告子与孟子人性论辩之分析

《孟子》中告子与孟子关于人性的论辩是中国哲学史上的经典对话。过去学者们大多站在儒家立场上评论他们之间的观点分歧。有的学者认为这场对话表明在人性问题上告子与孟子的差别最为明显,有的学者认为告子与孟子的人性学说不在一个层次,有的学者暗示告子悟性不足,未能理解孟子的思想。但是至今尚未有人对告子的论述作出连贯、系统的解释。如果我们仔细推敲和辨析告子与孟子的对话,澄清他们的概念与譬喻的含义,会发现告子对于人性的表述是一个层层递进、内在统一的论证体系。虽然告子与孟子的人性学说不相一致,但两者之间并不存在不可逾越的鸿沟。无论从双方论辩的内容还是形式来看,告子都是孟子的一个合适的对话者。     

渐进式论证、连锁型滑坡论证和连锁悖论的概率分析

渐进式论证是一种日常生活中常见的但很少得到专门讨论的论证。不过,和渐进式论证形式几乎完全相同的连锁悖论和连锁型滑坡论证,则得到了不少关注和研究。虽然连锁悖论和连锁型滑坡论证传统上都归为谬误,但我们不需要改变论证的形式而只需要限制推理的长度,就能避免得到荒谬的或不可接受的结论。换而言之,并非所有渐进式论证都像连锁悖论和连锁型滑坡论证一样会得出不能接受的结论。那么,渐进式论证究竟何时得出可接受的结论进而成为一个好的论证,何时得出不可接受的结论而成为谬误？对于连锁型滑坡论证,沃尔顿认为若推理过程从可控区域经过灰色区域最终滑向失控区域,就会得出不可接受的结论。不过,关键的灰色区域如何更为精确地定义和识别？本文将使用概率论和模糊集对渐进式论证、连锁悖论和连锁型滑坡论证的论证过程进行定量刻画,从而回答这些问题,并得到这些论证之间的一些内在联系和不同之处。     

不确定条件下的推理——亚里士多德三种修辞学的“证明”（英文）

1958年,图尔敏出版了《论证之用》。同年,帕尔曼和奥尔布莱希特—泰特卡发表了《新修辞学》。这两部重要著作都明显受到亚里士多德的影响。实际上,帕尔曼甚至把他的著作看作是对亚里士多德理论的扩充和延展。另外,逻辑学家们从亚里士多德的理论中受益匪浅,不仅在于他关于演证理论,更在于他的修辞学理论。亚里士多德提供更丰富的三种方法来扩充关于"证明"的概念,通过这些方法,一个演讲者或者论辩者可能在充满不确定性的情形下被说服。本文探讨关于logos、ethos和pathos这三个概念,逐一解释其含义以及探讨它们在当代与人们之间的关系。     

论应然的基础

应然的基础主要包括真实性、合意性和正义性三个方面.近代以前,人们对于应然的论证,主要强调其真实性基础,即说明其所依据的世界图景的真实性和真理性;近代以来,尤其是人本主义兴起之后,对应然的论证除了真实性基础之外,还要阐明其合意性基础,即说明其符合人的需要,是可欲的、合意的;在当代,人们认识到个体的合意性之间往往存在冲突,开始更多地阐述其正义性基础以调解个体合意性之间可能存在的冲突.如果一个伦理体系不坚持真实性,那么,道德伦理的底线就容易垮塌;如果不重视个体的合意性,那么个人的权利就容易遭到侵犯;如果不重视公平正义,就会损害既有秩序的合法性和稳定性.     

西方伦理思想史上的德福之辩

德福之辩是贯穿古今中外的一个恒久课题。在西方伦理思想史上,德福之辩有其形成和发展的历史,不同的学派和学者对于道德和幸福的关系有着不同的见解,并试图对德福相悖问题做出圆满的解释,由此形成了西方伦理思想史上的德福观。在西方伦理思想史上,对于道德与幸福的探究存在着理性主义、非理性主义和基督教的德福思想,表现出三种不同的德福观。当代西方伦理学者也不断深入探究道德与幸福之间的关系,理论研究呈现出一些新的面向,表现出一些现代性特征。虽然中国伦理思想与西方伦理思想在许多方面存在差异甚至是冲突,但在德福问题上可以形成对话和商谈。     

逻辑的范围

人们在作出陈述时,可能提供论据以支持它们,也可能不这样。一个被论据支持的陈述是一个论证的结论,而逻辑则提供对论证进行分析的工具。逻辑分析所涉及的是结论和支持它的论据之间的关系。人们思考时,作出推理,这些推理可以转变为论证,而逻辑工具这时就应用于这些得出的论证之上。这样,就可以检验产生这些论证的推理。逻辑研究论证与推理。它的主要目的之一是为区别逻辑上正确的与不正确的论证与推理提供方法。     

程序公正、不确定性对公共政策可接受性的影响:情感信任、认知信任的中介作用

为了研究程序公正、不确定性与公共政策可接受性之间的关系,并进一步考察情感信任和认知信任在其中的中介效应,本研究选取公共政策领域,通过问卷调查的方法随机选取510名北京市民进行研究。研究发现,程序公正与公共政策可接受性正相关,不确定性与公共政策可接受性负相关,情感信任中介程序公正与公共政策可接受性,并对不确定性与公共政策可接受性之间有遮掩效应,而认知信任不存在显著的中介作用。     

指称、意向性和纯意向对象（英文）

要使信念和其他命题态度语境的量化有意义,存在两个大的困难。一个是所指称的对象可能不存在;另一个是共指称词项的替换性原则可能会在这样的语境下被破坏。我将在本文中论证,第一个问题可以通过如下方式解决:将信念对象看成是一类实体,这种实体不管它是否存在,都可以被指称。我将概述一种存在物的理论来使其可行。此外,我将论证,指示性指称本身不是直接指称;而且,当所涉及的共指称的两个词项都以直接指称的方式使用时,不存在替换性问题。     

天主造世、耶稣降生显示了天主对人类的爱

教会所信仰的天主是三位一体的天主,即第一位天主圣父,第二位天主圣子,第三位天主圣神。三位一体的天主不是三个天主,而是一个天主有三位。三位即有联系,又有区别。就是说：父、子、圣神享有同一的天主性,即本性上是同一的天主;但位格却彼此独立,即父不是子,子不是父．圣神不是父或子。天主三位之间的关系是爱的共融关系。由于爱,父生了子,子又将这种爱反馈给父,父与子之间的互爱共发了圣神,所以,天主的本质就是爱。     

家庭功能与儿童孤独感的关系：中介的作用

以246名小学三、四、五年级儿童为被试,考察了儿童孤独感、同伴接受性、问题行为与家庭功能的关系。结果发现,儿童的外部问题行为在家庭功能与同伴接受性之间起着中介作用,同伴接受性在外部问题行为与孤独感之间起着中介作用;内部问题行为是家庭功能影响儿童孤独感的中介,而外部问题行为与同伴接受性依次组成家庭功能与孤独感联系的另一间接作用路;不仅如此,家庭功能对儿童孤独感还有较强的直接作用。最后讨论了这些中介作用存在的原因以及适用范围上的限制。     

Tracing and heavenly freedom

A new version of the ontological argument for the existence of God is outlined and examined. After giving a brief account of some traditional ontological arguments for the existence of God, where their defects are identified, it is explained how this new argument is built upon their foundations and surmounts their defects. In particular, this version uses the resources of impossible worlds to plug the common escape route from standard modal versions of the ontological argument. After outlining the nature of impossible worlds, and motivating the need for positing them, the new argument is delineated and its premises justified. It is taken for granted that the argument cannot be sound, since it would prove too much. However, its premises are all plausible, and their denial promises to have significant ramifications. Several intuitive lines of objections are then explored in order to illuminate their shortcomings. The puzzle that the argument poses is therefore not whether the argument is sound, for it clearly cannot be. Rather, it is to place pressure on its plausible premises, so some plausible account of how the argument fails can be identified, and that the devising of such an account promises to be insightful. In the process, we should gain an improved understanding of how such ontological arguments work.     

Ability-based objections to no-best-world arguments

In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call such arguments no-best-world arguments. In this paper, we discuss ability-based objections to such arguments; an ability-based objection to a no-best world argument claims that the argument fails because one or more of its premises conflict with a plausible principle connecting the applicability of some type of moral evaluation to the agent’s possession of a relevant ability. In particular, we formulate and evaluate an important new ability-based objection to the most promising no-best world argument.     

Three arguments for humility

Ramseyan humility is the thesis that we cannot know which properties realize the roles specified by the laws of completed physics. Lewis seems to offer a sceptical argument for this conclusion. Humean fundamental properties can be permuted as to their causal roles and distribution throughout spacetime, yielding alternative possible worlds with the same fundamental structure as actuality, but at which the totality of available evidence is the same. On the assumption that empirical knowledge requires evidence, we cannot know which of these worlds is actual. However, Lewis also appeals to a range of familiar semantic principles when framing his argument, which leads some authors to suppose that he can also plausibly be interpreted as offering a purely semantic argument for humility in addition. In this paper I grant that these arguments are Lewisian, but argue that Lewis is also committed to a theory of mind that licenses a purely metaphysical argument for humility based on the idea that mental properties supervene on fundamental structure. Given that knowing which x is the F requires knowing that a is the F, the supposition that we could come to know which properties actually occupy the fundamental roles entails differences in mental properties between worlds with the same fundamental structure, violating supervenience. Humility follows right away, without any further epistemic or semantic principles. This argument is immune to almost every way of rebutting the sceptical and semantic arguments; conversely, almost every way of rebutting the metaphysical argument tells equally against the others.     

Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox

In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among other things, Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie—error theory’s progenitor—supports a stronger modal reading of error theory. His argument is as follows: Mackie’s is an abductive argument that error theory is the best explanation for divergence in moral practices. Since error theory will likewise be the best explanation for similar divergences in possible worlds similar to our own, we may conclude that error theory is true at all such worlds, just as it is in the actual world. I contend that Brown’s argument must fail, as abductive arguments cannot support the modal conclusions he suggests. I then consider why this is the case, concluding that Brown has stumbled upon new and interesting evidence that agglomerating one’s beliefs can be epistemically problematic—an issue associated most famously with Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox.     

Representation of Argumentation in Text with Rhetorical Structure Theory

Various argumentation analysis tools permit the analyst to represent functional components of an argument (e.g., data, claim, warrant, backing), how arguments are composed of subarguments and defenses against potential counterarguments, and argumentation schemes. In order to facilitate a study of argument presentation in a biomedical corpus, we have developed a hybrid scheme that enables an analyst to encode argumentation analysis within the framework of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST), which can be used to represent the discourse structure of a text. This paper describes the hybrid representation scheme and illustrates its use for investigation of contexts that license omission of elements of an argument. The analyses given in the paper involve reconstruction of enthymemes. Defeasible argumentation schemes serve as a constraint on reconstruction. In addition, the examples illustrate several other types of contextual constraints on reconstruction of enthymemes.     

Books Received

This paper is an attempt to answer the question, ‘could there be causation in a timeless world?’ My conclusion: tentatively, yes. The paper and argument have three parts. Part one introduces salient issues and spells out the importance of this (initially somewhat baroque seeming) line of investigation. Section two of the paper reviews recent arguments due to Baron and Miller, who argue in favour of the possibility of causation in a timeless world, and looks to reject their arguments developed there. Section three is a response to a response. In their, Baron and Miller also argue that an argument in favour of the possibility of causation at timeless worlds, that I put forward, is an argument that fails. In section three, my response to Baron and Miller is that their argument against me succeeds, but that there is a nearby argument that we can appeal to in order to demonstrate the possibility of causation at timeless worlds.     

Meaning Approached Via Proofs

According to a main idea of Gentzen the meanings of the logical constants are reflected by the introduction rules in his system of natural deduction. This idea is here understood as saying roughly that a closed argument ending with an introduction is valid provided that its immediate subarguments are valid and that other closed arguments are justified to the extent that they can be brought to introduction form. One main part of the paper is devoted to the exact development of this notion. Another main part of the paper is concerned with a modification of this notion as it occurs in Michael Dummett’s book The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. The two notions are compared and there is a discussion of how they fare as a foundation for a theory of meaning. It is noted that Dummett’s notion has a simpler structure, but it is argued that it is less appropriate for the foundation of a theory of meaning, because the possession of a valid argument for a sentence in Dummett’s sense is not enough to be warranted to assert the sentence.     

Essentialism and the Necessity of the Laws of Nature

In this paper I discuss and evaluate different arguments for the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I conclude that essentialist arguments from the nature of natural kinds fail to establish that essences are ontologically more basic than laws, and fail to offer an a priori argument for the necessity of all causal laws. Similar considerations carry across to the argument from the dispositionalist view of properties, which may end up placing unreasonable constraints on property identity across possible worlds. None of my arguments preclude the possibility that the laws may turn out to be metaphysically necessary after all, but I argue that this can only be established by a posteriori scientific investigation. I therefore argue for what may seem to be a surprising conclusion: that a fundamental metaphysical question – the modal status of laws of nature – depends on empirical facts rather than purely on a priori reasoning.     

Manipulation and mitigation

Manipulation arguments are commonly deployed to raise problems for compatibilist theories of responsibility. These arguments proceed by asking us to reflect on an agent who has been manipulated to perform some (typically bad) action but who still meets the compatibilist conditions of responsibility. The incompatibilist argues that it is intuitive that the agent in such a case is not responsible even though she met the compatibilist conditions. Thus, it is argued, the compatibilist has not provided conditions sufficient for responsibility. Patrick Todd has recently argued that incompatibilists have taken on a heavier dialectical burden than is necessary. Todd argues that incompatibilists need not argue that an agent in a manipulation case is not at all responsible, but only that her responsibility is mitigated in order to refute compatibilism. Hannah Tierney has responded to Todd’s argument by arguing that a compatibilist can admit that manipulation mitigates responsibility without eliminating it. I argue that Tierney’s response is unsuccessful on its own terms. But, I argue, Todd’s argument can be resisted by way of a parallel counter-argument for compatibilism. I argue that Todd’s argument for incompatibilism is no more powerful than my argument for compatibilism. And since Todd’s manipulation argument is offered as an objection to compatibilism, this amounts to a victory for the compatibilist; the objection is defused.     

The Possibility of Inductive Moral Argumets

Abstract

Is it possible to have moral knowledge? ‘Moral justification skeptics’ hold it is not, because moral beliefs cannot have the sort of epistemic justification necessary for knowledge. This skeptical stance can be summed up in a single, eat argument, which includes the premise that ‘Inductive arguments from non-moral premises to moral conclusions are not possible.’ Other premises in the argument may rejected, but only at some cost. It would be noteworthy, therefore, if ‘inductive inferentialism’ about morals were show to be at least possible. Some philosophers may suppose that inductive moral argumets from non-moral premises cannot get off the ground, but I show that a perfectly legitimate inductive moral argument exists. This argument has on-moral premises and a moral conclusion, its premises are related to its conclusion in the right way, and it avoids some of the problems of other, better-know argumets from ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’.