道德直觉决策及其机制探析

道德直觉决策研究是从直觉思维角度探讨决策者在道德境遇下的决策。道德直觉决策是道德情境下的直觉反应, 其理论基础包括躯体标记假说、社会直觉模型、双加工理论、事件特征情感复合体系以及双系统理论; 道德直觉决策机制至少包括：无意识加工、情绪加工和直觉加工三个基本的心理加工过程, 与之对应的神经系统则至少存在三个可能的脑神经回路：无意识加工的道德脑区、情绪加工的道德脑区和直觉加工的道德脑区。研究主要从客观和主观两方面分析了道德直觉决策的一般性影响因素--文化、道德境遇、经验、情绪和道德直觉; 揭示了道德直觉决策的加工机制。未来研究应在加强理论建构的基础上, 通过更缜密细致的实验设计去探究决策过程中各因素的交互作用, 并明确道德脑区之间的联结。     

道德直觉加工机制的理论构想

认知和情绪因素在道德判断中的作用机制是社会认知神经科学研究中最具争议的热点问题之一。本文认为, 人类拥有一种普遍性的道德直觉, 它是一种可能同时包含道德知识和情绪情感的自动化加工系统, 决定人们对一个道德违反情境作出快速的判断。据此, 本文就如何深入揭示道德直觉的加工机制提出了研究构想, 研究将首先采用经颅磁刺激技术, 探索当认知功能受抑制后人们的道德加工的特点, 初步探索道德直觉存在的可能性; 然后采用事件相关电位技术, 从外显和内隐两个维度上探讨道德直觉的时程加工机制; 最后采用侧向化运动准备电位指标, 进一步探索道德直觉和基本厌恶情绪的分离。     

直觉还是推理,道德判断如何形成?

道德判断形成的机制一直存在争议,许多研究者通过实证研究来探索诸因素对道德判断的影响,这有助于理清不同因素的作用,但却难以构建道德判断形成的理论框架。文章系统性地回顾和总结了道德判断形成的五个经典理论模型及其相关理论,并结合实证研究的成果梳理了道德判断形成中理性、情绪、认知、直觉和推理之间的关系。基于此,构建了以直觉和推理为基本路径,基于规则的认知和情绪为调节因素的道德判断形成的理论框架。现有的理论模型和实证研究在该框架下均可以的得到较好的解释。同时,根据该框架,建议未来的实证研究中应当注重对影响因素的分类以及对实验情景的控制。     

道德判断中的情绪因素——从认知神经科学的角度进行探讨

道德判断中的情绪与认知因素是社会认知神经科学研究的重要议题。本文对近年来社会认知神经科学领域中有关情绪影响道德判断的研究发现和相关理论进行了回顾和总结。介绍了外源性情绪影响道德判断的行为研究证据,大脑情绪功能障碍者在道德判断中的异常表现以及道德两难任务所对应的大脑激活模式,着重探讨了情绪因素影响道德判断的神经机制和道德判断中情绪加工与认知加工相互作用的过程。揭示了情绪是道德判断的必要因素,道德判断是情绪加工和认知加工协同作用的结果,并在此基础上提出了该领域未来发展的设想。     

自豪感的神经基础：比较的视角

自豪感是对自身成就进行评估时产生的积极情绪体验。神经基础研究表明, 心理理论、自我参照、情绪、奖赏和记忆等相关脑区的协同作用构成了自豪感的神经基础, 而神经和生理的比较研究则揭示了自豪感和其他基本情绪以及道德情绪等在神经基础上的异同。以上结果为理解自豪感的复杂神经机制提供了依据。未来研究应对不同种类自豪感以及自豪感与认知过程相互作用的神经机制进行深入探讨。     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

不道德传染的心理机制及其影响

不道德传染, 是指道德违法者作为传染源将消极道德品质直接传递给传染对象, 或先传递给道德中性物品, 再由此物品传递给受传染对象, 引起其情绪、认知、生理等方面变化的过程。本文主要讨论了不道德传染发生的心理机制——厌恶, 围绕不道德传染对道德心理领域(道德情绪以及道德认知过程)产生的影响进行梳理; 进而将视角拓宽到非道德层面, 如具身认知、组织管理以及人际互动, 探究其对人类社会的广泛影响。最后, 从不同文化视阈、不同个体差异、传染过程的动态神经机制及正向道德传染等方面为研究提供新的思路。     

社会认知神经科学研究的最新进展

社会认知神经科学是一门采用认知神经科学技术研究社会认知现象的交叉学科,目前已经形成认知神经科学与心理生理学的热点研究领域。该文回顾了近年来有关情绪、情绪障碍、自我意识、经济决策、道德等方面的脑机制研究,临床研究和脑成像研究表明,恐惧、厌恶、愤怒、惊讶、快乐、悲伤等基本情绪在表达和识别上具有普遍性与特殊性;孤独症与“男性脑”的特征相关,抗抑郁药百忧解对抑郁症儿童的治疗作用;在自我意识的研究领域,自我概念产生的脑区定位、灵长类的自我意象、精神疾病患者的自我概念变化等研究的热点问题;经济决策的研究最近成为亮点之一,主要包括强互惠合作、风险决策、跨期选择以及品牌决策等方面;在道德的脑机制研究中,重点涉及了道德判断与捐赠行为的神经基础。文章最后展望了社会认知神经科学在我国发展的前景     

公正判断中的“非理性”：加工特征、主要表现和影响因素

公正判断中的“非理性”研究是社会认知双过程加工理论在公正领域的拓展, 也是不确定性管理和道德心理研究的延续。就加工过程而言, 个体的公正判断可能同时依存“理性”和“非理性”两个结构和进化都不同的认知体系。置换过程、首因效应、极端判断、补偿偏见、责备无辜受害者和道德命令效应是公正判断中“非理性”的主要表现。自我因素、公正敏感性、道德认同、情绪状态和公正世界信念等个体变量是其主要影响因素。综合来看, 目前公正判断的“非理性”研究还比较庞杂, 其进化根源、生理机制、如何与理性过程交互作用等还有待深入研究。此外, 结合社会现实问题、关注第三方视角、多理论解释的整合及多水平因素的交互影响可能是未来的研究方向。     

道德情绪在道德隐喻映射中的作用及其神经机制

道德隐喻的加工, 实质上是从始源域的身体感知觉经验映射到目标域, 表征抽象道德概念的过程。新近研究从认知神经科学角度揭示道德隐喻加工的神经机制, 进而探讨情绪因素在道德隐喻映射中的作用。道德隐喻映射机制是在具体道德情境中身体感知经验与情绪体验、认知加工相互作用的结果。未来研究应拓展道德隐喻映射的维度和方向, 在社会交互环境中丰富和完善研究范式, 提高生态效度和跨文化效度。     

Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.     

The armchair and the trolley: an argument for experimental ethics

Ethical theory often starts with our intuitions about particular cases and tries to uncover the principles that are implicit in them; work on the ‘trolley problem’ is a paradigmatic example of this approach. But ethicists are no longer the only ones chasing trolleys. In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists have also turned to study our moral intuitions and what underlies them. The relation between these two inquiries, which investigate similar examples and intuitions, and sometimes produce parallel results, is puzzling. Does it matter to ethics whether its armchair conclusions match the psychologists’ findings? I argue that reflection on this question exposes psychological presuppositions implicit in armchair ethical theorising. When these presuppositions are made explicit, it becomes clear that empirical evidence can (and should) play a positive role in ethical theorising. Unlike recent assaults on the armchair, the argument I develop is not driven by a naturalist agenda, or meant to cast doubt on the reliability of our moral intuitions; on the contrary, it is even compatible with non-naturalism, and takes the reliability of intuition as its premise. The argument is rather that if our moral intuitions are reliable, then psychological evidence should play a surprisingly significant role in the justification of moral principles.     

Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

The Moral Dilemmas Debate, Deontic Logic, and the Impotence of Argument

In this paper I argue for modesty concerning what theoretical reason can accomplish in the moral dilemmas debate. Specifically, I contend that philosophers' conclusions for or against moral dilemmas are driven less by rational argument and more by how the moral world intuitively appears to them.I support this thesis by first considering an argument against moral dilemmas, the argument from deontic logic, and showing that its persuasive force depends on one's having already accepted its conclusion. I then make a different, and general, case that any argument in the moral dilemmas debate concerning the defeasibility of conflicting obligations can be marginalized by making not-unreasonable adjustments in the conditions for wrongdoing.These two strands of argument are related by the notion of inescapable wrongdoing. It is our standing intuitions about inescapable wrongdoing which make the relevant deontic logical principles plausible or implausible to us. And whether wrongdoing can be inescapable is central to deciding what the conditions for wrongdoing are. My conclusion is that the arguments in the moral dilemmas debate merely implement whatever standing intuition we have concerning inescapable wrongdoing, and that apart from any such intuition the arguments are unpersuasive.     

Agent-based Theories of Right Action

In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.     

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.     

A Humean theory of moral intuition

According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which the phenomenal feel of emotions is crucial for their intentional content.     

Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions

One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In contrast, we instead focus on the idea of “muddled” intuitions—i.e. intuitions that are misdirected and about notions other than the ones under discussion. We argue that the philosophically untutored are likely to have muddled intuitions and that professional philosophers are likely to have unmuddled intuitions. Although being umuddled does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers, being muddled is enough to disqualify the intuitions of the philosophically untutored. We then turn to the charge that, despite being unmuddled, professional philosophers still have biased intuitions. To evaluate this charge, we switch focus from the general notion of biased intuition to the more specific notion of theory-laden intuition. We argue that there is prima facie evidence—in the form of the presence of conflicts of intuition—for thinking that at least some of the intuitions of professional philosophers are theory-laden. In summary, we conclude that that there is no clean and easy answer to the question of whose intuitions should matter.     

道德直觉合乎道义却不客观

面对道德困境, 道德直觉倾向于促使人们做出道义论的判断。但是, 道德直觉易受情绪因素影响, 具有较强的主观性。道德直觉警惕有意图地使用个人力量造成的伤害, 却会接受由非个人力量或连带作用引发的伤害。“模块近视假说”认为, 大脑中存在一个预警系统, 能快速地对主动伤害的想法发出情绪警报。但该系统的审查机制是一种简单的“单通道”加工, 这种加工局限使连带作用造成的伤害避开了审查机制的监控。道德直觉的不客观提示, 面对现实生活中的道德争议, 不应该仅听凭直觉作为行动的依据。