Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

Life and death in Freudian metapsychology: A reappraisal of the second instinctual dualism1

In this paper we re‐examine the second instinctual dualism hypothesis introduced by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. We suggest that the life instinct hypothesis as something opposed to the death instinct does not seem to fit into this theory easily. On the other hand, death instinct turns out to be an internal necessity of Freudian metapsychological theory from the beginning of Freud ’s metapsychological writing. We shall argue, based on the ideas formulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and in later metapsychological texts, that Freud could not wholly justify the existence of an opposition and a symmetry between the two classes of instincts. Even though up to his last works Freud held on to this instinctual dualism, again and again his arguments lead to the idea that the life instincts should be regarded, ultimately, as death instincts.     

On the Nature and Meaning of Human Finitude

This article considers the interaction between psychoanalysis and philosophy by examining the meaning of human finitude in the work of Freud and Heidegger. Although Freud and Heidegger develop radically different systems of thought, they are surprisingly close in their examination of the human attitude toward death. Freud's philosophical reflections on the nature of death are ultimately subsumed in his speculative theory of the death instinct, which is far removed from the lived experience of finitude. Heidegger's ontological account of death draws from lived experience but neglects the relational nature of finitude. Drawing on the connection between the work of Binswanger and Stolorow, I maintain that finitude is a fundamentally relational phenomenon. While philosophy can help us to understand and formulate an account of human finitude, the relational nature of psychoanalysis can help us bear the trauma associated with death.     

Why Didn’t Freud Reject Pfister? A Response to Isabelle Noth and Christoph Morgenthaler

The Freud-Pfister correspondence is in some sense an Urtext for the most friendly debate imaginable between the self-identified “godless Jew” who founded psychoanalysis, and the liberal Swiss pastor who was drawn to psychoanalysis while retaining his belief in God. Why didn’t Freud reject Pfister? This article will probe this question using the tools of psychoanalysis itself. After reviewing Freud’s associations to childhood religion, the Bible, and his father (citing Rizzuto), I am proposing that Pfister functioned unconsciously for Freud not only as an admiring son and disciple, but also a father substitute—much like Freud’s beloved antiquities—who represented both a God and a father who would admire and love him, and carry Freud’s name forward in the Book of Life.     

Freud and the Psychoanalysis of Telepathy: Commentary on Claudie Massicotte’s “Psychical Transmissions”

Freud was interested in and eventually accepted the diverse forms of telepathic communication as psychoanalytic rather than occult phenomena, particularly as manifested in dreams. Massicotte revisits the topic of Freud and his interest in the occult in a manner that invites serious reconsideration of this aspect of his work, long the subject of intense controversy in the history of psychoanalysis. In my response to Massicotte’s paper I argue that Freud’s interest in telepathy or thought transference belongs to his psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious and transference. His approach to telepathy parallels his approach to religious beliefs: He accounts for both as creations of the human mind as individuals attempt to make sense and meaning of their real experiences. What Freud meant by telepathy is what contemporary psychoanalysis refers to as unconscious communication, and the strange, often inexplicable forms it takes in clinical contexts. For Freud, instances of telepathy or unconscious communication are to be understood contextually and relationally, revealing important data about the nature of affectively charged human relationships.     

The plight and promise of contemporary psychoanalysis in the light of its social history

This paper addresses the many changes which have beset psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic community since the widespread, general acceptance of both by the educated, middle-class public in the 1950s. It attempts to explain these changes, at least in part, by reflecting upon them in the light of the history of the psychoanalytic movement and upon the rise of dynamic psychology as well. Many in the psychoanalytic community think that their work is being ignored, devalued, and even attacked by an increasing number of influential persons and organizations. Critics claim that, epistemologically, psychoanalysis is scientifically invalid; therapeutically, it is ineffective; economically, it is too costly and takes too long; and theoretically, it is pluralized to the point of fragmentation. This is the plight of psychoanalysis. This paper argues that many of the major problems which once beset Freud and his colleagues, and which beset the psychoanalytic community today, are best understood in terms of two sociological processes, legitimation and institutionalization. Legitimation is the socio-cultural process whereby a new idea (e.g., Freud's theories, Jung's theories) contests the established web of ideas which give coherence and meaning to social and personal identity. Institutionalization refers to the way legitimated ideas replace once-contested views of reality. The single most decisive factor generating the plight of contemporary psychoanalysis is the ‘decision’ (1) to socially locate (institutionalize) psychoanalysis in institutes, rather than in clinics or universities, and (2) to represent psychoanalysis to the public (legitimation) as a medical science. In order to illustrate and advance these claims, I first define and distinguish sociologically the institute, the clinic and the university. Second, I describe the origins and development of the ‘decision’, made by Freud and his followers, to locate or institutionalize psychoanalysis in institutes. Third, I compare and contrast this early pattern of legitimation and institutionalization with that of the present-day psychoanalytic movement in England (relatively benign institutionalization) and in the United States (relatively destructive institutionalization). Throughout this discussion I draw upon the new literature on the history of psychoanalysis, past and present. As for the ‘promise’ for psychoanalysis, it can materialize insofar as psychoanalysis establishes contact with the clinic and the university (re-legitimation) and insofar as that contact becomes so self-evident that it is taken for granted (i.e., it is re-institutionalized).     

‘Freud's speculations in ethnology’: A reflection on anthropology's encounter with psychoanalysis

In the early 20th century, many analysts – Freud and Ernest Jones in particular – were confident that cultural anthropologists would demonstrate the universal nature of the Oedipus complex and other unconscious phenomena. Collaboration between the two disciplines, however, was undermined by a series of controversies surrounding the relationship between psychology and culture. This paper re‐examines the three episodes that framed anthropology's early encounter with psychoanalysis, emphasizing the important works and their critical reception. Freud's Totem and Taboo began the interdisciplinary dialogue, but it was Bronislaw Malinowski's embrace of psychoanalysis – a development anticipated through a close reading of his personal diaries – that marked a turning point in relations between the two disciplines. Malinowski argued that an avuncular (rather than an Oedipal) complex existed in the Trobriand Islands. Ernest Jones’ critical dismissal of this theory alienated Malinowski from psychoanalysis and ended ethnographers’ serious exploration of Freudian thought. A subsequent ethnographic movement, ‘culture and personality,’ was erroneously seen by many anthropologists as a product of Freudian theory. When ‘culture and personality’ was abandoned, anthropologists believed that psychoanalysis had been discredited as well – a narrative that still informs the historiography of the discipline and its rejection of psychoanalytical theory.     

Revisiting the crisis in Freud's libido theory and Abraham's concept of the oral‐sadistic phase as a way out of it

The now available unabridged correspondence between Freud and Abraham leads to a re‐evaluation of the significance of Abraham's work. The author proposes the thesis that clinical observations by Karl Abraham of the ambivalence of object relations and the destructive‐sadistic aspects of orality have an important influence on the advancement of psychoanalytical theory. The phantasy problem of the Wolf Man and the question of the pathogenic relevance of early actual, or merely imagined traumata led Freud to doubt the validity of his theory. He attempted repeatedly to solve this problem using libido theory, but failed because of his problematic conception of oral erotics. The pathogenic effect of presymbolic traumatizations cannot be demonstrated scientifically because of the still underdeveloped brain in the early stage of the child's development. Consequently, the important empirical evidence of a scientific neurosis theory could not be provided. A revision of the theory of the instincts thus became necessary. With Abraham's clinical contributions and other pathologic evidence, Freud was, with some reservation, forced to modify his idea of oral erotics by ascribing to it a status of a merely constructed and fictive phase of oral organization. A solution was eventually facilitated via recognition of non‐erotic aggression and destruction, thereby opening libido theory to fundamental revisions. Driven by the desire to develop a scientific theory, Freud initially had, in his first theory of the instincts, assumed a strongly causal‐deterministic view on Psychic Function. His third revision of theory of the instincts, Beyond the Pleasure Principle including the death instinct hypothesis, considered the hermeneutic aspect of psychoanalytic theory, which had previously existed only implicitly in his theory. Further development of the death instinct hypothesis by Melanie Klein and her successors abandoned quantitative‐economic and causal‐deterministic principles, and instead focused on the practical utility of the psychoanalytic theory.     

Freud with Charcot: Freud's discovery and the question of diagnosis

Although Charcot's seminal role in influencing Freud is widely stated, although Freud's trip to Paris to study with Charcot is well recognized as pivotal in his shift from neurological to psychopathological work, a key fact of the Freudian heuristic remains largely underestimated: namely, that Freud's psychopathological breakthrough, which gave birth to psychoanalysis, cannot be separated from his ‘diagnostic preoccupation’, which is a crucial and at times the first organizing principle of his earliest writings. The purpose of this article is therefore to reopen the question of diagnosis by following its development along the path leading from Charcot to Freud. The authors demonstrate that Freud's careful attention to diagnostic distinctions follows strictly in the direction of Charcot's ‘nosological method’. More importantly, the article intends to identify the precise way in which his ideas operate in Freud's own work, in order to understand how Freud reinvests them to forge his own nosological system. If the authors trace the destiny of Charcot's lessons as they reach Freud's hands, it is the importance granted to mixed neuroses in Freud's psychopathology that allows them to pinpoint the role played by the diagnostic process in the rationality of psychoanalysis.     

Notes on ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and Strachey’s translation as ‘instinct for mastery’

This short paper looks at Freud’s use of the term ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and its translation by Strachey as ‘instinct for mastery’ when Freud was describing the motives behind his grandson’s game with the wooden reel and string in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The word ‘Macht’ [power], which is contained in the word ‘Bemächtigung’ points to Freud’s difficult relationship with Alfred Adler, whose early theories on the aggressive drive and later theories on ‘striving for power’ were initially rejected by Freud. Looking at the changes in Freud’s reception of Adlerian terms, some of which he later integrated into his own theory, throws light on his choice of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ in 1920, when he was just beginning to introduce his thoughts on the death instinct. A slightly different translation of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’, one which takes these historical and theoretical aspects into account, could make these connections clearer for the English reader.     

Grant Me the Knowledge of What I Want Because All I Know Is That I Want: A Lacanian View of Hysteria

ABSTRACT

Freud’s work with hysterics led him to the discovery of the unconscious and the founding of psychoanalysis. The dream of the beautiful butcher’s wife, one of Freud’s patients, is examined following Lacan’s added insights that give full credit to his well known statement: “The unconscious is structured like a language.” Three basic identifications are presented by Lacanian analysis and I add a clinical vignette that exemplifies my work in the treatment of a couple.     

‘An unpublished letter by Sigmund Freud on the Shakespeare authorship question’

This article provides the text of the English translation of Sigmund Freud’s previously unpublished 1935 letter to Percy Allen, the only known letter in which Freud expresses his unqualified support for the theory that ‘William Shakespeare’ was the pen name of Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford (1550–1604). The article summarizes the literature on Freud’s authorship views, showing that scholars who disagree with Freud on this matter have minimized his opinion by pathologizing it, or emphasizing Freud’s reservations about the matter. The prevailing theory as to who wrote Shakespeare, on close examination, turns out to be based primarily on circular thinking, confirmation bias, tradition, authority, groupthink, and enforcement of a taboo against the presentation or objective consideration of conflicting evidence. In addition, it originated before we had a better understanding of the high frequency of anonymous, pseudonymous, and allonymous literature in Elizabethan England. The reputations enjoyed by leading Shakespeare scholars lead nonspecialists to assume that these experts can be trusted to tell us who wrote Shakespeare. Unfortunately, Shakespeare scholars falsely claim absolute certainty that they know that ‘Shakespeare wrote Shakespeare.’ Freud’s dissenting opinion has been supported by increasing evidence since 1935.     

弗洛伊德的得意门生——亚伯拉罕和费伦茨对精神分析发展的贡献

亚伯拉罕和费伦茨都是弗洛伊德的早期弟子,他们在精神分析早期理论以及治疗技术的创新和发展中都有着重要的贡献。亚伯拉罕重新划分了弗洛伊德的心理性欲发展阶段并探讨了前俄狄浦斯期的母子关系,这都深深影响了后来的客体关系学派;费伦茨发展了弗洛伊德的性诱惑理论并在治疗技术上做出了许多革新,这为精神分析后来的发展开辟出了更广阔的道路。     

The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: a look into Freud's rhetorical tool box

In my ‘Seven Sins of Pseudo-Science’ (Journal for General Philosophy of Science 1993) I argued against Grünbaum that Freud commits all Seven Sins of Pseudo-Science. Yet how does Freud manage to fool many people, including such a sophisticated person as Grünbaum? My answer is that Freud is a sophisticated pseudo-scientist, using all Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist to keep up appearances, to wit, (1) the Humble Empiricist, (2) the Severe Selfcriticism, (3) the Unbiased Me, (4) the Striking but Irrelevant Example, (5) the Proof Given Elsewhere, (6) the Favorable Compromise, and (7) the Display of Methodological Sophistication. One should note that not all strategies are disreputable in themselves. But all are used very cunningly so as to hide weaknesses in Freud's arguments. To be fair, quite a few of his methodological remarks are sophisticated enough. As Freud combines these sophisticated remarks with an appalling methodology in practice, I call him a sophisticated pseudo-scientist. I do not claim that these rhetorical strategies are specific to him.     

One Pilgrim's Progress Toward the Psychoanalytic Citadel

My psychoanalytic odyssey started in my childhood. My parents were avid readers of Freud and discussed his views with their friends. Our family doctor had been analyzed by Freud and spoke to my family about it on many occasions. I renewed my interest in psychoanalysis in college while studying English literature and then even more so in medical school, where we had a very inspiring department of psychiatry. My psychoanalytic training was to cross many frontiers: orthodox Freud, classical Freud, Fairbairn, Winnicott, and then Klein and Bion. I entered the field of psychoanalysis at a time when it was highly respected and virtually dominated the field of psychiatry, especially in medical schools. I have sadly watched its decline from popular favor and was even sadder to encounter its bitter divisiveness, especially in this country. Today psychoanalysis is left divisive and more variegated. Many different schools of thought have emerged that are now accorded legitimacy, fortunately. One might say that I have seen it at its best and at its worst but have not lost faith in its capacity to excite one's imagination and to inspire hope for a more evolved consciousness of self.     

Commentary on ‘The arms of the chimeras’ by Béatrice Ithier

In this Commentary I will first of all summarise my understanding of the proposal set out by Béatrice Ithier concerning her concept of the ‘chimera’. The main part of my essay will focus on Ithier's claim that her concept of the chimera could be described as a ‘mental squiggle’ because it corresponds to Winnicott's work illustrated in his book ‘Therapeutic Consultations’ (1971). At the core of Ithier's chimera is the notion of a traumatic link between analyst and patient, which is the reason she enlists the work of Winnicott. I will argue, however, that Ithier's claim is based on a misperception of the theory that underpins Winnicott's therapeutic consultations because, different from Ithier's clinical examples of work with traumatised patients, Winnicott is careful to select cases who are from an ‘average expectable environment’ i.e. a good enough family. Moreover, Winnicott does not refer to any traumatic affinity with his patients, or to experiencing a quasi‐hallucinatory state of mind during the course of the consultations. These aspects are not incorporated into his theory. In contrast (to the concept Ithier attempts to advance), Winnicott's squiggle game constitutes an application of psychoanalysis intended as a diagnostic consultation. In that sense Winnicott's therapeutic consultations are comparable with the ordinary everyday work between analyst and analysand in a psychoanalytic treatment. My Commentary concludes with a question concerning the distinction between the ordinary countertransference in working with patients who are thinking symbolically in contrast to an extraordinary countertransference that I suggest is more likely to arise with patients who are traumatised and thus functioning at a borderline or psychotic level.     

“Transferring” and transference

This paper is part of my research into psychotic transference and is also related to the psychotic aspect of any adult or infantile patient in analysis. In my research, I studied the origin of the concept of transference in Charcot's time before Freud, and the transformation of this concept in psychoanalysis. Freud thought that psychotic patients were not able to establish a transference relationship, but some of his early papers show the opposite. In fact, Freud himself and then several other analysts were able to develop a personal experience regarding the possibility of contact and transferring feelings and delusional experiences in a therapeutic context – individual, group, or institution. I provide some clinical examples in this paper, as well as some theoretical, personal views regarding intrapersonal and interpersonal transference. Like Freud and Melanie Klein, I believe that transference starts with life, but that in psychoanalysis it has a particular meaning.     

The Vanishing Mother: Reply to Commentaries

In this response to discussions by Aron and Boyarin I draw attention to the instability of the figure of the mother within Freud's presentation of his life, as well as within psychoanalysis. I link this instability to the figure of a “spectral” mother and perhaps subversive aspects of femininity. Whereas Aron links castration anxiety with prevailing anti-Semitic ideas, I look to the Jewish ritual of the Brit Milah and the laws of Niddah, which further reveal attempts to control and contain femininity. Boyarin raises a concern between historicizing and psychoanalyzing Freud that I consider a misreading. I believe my hybrid method of moving between historical, cultural, religious, and psychoanalytic planes, as lived by Freud within his family, is not so different from Boyarin's own approach.     

Sándor Ferenczi und der Institutionskonflikt der Psychoanalyse

By the foundation of the International Psychoanalytical Association by Freud, Jung and Ferenczi the “psychoanalytic movement” joined into regulated tracks. Thus, the project “Psychoanalysis”, a project in the spirit of the “Aufklärung”, which had prescribed itself to individualistic autonomy, got into breach. In this contribution the reasons are reflected in regard to the establishment as non-university science and the threat of marginalization. They objected Freud’s pretension of influence and belonging. It is unclear why it was explicitly Sándor Ferenczi who was designated to be the precursor of that foundation. He was initially a critical opponent of Freud’s thoughts. His biography illustrates that the institutionalization of psychoanalysis happened too early and that this brought scientific isolation and personal distress over his life when, at the end of his life, he strived for emanzipation in his relationship to Freud.     

Hidden in Plain Sight: Freud's Jewish Identity Revisited

Using a contextualizing, integrative approach, the author looks at aspects of Freud's life and the multiple levels of influence in terms of his theories. While keeping a broad overview of the historical and cultural life for Jews in 19th-century Europe, including the effects of anti-Semitism, emancipation, and the enlightenment movement, the author intertwines Freud's parents' lives and personalities as they played out in Freud's own development and in his theories. The author believes that Freud formed a particular repression linking Jewishness, passivity, femininity, and religion while elevating in his theories masculinity, activity, science, and atheism. The author specifically focuses on Freud's theories of the Unconscious and the oedipal complex as particularly representative of a split between his own Jewish home and the German high culture he was educated within. Drawing on literature within psychoanalysis and the disciplines of Jewish studies and broad cultural history, the author concludes that Freud's rejection of certain parts of his own life are embedded within his theory when considered from a multiply-layered point of view.