具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。     

抽象概念表征的具身认知观

抽象概念是否通过感知经验来表征以及如何被感知经验表征是具身认知面临的一大问题.在抽象概念表征是否具有感知经验基础的问题上,具身认知理论认为抽象概念通过情境模拟或隐喻与感知经验发生联系.在抽象概念如何与感知经验表征发生联系的问题上,概念模拟理论强调情景或运动模拟在抽象概念表征中的直接作用;概念隐喻理论则侧重具体经验或具体经验与抽象概念之间的共同结构关系在抽象概念表征中的间接作用.未来研究应改变概念表征的稳定的心理实体观,从语言和抽象表征的关系、正常儿童和特殊群体的抽象概念表征差异入手,整合不同的具身认知观点.     

身体与认知表征:见解与分歧

对于身体的不同理解促使认知心理学形成了不同研究取向。经典认知心理学视身体为不同于心智的生物物理实体。认知表征则成为沟通心智与包括身体在内的外在世界之间联系的"桥梁"。在经典认知心理学那里,心智是一种运算,运算的内容则是认知表征。认知表征是符号性的、抽象的,与身体的构造和感觉—运动通道无关。身体似乎仅仅是认知表征的"载体"或"容器"。具身认知则强调了身体在认知过程中所发挥的关键作用。具身认知中的"温和派"视身体为心智中的身体,认知在其根本上是一种身体经验。因此,认知表征不是抽象的,而是身体格式的,是身体特定感觉–运动通道提供的具体身体体验。心智是一种运算,但运算的内容不是抽象符号,而是具体的身体经验。具身认知中的"激进派"则主张彻底抛弃"运算"和"表征"。在激进派那里,认知是被身体作用于世界的活动塑造出来的。认知是为了解决问题,而不是为了形成认知表征。基本的心智不涉及内容,换言之,基本心智过程不涉及认知表征。认知在本质上是一种具身的行动。     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

语义表征具身理论:情绪在概念表征中的作用

概念如何被表征是认知科学的热点问题,其中抽象概念如何表征是当前具身认知最具争议性的话题之一。与前期概念隐喻理论(强调意象图式)和知觉符号理论(强调情境内省信息)的观点不同,语义表征具身理论强调情绪经验信息在抽象概念表征和加工中的作用。具体而言,具体概念的表征主要来自感觉运动信息,而抽象概念的表征主要来自情绪经验信息和语言信息。研究证明,抽象概念的高情绪经验信息能够促进词汇的加工,且这一促进作用受词汇情绪效价的调节。未来研究应进一步考虑影响情绪经验信息发挥作用的因素,比如语言信息的丰富性、情绪唤醒或个体的情绪状态等。     

从数量表征到数表征：具身认知视角下的人类数能力获得

数能力是数学认知的基本成分。与动物所具有的基本数能力不同,人类不仅具备数量表征能力,更重要的是还拥有对数概念进行表征的数表征能力。虽然具身认知与离身认知都对数概念的表征问题进行了解释,但二者却存在明显理论分歧。具身认知观点主要从具身数量表征和数能力发展的具身认知机制两方面为人类独特数能力的获得提供了理论支撑及实证证据。这启示人们需要重视具身学习在数能力形成实践中的关键作用,重视具身数量表征在数学教学中的作用,仍需进一步揭示其内在的心理和神经基础。     

镜像神经元:认知具身性的神经生物学证据

传统认知心理学认为认知类似于计算机对抽象符号的加工和运算,这种观点支持了身心二元论。但是近年来兴起的具身认知运动却否定了这一观点的合理性。具身认知认为认知是身体与世界互动的结果,是身体的感觉-运动系统作用于世界而塑造出来的。认知是具身的,离不开身体的构造和感觉运动系统的作用。镜像神经元的发现支持了认知的具身特征,为认知的具身性提供了神经生物学的证据。     

手指的感知、运动以及数量表征对数字认知的促进作用

手指是儿童在习得数字符号之前最常使用的表征数量的工具,大量研究都表明手指在数字认知中具有促进作用。但是,目前仍不清楚手指在数字认知中的作用机制。综述从手指感知、手指运动以及手指数量表征三个方面总结了手指在数字认知中所起的作用。手指感知可能通过影响儿童的数量表征能力间接地影响其它数学能力;与表征量有关的手指运动可能促进了数量大小的加工。关于手指数量表征在数字认知中的作用存在两种有争议的观点：一种认为手指数量表征促进了儿童由非符号数量表征向符号数量表征的转化;另一种认为手指数量表征可能是一种数量语义表征方式。未来应该在发展、作用机制、性别差异等方向继续开展研究,进一步探讨手指在数字认知中所起的作用。     

反应-效应相容性范式下不同数字表征方式和身体经验对数字认知加工的影响

采用反应-效应相容性范式,探讨不同数字表征方式和身体经验对个体数字认知加工的影响。实验1首先采用木棒数字表征从知觉层面证明反应-效应相容性效应的存在;实验2采用累计手指数字表征考察手指数字表征在反应-效应相容性匹配中的优势;实验3则进一步排除了近似数量表征系统的影响,从语义层面探讨中国文化背景下语义概念手指数字表征的反应-效应相容性对数字认知加工的影响。结果发现,不同的数字表征系统中均存在反应-效应相容性效应,支持了观念运动理论;相比客体材料,手指数字表征在相容条件下具有明显的匹配优势,支持了具身数量的观点。     

重要还是笨重?——概念表征对重量具身效应的影响

本研究考察在"重量-重要性"和"重量-灵活性"两种情境下重量具身效应的表现,进而探讨概念表征对具身效应所产生的影响。实验结果表明,在"重量-重要性"情境下,被试认为重鼠标的价格显著大于轻鼠标的价格,并且更容易将重鼠标与高价值货币,轻鼠标与低价值货币建立联系,表现为经典的"重量-重要性"具身效应;而在"重量-灵活性"情境下,被试认为重鼠标的价格显著小于轻鼠标的价格,并且鼠标重量与高低价值货币之间的联系并没有明显倾向性,重量具身效应出现明显变化。研究结果表明,重量具身效应受概念表征的显著影响,该效应的表现不仅取决于对客体重量的经验,更取决于主体如何对重量感进行认知表征。。     

情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉的相互影响

通过3个实验探讨情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉是否存在相互影响, 以及加工深度对两者关系的影响。实验1采用情绪面孔启动范式, 探讨较深的情绪概念加工层面对情绪概念与情绪面孔的关系的影响。实验2更改概念任务, 探讨较浅的概念加工层面对两者关系的影响。实验3缩短启动面孔呈现时间, 探讨较浅的面孔知觉层面对两者关系的影响。通过研究主要得出以下结论：(1)情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉确实存在相互影响; (2)概念加工深度影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是单向的; (3)知觉加工深度也影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的知觉加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的知觉加工层面, 没有发现两者的相互影响。本研究为抽象概念的具身表征提供了实证支持。     

Perceptual processing affects conceptual processing

According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition ( Barsalou, 1999 ), modality-specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property-verification task in alternation. Responses on the property-verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. This finding of a modality-switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems.     

Perceptual symbol systems

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.     

The psychological reality of practical representation

ABSTRACT

We represent the world in a variety of ways: through percepts, concepts, propositional attitudes, words, numerals, recordings, musical scores, photographs, diagrams, mimetic paintings, etc. Some of these representations are mental. It is customary for philosophers to distinguish two main kinds of mental representations: perceptual representation (e.g., vision, auditory, tactile) and conceptual representation. This essay presupposes a version of this dichotomy and explores the way in which a further kind of representation – procedural representation – represents. It is argued that, in some important respects, procedural representations represent differently from both purely conceptual representations and purely perceptual representations. Although procedural representations, just like conceptual and perceptual representations, involve modes of presentation, their modes of presentation are distinctively practical, in a sense which I will clarify. It is argued that an understanding of this sort of practical representation has important consequences for the debate on the nature of know-how.     

语言和情境对具体概念感知运动仿真的影响

具体概念加工中的感知运动仿真是概念表征的核心加工过程。本研究系统探讨了语言因素(语言类型：第一语言和第二语言)和情境因素(知觉情境：空间知觉情境和语义知觉情境)对具体概念加工中感知运动仿真的影响。实验1采用语义相关判断范式探讨了第二语言加工过程中是否存在感知运动仿真, 以及第二语言中的仿真和第一语言中的仿真是否存在差异。研究发现, 第二语言加工中依然存在感知运动仿真, 但是第一语言的感知运动仿真具有一定的优势。实验2采用语义相关判断范式及其变式, 通过2个分实验分别探讨了个体加工概念时空间知觉信息和语义知觉信息对于概念表征过程中感知运动仿真的影响。研究发现, 无论是在较弱的空间信息知觉条件下还是在较浅的语义信息知觉条件下, 具体概念加工过程中都产生了感知运动仿真。本研究的发现弥补了知觉符号理论未对第二语言中的感知运动仿真提出针对性预测的不足, 表明感知运动仿真具有一定的跨语言稳定性。同时, 具体概念加工中的感知运动仿真不受空间信息和语义信息的调节, 这表明感知运动仿真能在一定程度上自动化产生。     

Verifying different-modality properties for concepts produces switching costs

According to perceptual symbol systems, sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts. It follows that sensorimotor phenomena should arise in conceptual processing. Previous studies have shown that switching from one modality to another during perceptual processing incurs a processing cost. If perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing, then verifying the properties of concepts should exhibit a switching cost as well. For example, verifying a property in the auditory modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud) should be slower after verifying a property in a different modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than after verifying a property in the same modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling). Only words were presented to subjects, and there were no instructions to use imagery. Nevertheless, switching modalities incurred a cost, analogous to the cost of switching modalities in perception. A second experiment showed that this effect was not due to associative priming between properties in the same modality. These results support the hypothesis that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing.