D and I occur when I has some nonzero value and D is at chance level; the traditional requirement of zero awareness is necessary for this criterion only. Sensitivity dissociations only require that I be larger than D; double dissociations occur whensome experimental manipulation has opposite effects on I and D. We show that double dissociations require much weaker measurement assumptions than do other criteria. Several alternative approaches can be considered special cases of our framework.     

Accuracy and awareness in the perception and categorization of male sexual orientation

For clear and unambiguous social categories, person perception occurs quite accurately from minimal cues. This article addresses the perception of an ambiguous social category (male sexual orientation) from minimal cues. Across 5 studies, the authors examined individuals' actual and self-assessed accuracy when judging male sexual orientation from faces and facial features. Although participants were able to make accurate judgments from multiple facial features (i.e., hair, the eyes, and the mouth area), their perceived accuracy was calibrated with their actual accuracy only when making judgments based on hairstyle, a controllable feature. These findings provide evidence that suggests different processes for extracting social category information during perception: explicit judgments based on obvious cues (hairstyle) and intuitive judgments based on nonobvious cues (information from the eyes and mouth area). Differences in the accuracy of judgments based on targets' controllability and perceivers' awareness of cues provides insight into the processes underlying intuitive predictions and intuitive judgments.     

Using ecphoric confidence ratings to discriminate seen from unseen faces: The effects of retention interval and distinctiveness

Theories of confidence processing for recognition judgments suggest that confidence indexes the degree of match between a presented stimulus and an image in memory (ecphoric similarity). Recent research has demonstrated that having participants rate their confidence that a face had been previously seen provides an equivalent or a better index of the stimulus's status than does eliciting a simple binary response (Sauer, Brewer, & Weber, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137: 528-547, 2008). Using a face recognition paradigm, we manipulated retention interval and stimulus distinctiveness to directly test the suggestion that confidence indexes ecphoric similarity and to probe the boundary conditions for using confidence ratings to discriminate seen from unseen faces. Consistent with the proposed ecphoric basis for confidence ratings, mean confidence was higher for previously seen than for unseen faces, and conditions conducive to the formation of strong memories improved confidence-based discrimination. In all conditions, after the application of a classification algorithm, confidence ratings provided a more sensitive index of face status (i.e., seen or unseen) than did binary responses.     

Getting technical about awareness

It has recently been argued that post-decision wagering provides an objective measure of awareness. We critically evaluate this claim, emphasizing the distinction between performance without awareness and a reluctance to gamble in full awareness of weak sensory evidence. We address two key methodological issues. The first is the design of the pay-off matrix to reward a strategy of wagering that reflects the strength of sensory evidence. The second is the use of signal detection theory to analyze the resulting data. We argue that proper treatment of these issues is essential if post-decision wagering is to prove valuable in validating claims of perception without awareness in normal subjects and neuropsychological patients.     

Feeling time in nature: The influence of directed and undirected attention on time awareness

In the present study, we examined the impact of the interaction of environmental and task-induced attentional focus on time perception, specifically awareness of the time flow. We tested 48 participants in either a natural or urban setting over three 25- to 35-min sessions. We manipulated the within-subjects factor task by means of two tasks—one requiring directed attention on the task itself, the other undirected attention on the environment—alongside a control condition with no specific task. We measured time awareness, passage of time judgments, felt time judgments, and estimated time as dependent variables. For time awareness, we found an interaction between environment and task: in the natural environment, only a task requiring directed attention reduced time awareness; whereas, in the urban environment, both tasks reduced time awareness compared to the control condition. The results suggest that natural environments increase time awareness unless we focus our attention on a task.     

两种条件下的妒忌分离:间接测量的优势

通过间接测量和直接测量考察被试的妒忌感受(实验1),并测量两种测量条件下被试的敏感性和反应偏向的分离(实验2).结果发现:间接测量组的被试比直接测量组报告更多的妒忌感受,两种条件下被试所采用的判定标准没有变化,但间接测量中被试的敏感性高于直接测量,这说明两种测量测得了妒忌的不同层面,间接测量在测量妒忌的无意识方面更具优势;而两种条件下被试对于妒忌者都比被妒忌者要更为敏感,则表明了被试在无意识中对妒忌者更为偏好;两种条件下对于妒忌的评定均无性别差异.     

Direct and indirect perception of size

Three experiments, using a reaction time paradigm, examine the direct (stimulus bound) and indirect (mediational inference) approaches to size perception. Subjects determine which of two stimuli is the larger when the two can be at different egocentric distances. The effects of two variables on reaction times are examined—distal ratio, the ratio of physical sizes of the stimuli, and proximal ratio, the ratio of the angular projections of the stimuli on the retina. In Experiment 1, both ratios are found to affect reaction times, with the proximal ratios yielding the larger effect, more in line with the predictions of the indirect approach. But the results of Experiments 2 and 3 indicate that distance is taken into greater account, the more similar the distal sizes of the stimuli. In one stimulus condition, distance appears not to affect reaction times. It is suggested that direct size perception occurs for large stimulus differences, indirect size perception for smaller differences. The identical results of the two experiments, one with and one without texture, point to some variable other than texture occlusion or interception as the stimulus for direct size perception. Some aspect of distance from the eye-level plane is suggested as an alternative.     

Unconscious perception or not? An evaluation of detection and discrimination as indicators of awareness

Most investigations of unconscious perception use a dissociation design in which an awareness variable (e.g., detection) is compared with a perceptual processing variable (e.g., identification). Unconscious perception is inferred when the awareness variable lacks sensitivity to the stimulus but evidence of perceptual processing is still obtained. In two studies we examined the relationship between word identification and detection (Study 1) or discrimination (words vs. nonwords; Study 2) with a variety of techniques. In both studies, dissociations suggestive of unconscious perception occurred when the data were examined with subjective threshold approaches, but these differences disappeared when the variables were compared with techniques derived from signal detection theory (SDT). These results do not support unconscious perception in subjective threshold paradigms. In addition, detection appears to be the most sensitive and appropriate task for assessing stimulus awareness, provided that several SDT assumptions are met.     

Direct perception and the predictive mind

Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically indirect on the predictive approach, in the sense of being constructivist or inferential. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that perception is therefore indirect in a metaphysical or epistemological sense on the predictive approach. In the metaphysical case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect solutions to the metaphysical problem of perception (e.g. naïve realism, representationalism, sense datum theory). In the epistemological case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect approaches to the justification of perceptual belief. In this paper, I demonstrate how proponents of the predictive approach have conflated these distinct notions of perceptual directness and indirectness, and I propose alternative strategies for developing the philosophical consequences of the approach.     

Thresholds for detection and awareness of masked facial stimuli

It has been suggested that perception without awareness can be demonstrated by a dissociation between performance in objective (forced-choice) and subjective (yes–no) tasks, and such dissociations have been reported both for simple stimuli and more complex ones including faces. However, signal detection theory (SDT) indicates that the subjective measures used to assess awareness in such studies can be affected by response bias, which could account for the observed dissociation, and this was confirmed by Balsdon and Azzopardi (2015) using simple visual targets. However, this finding may not apply to all types of stimulus, as the detectability of complex targets such as faces is known to be affected by their configuration as well as by their stimulus energy. We tested this with a comparison of forced-choice and yes–no detection of facial stimuli depicting happy or angry or fearful expressions using a backward masking paradigm, and using SDT methods including correcting for unequal variances in the underlying signal distributions, to measure sensitivity independently of response criterion in 12 normal observers. In 47 out 48 comparisons there was no significant difference between sensitivity (d_a) in the two tasks: hence, across the range of expressions tested it appears that the configuration of complex stimuli does not enhance detectability independently of awareness. The results imply that, on the basis of psychophysical experiments in normal observers, there is no reason to postulate that performance and awareness are mediated by separate processes.     

Learning to perceive the relative mass of colliding balls: the effects of ratio scaling and feedback

The theory of direct perception holds that competent observers are able to detect optical patterns that specify the relative mass of colliding balls. Heuristic theorists, on the other hand, claim that judgments of relative mass are based on variables that do not specify relative mass. We contrasted these views with an experiment in which participants were given feedback on their ratio-scaled estimates of the relative mass of simulated colliding balls. Correlations between judged relative mass and various kinetic and kinematic measures of the collisions revealed that (1) judgments of relative mass become more accurate with feedback, (2) different observers use different variables, (3) during training, many observers change which variables they use, (4) before training, observers tend to use nonspecifying variables or combinations thereof, (5) after a minimal amount of training, at least some observers seem to detect mass-specifying information, and (6) the judgments do not support a generalization of the heuristic model of Gilden and Proffitt (1989, 1994). These findings suggest that direct perception of relative mass is a skill that can be developed through appropriate training.