Is the sense of bodily ownership related to pre-reflective bodily awareness? A reply to Kuhle

There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily awareness: the sense of bodily ownership. Unfortunately, I argue, there is little reason to believe a relationship between pre-reflective bodily awareness and the sense of bodily ownership exists. Until more work is done, pre-reflective bodily awareness remains beyond our empirical grasp.     

The Feeling of Bodily Ownership

In certain startling neurological and psychiatric conditions, what is ordinarily most intimate and familiar to us—our own body—can feel alien. For instance, in cases of somatoparaphrenia subjects misattribute their body parts to others, while in cases of depersonalization subjects feel estranged from their bodies. These ownership disorders thus appear to consist in a loss of any feeling of bodily ownership, the felt sense we have of our bodies as our own. Against this interpretation of ownership disorders, I defend Sufficiency, the thesis that every experience of bodily awareness suffices for a feeling of bodily ownership. Since Sufficiency conflicts with a face-value interpretation of these ownership disorders, the burden is on me to explain away the apparent tension. To do so, I identify and correct what I believe to be the fundamental mistake in the extant literature on the feeling of bodily ownership, namely the tendency to treat the notion of a feeling of bodily ownership as a single psychological construct. Instead, I distinguish the feeling of minimal ownership, the first-personal character of bodily awareness, from the feeling of affective ownership, the distinctive type of felt concern we have for our bodies. I motivate this distinction by raising the disownership puzzle, the fact that subjects suffering from ownership disorders display an ambiguous set of symptoms, arguing the distinction I draw between minimal and affective ownership is just what is required to resolve the puzzle.     

Bodily Awareness, Imagination and the Self

Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in ways in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title ‘bodily awareness’. The legitimacy of grouping together these ways of gaining information is shown by the fact that they are unified phenomenologically; they provide the subject with an awareness of his or her body ‘from the inside’. Bodily awareness is an awareness of our own bodies from within. This perspective on our own bodies does not, cannot, vary. As Merleau‐Ponty writes, ‘my own body…is always presented to me from the same angle’ (1962: 90). It has recently been claimed by a number of philosophers that, in bodily awareness, one is not simply aware of one's body as one's body, but one is aware of one's body as oneself. That is, when I attend to the object of bodily awareness I am presented not just with my body, but with my ‘bodily self’. The contention of the present paper is that such a view is misguided. In the first section I clarify just what is at issue here. In the remainder of the paper I present an argument, based on two claims about the nature of the imagination, against the view that the bodily self is presented in bodily awareness. Section two defends the dependency thesis; a claim about the relation between perception and sensory imagination. Section three defends a certain view about our capacity to imagine being other people. Section four presents the main argument against the bodily self awareness view and section five addresses some objections.     

The body in action

This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent’s awareness of her own action. In “Kinaesthetic awareness and control,” I sketch how I think the experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described. On this background, I move on to present, in “Arguments for epistemic role,” three arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving is epistemically important to one’s awareness of acting intentionally. In the final “Concluding remarks,” I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated the denial of my claim in the first place.

The multisensory basis of the self: From body to identity to others

By grounding the self in the body, experimental psychology has taken the body as the starting point for a science of the self. One fundamental dimension of the bodily self is the sense of body ownership that refers to the special perceptual status of one’s own body, the feeling that “my body” belongs to me. The primary aim of this review article is to highlight recent advances in the study of body ownership and our understanding of the underlying neurocognitive processes in three ways. I first consider how the sense of body ownership has been investigated and elucidated in the context of multisensory integration. Beyond exteroception, recent studies have considered how this exteroceptively driven sense of body ownership can be linked to the other side of embodiment, that of the unobservable, yet felt, interoceptive body, suggesting that these two sides of embodiment interact to provide a unifying bodily self. Lastly, the multisensorial understanding of the self has been shown to have implications for our understanding of social relationships, especially in the context of self–other boundaries. Taken together, these three research strands motivate a unified model of the self inspired by current predictive coding models.     

“The body I call ‘mine’ ”: A sense of bodily ownership in Descartes

How does Descartes characterize the peculiar way in which each of us is aware of our bodies? I argue that Descartes recognizes a sense of bodily ownership, such that the body sensorily appears to be one's own in bodily awareness. This sensory appearance of ownership is ubiquitous, for Descartes, in that bodily awareness always confers a sense of ownership. This appearance is confused, in so far as bodily awareness simultaneously represents the subject as identical to, partially composed by, and united to her body, without distinguishing these relations. Finally, the appearance of ownership is grounded in multiple other ways in which the body sensorily appears: namely, in the fact that the body appears to be inescapable, modified by bodily sensations, and an object of special concern.     

Seeing Empty Space

Abstract: In this paper I offer an account of a particular variety of perception of absence, namely, visual perception of empty space. In so doing, I aim to make explicit the role that seeing empty space has, implicitly, in Mike Martin's account of the visual field. I suggest we should make sense of the claim that vision has a field—in Martin'ss sense—in terms of our being aware of its limitations or boundaries. I argue that the limits of the visual field are our own sensory limitations, and that we are aware of them as such. Seeing empty space, I argue, involves a structural feature of experience that constitutes our awareness of our visual sensory limitations, and thus, in virtue of which vision has a field.     

权力具身效应的影响因素及机制

具身认知为人们解读“权力”提供了新的理论基础和方法论,但以往多数研究强调语言层面上权力的概念表征,较少关注权力的社会具身效应。本文通过梳理国内外权力具身认知研究的文献,从情境、文化因素、个体因素等方面分析权力具身效应的影响因素,并揭示身体经验影响权力认知和行为的心理机制和过程——模态启动。在此基础上进一步明确未来的研究方向,应从社会具身效应的作用机制、多重心理机制、权力具身效应的神经机制、应用研究等方面进行深入研究。     

身体拥有感及其可塑性：基于内外感受研究的视角

身体自我表征中的身体拥有感(即我的身体属于我的感受)问题一直是自我意识研究的核心话题。大量的已有研究表明, 身体拥有感的体验涉及不同感官信号的整合, 当前大多数研究只重视视觉、触觉等外感受的作用, 一方面忽视了内感受的作用, 另一方面也缺乏对两类感受整合的关注。橡胶手错觉实验和身体障碍患者身上所表现出的外感受和内感受对身体拥有感的影响支持了身体拥有感的可塑性假设, 自由能量原理认为身体拥有感形成的基础是大脑不断评估更新可能性表征来维持稳定。未来的研究需要从改善内感受的测量和刺激呈现方法, 探索影响内感受的高阶认知因素以及关注某些神经症患者的内感受等方面寻求突破。     

More of myself: Manipulating interoceptive awareness by heightened attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self

Psychology distinguishes between a bodily and a narrative self. Within neuroscience, models of the bodily self are based on exteroceptive sensorimotor processes or on the integration of interoceptive sensations. Recent research has revealed interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive processing of self-related information, for example that mirror self-observation can improve interoceptive awareness. Using heartbeat perception, we measured the effect on interoceptive awareness of two experimental manipulations, designed to heighten attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self. Participants gazed at a photograph of their own face or at self-relevant words. In both experimental conditions interoceptive awareness was significantly increased, compared to baseline. Results show that attention to narrative aspects of self, previously regarded as relying on higher-order processes, has an effect similar to self-face stimuli in improving interoceptive awareness. Our findings extend the previously observed interaction between the bodily self and interoception to more abstract amodal representations of the self.     

The body in clinical cognitive theory: from beck to mindfulness

Working with the body in Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) is often seen as a ‘means to an end’; that is, a vehicle for diverting attention from negative thought patterns, thereby fostering a detached metacognitive awareness of problematic thinking. The MBCT literature, however, accords the body a more central role. The literature expresses both the idea that the body is integral to a basic level of meaning creation experienced as a ‘bodily felt sense of something’ and that direct sensory or bodily awareness can contribute to a critical change in the felt sense of emotional difficulties. Tracing the development of the concept of the body in clinical cognitive theory, the paper concludes that these ideas of the body are anticipated in earlier revisions to Beck's schema theory. The paper concludes that research into the psychological mechanisms behind bodily awareness would be a fruitful supplement to the current research focus on metacognitive awareness.     

The construction of emotional experience: State‐related emotional awareness and its application to psychotherapy research and practice

The cognitive–developmental theory of ‘levels of emotional awareness’ (LEA) addresses an individual's capacity to experience and express emotion, a capacity highly relevant to psychotherapy. Previous papers on LEA and psychotherapy addressed the aspect of LEA theory pertaining to the ‘trait’ (i.e. enduring) aspects of an individual's emotional functioning over time. LEA theory also applies to the construction of emotional experience at any given moment, in which levels emerge or disappear in a process of microgenetic construction as a function of arousal and other variables. This state‐related perspective is supported by recent research showing that people vary in their LEA from moment to moment. Momentary changes in LEA correspond to the variations in lived experience that occur in relationships, including the therapy relationship, and provide the context for corrective emotional experiences that promote change. In this paper, the construction of emotional experience at different levels of organisation is discussed separately in relation to clients and therapists. Key phenomena relevant to psychotherapy include the transition from bodily sensations to specific differentiated emotional feelings, the ability to be aware of multiple feelings that may be contradictory or counter‐intuitive, and the appreciation of how complex combinations of feelings may differ in self and other. This perspective adds to the literature on how the integration of emotion and cognition contributes to change in psychotherapy. The clinical and research implications of this perspective are discussed.     

My body as an object: self-distance and social experience

In phenomenology the body is often referred to as the lived body which makes the world familiar to me. In this paper, however, I discuss bodily self-consciousness in terms of self-distance. Self-distance is the suggestion that bodily self-consciousness consist in a reflective stance where you conceive of your body as a physical thing, an object in the world as well as the subject of bodily experiences. I argue that we are bodily self-conscious because we experience our own body in more than one way and that these ways are not derivative of one another or hierarchically ordered. This latter claim conflicts with certain phenomenological readings of how the body is experienced, one of which I will refer to and discuss as the Familiarity Objection to my idea of self-distance. I end the paper with a discussion of why we need the conception of experienced objectification that is entailed in the notion of self-distance to account for both pathological and non-pathological bodily self-experiences. The notion of self-distance improves our understanding of how the body plays a central role in psychosis for the experience of distorted inter-subjective relations.     

Misattribution in Virtual Groups: The Effects of Member Distribution on Self‐Serving Bias and Partner Blame

Interest in virtual groups has focused on attribution biases due to the collocation or distribution of partners. No previous research examines self‐attributions in virtual groups, yet self‐attributions—the acknowledgment of personal responsibility or its deflection—potentially determines learning and improvement. This study reviews research on attributions in virtual groups and the effects of distance on members’ proclivity to blame others or themselves. An experiment involved groups whose members were geographically collocated, distributed, or mixed, working over 2 weeks exclusively using asynchronous computer‐mediated communication. Attributions for participants’ own poor performance reflected a self‐serving bias in completely distributed groups, whose members eschewed personal responsibility and blamed their partners more than in collocated groups. Mixed groups’ results help distinguish among competing theoretical perspectives. Moreover, an externally imposed observational goal mitigated attributional bias among distributed members by raising awareness of the sociotechnical effects of communication medium among those for whom the goal was successfully induced.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Interoceptive awareness and unaware fear conditioning: are subliminal conditioning effects influenced by the manipulation of visceral self-perception?

Research has shown repeatedly that attention influences implicit learning effects. In a similar vein, interoceptive awareness might be involved in unaware fear conditioning: The fact that the CS is repeatedly presented in the context of aversive bodily experiences might facilitate the development of conditioned responding. We investigated the role of interoceptive attention in a subliminal conditioning paradigm. Conditioning was embedded in a spatial cueing task with subliminally presented cues that were followed by a masking stimulus. Response times to the targets that were either validly or invalidly predicted by the cues served as index of conditioning. Interoceptive attention was manipulated between-subjects. Half the participants completed a heartbeat detection task before conditioning. This task tunes attention to one’s own bodily signals. We found that conditioned responding was facilitated in this latter group of participants. These results are in line with the hypothesis that a rise interoceptive attention enhances unaware conditioned responding.     

Bodily movement – The fundamental dimensions

Bodily movement has become an interesting topic in recent philosophy, both in analytic and phenomenological versions. Philosophy from Descartes to Kant defined the human being as a mental subject in a material body. This mechanistic attitude toward the body still lingers on in many studies of motor learning and control. The article shows how alternative philosophical views can give a better understanding of bodily movement. The article starts with Heidegger's contribution to overcoming the subject-object dichotomy and his new understanding of the primacy of the practical involvement with the surrounding world. Heidegger, however, in many ways neglected the role of the human body. Merleau-Ponty took a huge step forward when he focused on the bodily intentionality of our interaction with the world. The next step was taken by Samuel Todes who presented a better understanding of how we are bodily oriented in space. After having seen how the body is oriented outward towards the environment it is proper that the final part of this article goes inward toward the role of bodily awareness and the role of proprioception in human movement. The goal of the presentation is to contribute to a better understanding of what goes on in sport. The article therefore uses examples from sport, especially football, to show the relevance of the new insights for sport studies.     

Body awareness in the physically abnormal

Conclusion No matter which of the above-listed basic attitudes a physically abnormal person has toward his own body, and no matter what theological presuppositions lie behind his attitude, he has a sense of body that the normal person can seldom experience. Many of us know the frustration of not being able to perform the simplest bodily functions without aid and pain; and we know these not as unique experiences but as, to us, normal. Many of us know, as well, the thrill of finding that we can move a muscle or a limb, or perform a physical task. Many have learned to distinguish between sensations of the skin, the muscles, the bones, and the nervous system—a distinction most normal people are never able to make except in unusual circumstances. Most of us are unable to predict with any accuracy just how our bodies will react in a given situation or to a particular stimulus; therefore, we are more apt to be aware of a tactile sensation or a physical reaction.All of this, it seems to me, could provide a rich resource for the psychologists, the scientists, the philosophers, and the educators who are exploring the meaning of body. We who are so close to our bodies have much to learn from those who tend to take their bodies for granted or who are able to ignore them. Others might learn something from us about their own bodies.The Rev. David E. Babin, Rel. D., an Episcopal minister who has served parishes in Knoxville and Memphis, Tennessee, is Professor of Christian Ministries at the Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, Evanston, Illinois. During the academic year 1974–75, he is on sabbatical leave and serving as theologian-in-residence for the Windward Coalition of Churches, Kailua, Hawaii.     

The objects of bodily awareness

Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than is the body as a whole. I conclude with some reasons why this should lead us to think that bodily awareness, unlike introspection, is a form of perception.     

正念机制的核心：注意还是态度？

注意与态度是正念的两个关键的工作机制,但关于这两个机制究竟哪个是核心机制却没有统一的定论。本文就针对这一争议存在的现状和原因进行了梳理和分析,认为正念的核心机制在于注意力的训练,并尝试从佛教与心理学两个角度在理论推导与实证支持两个层面上给予了阐释。