德性伦理与规范伦理在生命伦理中的契合

在生命伦理领域中,规范伦理与德性伦理都曾发挥重要作用,然而,德性伦理没有受到人们足够的重视,重新厘定传统德性伦理的现代价值显得尤为重要。初步探究在生命伦理迅速发展的情况下,德性伦理与规范伦理相结合的模式。     

略论制度伦理与德性伦理的关系

制度伦理的核心是伦理 ,其对德性伦理起作用的方式也应该是制度中的伦理因素而不是强制性规范。制度伦理以其内涵的伦理精神以及作为一种社会存在来影响个人德性。制度伦理与德性伦理相互作用并相互转化     

德性伦理及其现当代价值

现当代是否只适合发展规范伦理,而德性伦理注定趋向衰落?本文在分析德性伦理与道德特质、中国古代与西方德性伦理传统、马克思主义如何对待德性伦理以及如何应对德性伦理所面临的挑战和冲击等问题的基础上,认为德性伦理在现当代仍有重要的价值意义,仍是伦理学研究与道德建设具有重要理论意义和实践意义的课题。     

面向生活世界的伦理人类学

一、在规范伦理学与德性伦理学论争的背后规范伦理学与德性伦理学的论争是当代伦理学研究中的重要学术现象。规范伦理学以罗尔斯和哈贝马斯为代表,德性伦理学以麦金太尔为代表,形成了观点相互对立的两大伦理学阵营。规范伦理学以哲学思辨的方法研究伦理问题,其研究领域主要是伦理的价值或道德的应然,期望     

浅谈中西方传统的德性伦理

东西方传统的德性伦理具有不同的内涵。中国传统德性论认为,德性是与生俱来的;西方传统认为,人的德性是后天养成的。中国的德性伦理不仅规范处理人与人之间的关系,也处理人与自然之间的关系;西方的德性伦理则只规范处理人与人之间的关系。中国的德性伦理相对独立;西方的德性伦理则要受理性的支配和指导。     

德性与伦理规范刍议

道德都是历史的、具体的,但并不意味着人类不存在某种道德的普适性,也不表明当今社会毋须对普适伦理的寻求.康德的道德既是德性又是规范性;既是道德主体之自觉,又含有道德本体之意味,两者是内在统一的.然而,西方社会因历来政治、法律重于伦理道德,更多的表现为外在的规范伦理.中国传统伦理思想与之不同,是以内在规范和道德自觉之统一为其特征.传统的规范性道德理论,面临现代社会纷繁复杂的价值观和道德无序的局面,已无能为力.德性伦理的复兴,并不排斥伦理规范,而是要在新的历史条件下化外在规范为内在规范,使德性和规范在更高的层面得到内在统一.     

当代西方德性伦理的思想特色

德性伦理是当代西方伦理学中非常重要的一支,已经成为了当代各种思想不断争论的舞台和焦点.可以说,在当代,几乎每一种新的思潮和文化流派都会或多或少地涉及德性伦理.与康德主义和功利主义相比较,德性伦理具有基础性、批判性和叙事性等特征.     

论周人的德性伦理

考察周人的德性伦理结构,可以发现宗教中至上神天与祖先神的分离,在伦理上表现为公德之德与私德之孝的分离,使得周人的德性理论突破了血缘关系的范围,成为天下邦国联盟的公共伦理规范。周人德性伦理的结构从纵向上看,是人的德性与天的德性的合一,即天人合德。从横向上看,是领袖人物的德性与众民百姓的德性的合一:即四方同德。从界限上看,是上下内外的合一,即至善伦理与底线伦理的合一、文德与武德的统一。     

批判与建构:规则伦理的问题及亚里士多德德性伦理的启示

西方伦理学中的功利主义和道义论通过压缩和简化,从“人”这里抽出感性或理性,将之归结为人的全部,以此为预设,它们都希望通过构建某种普遍原则一劳永逸地解决道德生活领域的问题,统称为规则伦理.在德性伦理看来,因为对人及其幸福的误解,离开德性论规则,规则伦理知识与伦理生活出现了某种脱节,追寻德性于是成为了解决现代道德问题的出路,而这可以从亚里士多德的德性伦理中寻找智性资源.亚里士多德作为美德伦理系统经典的阐述者,至少可以在三个方面为当代的德性伦理方案提供直接借用的资源:幸福目的论的解释框架为德性伦理学提供了理论基点;对幸福的诠释在一定程度上为德性伦理搭起了生活目的的范式;在德性与规则之间追寻幸福为伦理学把握人类生活、建构德性伦理方案指明了现实途径.     

当代托马斯·阿奎那德性伦理研究的视阈

20世纪八九十年代以来,随着麦金太尔等人对德性伦理的复兴,托马斯.阿奎那的德性伦理作为西方中古时代德性伦理的一大传统受到了学术界的瞩目。鉴于阿奎那德性伦理的神哲学渊源和当代复兴背景,对它的研究应当基于西方德性伦理发展的历史脉络、神学背景和形而上架构以及当代德性伦理复兴这三个视阈,通过这三个视阈的综合或交融,阿奎那德性伦理的理论渊源、神学旨趣以及当代意义得以澄清和展现。     

Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics

This essay focuses on the unity of several virtues in pre-Qin Confucians. Confucius maintains the proper application and coherence of such virtues as benevolence, wisdom, trustworthiness, straightforwardness, courage, and firmness. Further, Confucius takes benevolence and nobility as characteristic of human being. Particular attention is paid to the distinction and relationship between virtuous characters and virtuous actions.     

Feminist Ethics and Religious Ethics

This focus issue is a conversation at and about the interface of feminist ethics and religious ethics, in order to show what these multifaceted fields of intellectual endeavor and practical import have to say to each other, to teach and to learn. The seven essays approach that dialogue from a variety of angles and traditions, reflecting the fecundity of both fields and the wide‐ranging concerns of colleagues in religious ethics who share commitments and methods with feminist ethics.     

语言伦理与媒体伦理

语言与媒体的联系表明语言伦理与媒体伦理具有内在联系;语言与媒体的差异表明语言伦理与媒体伦理之间又存在着巨大区别,从而使得前者构成了自然语言的伦理问题,后者构成了媒体语言的伦理问题。不要说谎(即说真话)既是自然语言伦理也是媒体语言伦理的基本要求,但是,由于媒体语言与自然语言的不对称,以及媒体语言已经成为公共领域的主导语言,所以,媒体语言之不要说谎的重要性远非自然语言不要说谎的重要性所能比拟。应用伦理学应该通过政府主管部门、媒体自律协会和全体社会公众三条监督途径,来解决媒体伦理问题,确保媒体遵循不要说谎的基本道德要求。其中,利用现代网络技术把自然语言提升为媒体语言,完善全体社会公众的监督途径尤为重要。     

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向,一是基于研究重心由“应当”问题转换为“德行之所以然”的问题,二是基于研究范式上由目的论、德性论、义务论等转换为价值论。作为传统伦理学的集大成者,康德伦理学一方面因其浓烈的价值论色彩而成为舍勒和N．哈特曼价值伦理学的前奏,另一方面因其“实质”内容缺失而致的形式主义又为后者的拓展提供了空间。舍勒,尤其是N．哈特曼的实质价值伦理学正是在康德伦理学的理论平台上得以建立的。     

Between Christian Ethics and Religious Ethics

By focusing on questions concerning what kind of training graduate students in theology and ethics and religious ethics should receive, I try to initiate a conversation we need to have about the kind of work the JRE should foster.     

Ethics Talk; Talking Ethics: An Example of Clinical Ethics Consultation

This written account of a clinical encounter - depicting fragments of a more extensive array of events - attempts to exemplify many facets and associated complexities of clinical ethics consultation. Within the general telling, I provide more detailed portrayals of several key events. In secion 1, I document briefly my initial interactions at the beginning of the consultation, focusing on the information gained - in the context of those interactions - as I read the medical chart of Mrs. Rose. Next in section 2, I briefly describes my initial conversation with Mrs. Rose's three sons. Section 3 illustrates several questions raised in sections 1 and 2. Then section 4 presents my encounter with Paul, the youngest son, as he was carrying out his vigil at his mother's bedside in the hospital. Section 5 chronicles my interactions with several care providers involved in Mrs. Rose's situation, including two different meetings that occurred with Mrs. Rose's attending physician. I conclude in section 6 by telling about a conversation I had with Mrs. Rose's middle son, Russell, approximately one month after Mrs. Rose died.     

Recentering Christian Ethics as Comparative Religious Ethics

The filial relationship between Christian ethics and Comparative Religious Ethics (CRE) need not be perniciously distortive and can be salutary for comparative work. I suggest that the suspicions about CRE as a disguised form of a “Christian ethical enterprise” are overstated and that we can appreciate the value of the legacy of Christian ethics for comparative work in the focal themes of emancipatory criticism and common morality. Both of these themes, even if influenced by Christian ethics, reflect more universal social‐moral problems that can be discerned in cross‐cultural contexts.     

Christian Ethics,Religious Ethics,and Secular Ethics: A Contemporary Reappraisal

In this essay, I argue that Christian ethicists should not think of themselves as religious ethicists. I defend this claim by arguing that the concept of religious ethics, as it has come to be understood as a discipline that is distinct from secular ethics, is incoherent. In part one, I describe the fraught attempts by theologians in the 20th century to identify the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. In part two, I argue that certain accounts of natural law unwittingly reinforce a problematic conception of secular ethics. Part three examines some trends in religious studies and comparative religious ethics to highlight problematic conceptions of religion. Drawing together these strands of inquiry, I contend that that the secular-religious dichotomy in contemporary ethics should be rejected, but by the same token, I suggest that comparative ethics remains a worthwhile enterprise.