Ifá divination as an exercise in deconstructionism

Abstract

Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy has largely been met with hostility from African philosophers. Whilst Tempels intended to show that the Bantu were not only capable of thinking, but also that they had a distinct and coherent philosophy of their own, his project seems to have achieved exactly the opposite. Temples’ project sought to expose the racism of thinkers such as Lucien Levy-Bruhl, thereby raising the African to the same status as the Westerner. However, his efforts have been rejected for a number of reasons ranging from the view that it is a theory of magic, freely generalized to the Bantu, to the accusation that his project fails to speak on behalf of the oppressed Bantu and furthermore, that he is overly obsessed with finding the African difference at the cost of reason. In this paper, I seek to argue that a neglected critique of Tempels is one that has to do with the basis of his philosophical racialism. I seek to show that at the root of Bantu Philosophy is racialism grounded in the same assumptions as those made by Levy-Bruhl. I seek to argue that the categories that Tempels creates for Bantu thought do not simply seek to articulate a genuine difference from Western categories. The Bantu categories are coined as inferior, incoherent, inarticulate, illogical, and mystified. I argue that it is for reasons of philosophical racialism that Tempels urges his Western audience to overthrow their logical and articulable systems if they ever want to understand the Bantu system of thought.     

Rationality in Religion

Religion can be defined narrowly as belief in anthropomorphic supernatural beings. For Levy-Bruhl this meant that prelogical ‘mystic participation’ preceded true religion. For Donald Wiebe and others it means that philosophical-scientific rationality has been struggling to replace religion since the axial age. A broader definition of religion interprets rational post-axial theology as a development within religion, not a replacement of true religion. Both definitions are legitimate. The narrow definition highlights a tendency to superstition in religion. The broader definition recognizes the possibility of an evolution of religious thought.     

The early evolution of Jean Piaget's clinical method

This article analyzes the early evolution of Jean Piaget's renowned "clinical method" in order to investigate the method's strikingly original and generative character. Throughout his 1st decade in the field, Piaget frequently discussed and justified the many different approaches to data collection he used. Analysis of his methodological progression during this period reveals that Piaget's determination to access the genuine convictions of children eventually led him to combine 3 distinct traditions in which he had been trained-naturalistic observation, psychometrics, and the psychiatric clinical examination. It was in this amalgam, first evident in his 4th text, that Piaget discovered the clinical dynamic that would drive the classic experiments for which he is most well known.     

Concepts,structures, and meanings

Concepts are basic elements of thought. Piaget has a conception of the nature of concepts as informational or computational operations performed in an inner milieu and enabling the child to understand the world in which it lives and acts. Concepts are, however, not merely logico‐mathematical but are also conceptually linked to the mastery of language which itself involves the appropriate use of words in social and interpersonal settings. In the light of Vygotsky's work on the social and interactive nature of children's thinking and the nature of language as an essentially public currency of rule‐governed signs, we are led to reconstrue conceptual mastery as the acquisition of an interactive and interpersonal repertoire of tools which introduces the child to the world of those who educate it. In this way we come to see the elements of mind as constitutively involving that activity in which the determinants of meaning constrain and direct the child's linguistic development.     

"He sees the development of children's concepts upon a background of sociology": Jean Piaget's honorary degree at Harvard University in 1936

In the recent memory, Jean Piaget has been known as a cognitive developmental psychologist. But in 1936 when Harvard gave him his first honorary degree, he was recognized mainly as a sociologist. Why did Harvard honor him in 1936? Who knew his work well enough to nominate him? This article will address these questions by exploring archival documents from different sources. Evidence draws our attention to a broad social and intellectual endeavor in philanthropy, other social sciences, and especially industrial research that brought Piaget across the water. This article also attempts to interpret the circumstances of the nomination process inside and outside of Harvard University by using a theory of institutional design. It suggests that embodied in Harvard's honor of Piaget in 1936 was an idealistic act in social designing for a future society.     

《易经》是否属于原始思维

有学者依据列维·布留尔的原始思维理论,认为《易经》属于原始思维。但事实上,《易经》无论从创作时代还是思维内容上都与原始思维有着本质上不同,《易经》包含着原始思维所不具备的理性思维。之所以误解《易经》为原始思维,主要是投有真正理解《易经》的“立象以尽意”的思维表达方式。《易经》以其意象表达了辩证、整体的宇宙观,并以此指导现实的人世生活,开创了中国人“推天道以明人事”的形而上学。     

态射的建构与发展:发生认识论的一种动态形式化

发生认识论主要研究认识的心理发生及其形式化。对于后者的研究,上个世纪30年代皮亚杰建构了“群集”结构来解释儿童前运算阶段的思维方式,70年代又引入了数学范畴论来解释形式运算阶段的认知发展,再一次对儿童思维的发展与科学发展两者间的连续性给出了明证。数学范畴论是对数学对象的结构间变换进行形式化的一个数学分支,建构的思想以及对所建构结构进行转换是范畴论的本质,而其中作为范畴对象的态射与态射组合体现了其建构本质,且能最为妥贴地描述认识的动态发生与发展。新的理论建模将对应与转换揉合在一起更好地阐释认知发展过程中每一转换过程的机制与结构发展。本文试图通过介绍认识发生过程中对应、转换的发展,以及所引入数学范畴论中态射的概念,来阐释认识发生中认知生成工具———态射———的建构与发展,以及认知结构的系统发展,从而对皮亚杰晚年这一形式化工作予以简单说明与评价。     

A Response to “Participation: A Religious Worldview” by James M. Gustafson

This response offers an interpretation of James Gustafson's “Participation: A Religious Worldview,” which thinks with Gustafson on the theme of “participation,” while highlighting points where my own thoughts diverge from his. The essay begins by drawing the reader's attention to Gustafson's style, arguing that the simple elegance of his writing constitutes part of his larger claim about the need to remove ourselves from the center of our thought. Next, the essay analyzes Gustafson's use of “participation” by putting it in context and connecting it with his broader methodology. Finally, I draw the reader's attention to important loci in the text in order to show how Gustafson's essay helps address various extant misinterpretations of his thought but also to point to ways in which my “thinking with” Gustafson leads me to think otherwise than he does.     

Cognition,construction of knowledge,and teaching

The existence of objective knowledge and the possibility of communicating it by means of language have traditionally been taken for granted by educators. Recent developments in the philosophy of science and the historical study of scientific accomplishments have deprived these presuppositions of their former plausibility. Sooner or later, this must have an effect on the teaching of science. In this paper I am presenting a brief outline of an alternative theory of knowing that takes into account the thinking organism's cognitive isolation from reality. This orientation was proposed by Vico at the beginning of the 18th century, disregarded for two hundred years, and then propounded independently by Piaget as a developmentally grounded constructivist epistemology. The paper focuses specifically on the adaptive function of cognition, Piaget's scheme theory, the process of communication, and the subjective perspective on social interaction. In the concluding section it then suggests some of the consequences the shift of epistemological presuppositions might have for the practice of teaching.The only truly ubiquitous factor in cognitive developments — be it in the history of science or in the ontogeny of mind — are of a functional, not a structural kind.Piaget and Garcia, 1983, p. 38I am indebted to Jack Lochhead and John Clement for their helpful critical comments on the draft of this paper. The work that led to it was supported in part by NSF Grants to IBR. University of Georgia, and SRRI, University of Massachusetts.     

我国6-10岁儿童的“上苍公正”判断特点

面对一个人的犯过行为与其遭到的继发灾祸,Ｐｉａｇｅｔ指出儿童具有作出“上苍公正”判断的特点,且是其道德发展的表现。Ｋａｒｎｉｏｌ的研究则发现不同的结果,得出了不同的结论。本研究以我国１０６名６－１０岁儿童为被试,所用的研究材料与Ｐｉａｇｅｔ和Ｋａｒｎｉｏｌ相比,在情境故事的结构、内容和因素控制上作了较周密的考虑。研究发现,我国６－１０岁儿童对这一问题存在着四种判断反应类型,这些判断反应不仅具有道德的性质,还与儿童的因果关系推理能力的发展有关。而且,我国儿童从前因果性解释到因果性解释发展的转折年龄约在８岁左右。此外,本研究对影响儿童判断反应的因素,如情境故事的结构和内容,以及可能隐含的内在公正问题进行了探讨。     

Avoiding misinterpretations of Piaget and Vygotsky: Mathematical teaching without learning,learning without teaching,or helpful learning-path teaching?

This article provides an overview of some perspectives about special issues in classroom mathematical teaching and learning that have stemmed from the huge explosion of research in children's mathematical thinking stimulated by Piaget. It concentrates on issues that are particularly important for less-advanced learners and for those who might be having special difficulties in learning mathematics. A major goal of the article is to develop a framework for understanding what effective mathematics teaching and learning is, because doing so is so important for struggling students and for research about them. Piaget's research had a fundamental influence on the on-going tension between understanding and fluency in the classroom, supporting efforts toward increasing understanding. But in some countries, misinterpretations of Piaget led to practices that are counterproductive for children, especially struggling learners. Such misinterpretations are identified and a more balanced approach that also draws on Vygotsky is described—a learning-path developmentally-appropriate learning/teaching approach.     

人类非逻辑思维辨析

按照皮亚杰的观点,成人的思维发展已达到“形式运算”的阶段,能够依据形式逻辑规则进行抽象的合乎逻辑的判断和推理。从此以后,根据逻辑的标准判断人类的推理是否是理性的就自然而然被接受了。然而最近的一些研究发现,人类在现实生活中并不完全遵照形式逻辑的规则来思维,在许多时候都表现出非逻辑的一面,似乎有另一种大家公认的“心理逻辑”。但是,非逻辑并不意味着非理性,从生态学的角度说,很多时候心理逻辑具有理性的一面。     

The mobile frontiers of Piaget’s psychology. From academic tourism to interdisciplinary collaboration / Las fronteras móviles de la psicología de Piaget. Del turismo académico a la colaboración interdisciplinaria

Jean Piaget’s (1896–1980) interdisciplinarity was related to his psychology in several ways. First, he was a simple tourist of other fields: an interested outsider. But as he became increasingly involved in the professionalization of the discipline, he moved through different contexts that constrained the possibilities for successful action in new and different ways. To make these clear, we adopt a little-known aspect of his later epistemological framework: the open hierarchy of levels. This then affords new perspectives of his life, his work, his theory and his location in the history of both Swiss psychology and French psychology. It also outlines his reasoning regarding the necessity of a disciplined approach to interdisciplinary collaboration, institutionalized in the founding of his International Centre for Genetic Epistemology. We therefore come not only to a fuller understanding of how Piaget thought scientific knowledge develops, but also of how the boundaries of scientific disciplines are pushed back.     

SITUATIONS SOCIALES À POTENTIEL CONFLICTUEL ET CARACTÉRISTIQUES SOCIO-COGNITIVES D'ENFANTS AGRESSIFS ET REJETÉS*

Twenty aggressive and rejected children (boys and girls), twenty socially competent and popular children, and twenty children having average social skills - all of which were first and second graders attending regular school - participated in this study. All were presented on videotape with nine typical peer-conflict situations. Each child was asked about the way that he/she felt, and the way that he/she would resolve each problem situation. In addition, each child had to specify what he/she thought to be the offender's intentions in each problem situation. Several points differentiated first grade from second grade subjects. However, aggressive, socially skilled and average subjects distinguished themselves on only a few items. Differences relating to subject's sex were also scarce. Data support the view that aggressive children know as well as other children how to appropriately resolve interpersonal conflict situations. However, they do not use this knowledge because of impulsivity control problems, an inability to correctly identify others' intentions or a lack of motivation.     

墨子音乐美学思想探微

墨子是小手工业者和小生产者的代表,却是一位卓越人物。其博大精深的学术思想、强国谋略、治世之法对后世影响至深,他所提出的以“兼爱、非命”为中心思想体系的学说可与儒家学说“仁义、礼乐”相媲美。墨子的音乐美学思想是其学说中的一个重要部分,也是我国古代音乐宝库中一颗璀璨的明珠,文章从墨子背景谈起,着重论述了墨子的音乐美学思想的内容,以及与“节用”的经济学说和“兼以易别”、“禁恶而劝爱”的政治思想的关系,从而进一步丰富、完善了墨子音乐美学思想的内涵。     

潜逻辑运算类皮亚杰守恒任务中的负启动效应

本研究的目的是检验完成潜逻辑运算类皮亚杰守恒任务是否需要认知抑制的参与。被试为两组11岁的儿童,全部通过了标准皮亚杰重量及液体守恒任务。实验一发现儿童在解决类皮亚杰重量守恒任务时出现了负启动效应,负启动量为138.06ms。实验二发现儿童在完成类皮亚杰液体守恒任务时仍然存在负启动效应,负启动量为67.4ms。实验结果表明要成功完成潜逻辑运算领域类皮亚杰守恒任务,也需要认知抑制过程的参与。     

Studying Children’s Religious Knowledge: Contributions of Ethnography and the Clinical-Critical Method

We analyze different methodological and conceptual contributions of anthropology and psychogenetic theory to the research of children’s religious knowledge. We argue that for the study of children’s points of view it is possible to build an approach that links aspects studied by both disciplinary fields. With this aim, we revise some of their basic theoretical assumptions and recent reviews as well as their methodological proposals. Then we review the core characteristics of ethnography and the clinical–critical method—proposed by Piaget’s psychogenetic theory—with the goal of stressing their potentialities as well as their limitations in research. We argue that within an ethnographic approach, we must establish certain restrictions on the clinical–critical method following basic premises of social anthropology. This approach lets us demonstrate the importance of understanding children’s constructions by placing them within social relations that children produce and update in everyday interactions.     

列斐伏尔日常生活批判概念的前后转变

作为西方马克思主义的创始人之一,列斐伏尔的核心贡献在于他首次提出了日常生活批判这个概念,但前后期有明显区别。本文概括了这种前后观点的转变。总体来说,他早期对日常生活主要采取了一种相对比较哲学化的与乐观化的立场：认为被异化的日常生活世界既包括着被压迫的因素,也包括着解放的因素;日常生活是各种社会活动与社会制度结构的最深层次连接处,是一切文化现象的共同基础,也是导致总体性革命的策源地。而他后期则对日常生活理解得更加微观(即社会学化),也相对悲观了一些：认为在发达资本主义社会,现代日常生活被全面地组织到纳入到生产与消费的总体环节中去。现代社会成了一个“消费被引导的官僚社会”,而不是一个可供人们自由选择的休闲社会、丰裕社会。     

Eight good questions for developmental epistemology and psychology

My reply to eight good questions arising from commentary is an elaboration of my main argument that there are parallels in the epistemologies of Frege and Piaget and that these parallels have distinctive implications for developmental psychology. The eight questions are: (i) was Piaget really an epistemologist? (ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological? (iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity? (iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism? (v) what is the relation between thinking and thought? (vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow? (vii) how are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought? (viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought? These questions are productive, and can be developed.     

Jung and Lévy-Bruhl

Abstract: For his knowledge of ‘primitive’ peoples, C. G. Jung relied on the work of Lucien Lévy‐Bruhl (1857–1939), a French philosopher who in mid‐career became an armchair anthropologist. In a series of books from 1910 on, Lévy‐Bruhl asserted that ‘primitive’ peoples had been misunderstood by modern Westerners. Rather than thinking like moderns, just less rigorously, ‘primitives’ harbour a mentality of their own. ‘Primitive’ thinking is both ‘mystical’ and ‘prelogical’. By ‘mystical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ peoples experience the world as identical with themselves. Their relationship to the world, including to fellow human beings, is that of participation mystique. By ‘prelogical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ thinking is indifferent to contradictions. ‘Primitive’ peoples deem all things identical with one another yet somehow still distinct. A human is at once a tree and still a human being. Jung accepted unquestioningly Lévy‐Bruhl's depiction of the ‘primitive’ mind, even when Jung, unlike Lévy‐Bruhl, journeyed to the field to see ‘primitive’ peoples firsthand. But Jung altered Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ mentality in three key ways. First, he psychologized it. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is to be explained sociologically, for Jung it is to be explained psychologically: ‘primitive’ peoples think as they do because they live in a state of unconsciousness. Second, Jung universalized ‘primitive’ mentality. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is ever more being replaced by modern thinking, for Jung ‘primitive’ thinking is the initial psychological state of all human beings. Third, Jung appreciated ‘primitive’ thinking. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is false, for Jung it is true—once it is recognized as an expression not of how the world but of how the unconscious works. I consider, along with the criticisms of Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ thinking by his fellow anthropologists and philosophers, whether Jung in fact grasped all that Lévy‐Bruhl meant by ‘primitive’ thinking.