判断与决策中的规划谬误

规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。     

相似任务经验和未来时间充裕感对计划失误的影响

本研究检验了人们一种潜在的认知倾向,即低估任务的完成时间。本研究分为2个实验,从两个角度来研究人们低估任务时间的行为。实验一从不同预测方式的角度,检验了任务的相似性和认知需求因素对任务时间估计的影响。实验二从未来时间知觉的角度,检验了未来时间充裕感对任务的完成时间预测的影响。结果表明:不同的时间预测方式都会引起对任务完成/持续时间的低估;任务的相似性会利于任务时间估计的精确性;认知需求因素会和任务的相似性产生交互作用,从而影响任务完成时间的估计;未来时间充裕感的程度也会影响人们对当前任务的预测。     

时间感知差异对跨期选择倾向的影响作用

本研究从人格特质差异角度出发, 采用简单跨期选择任务考察了由时距复制任务筛选的两类时距估计倾向不同的群体(时间高估者和时间低估者)在跨期选择中行为倾向的差异, 旨在探讨时间感知在跨期决策中的影响作用。结果发现：(1)无论任务难易, 与时间低估者相比, 时间高估者在跨期选择时更倾向于选择即时兑现的较小奖赏。(2)时间高估者和低估者的跨期选择反应时没有明显的差异, 但二者的反应时受任务难度的影响程度明显不同, 时间高估者的跨期选择反应时不受任务难度的影响, 而时间低估者在任务困难时的反应时比任务容易时明显增长。这些结果表明, 在跨期选择过程中, 时间感知倾向差异明显地影响了个体的选择倾向。时间高估倾向个体对时距的高估可能会导致其在跨期选择权衡中对收益成本的高估, 进而做出冲动的选择行为。     

行为决策中的比率偏差

比率偏差是指小概率事件以不同比率形式呈现时,人们倾向于认为以较小数字呈现的事件更不可能发生.这种现象在医疗卫生领域和职业生涯决策中有重要的应用价值.目前关于比率偏差产生的解释主要包括标准理论与认知经验自我理论.比率偏差的影响因素主要包括元认知技能、计算能力、认知视角和任务性质等.未来的研究需要从比率偏差现象的产生、心理机制及应用方面进行深入研究.     

公众时间回溯式记忆的特点

采用事后回溯设计,考察了大学生公众时间回溯式记忆的特点。研究选取1995到2001年之间发生可辨别的新闻事件14项,要求被试对新闻事件的时序、时点和时距进行回忆。结果表明：（1）公众事件回溯式时点记忆的正确率随时间的远近发生变化,较远的时间回忆正确率低,而较近的时间回忆正确率较高,存在近因效应。（2）公众事件的回溯式时距估计受真实时距的影响,短时距容易被高估,长时距容易被低估。（3）公众事件的回溯式时序回忆存在近因效应和首因效应,被试对发生较远的事件总是倾向于估计得更远,对发生较近的事件也倾向于估计得较近。而对两者中间的事件的顺序估计较为混乱。（4）本实验研究的公众事件回溯式时间记忆符合时间的重构理论和分段综合模型。     

成人人格障碍形成根源——基于E·H·Erikson心理社会发展理论探究

本文通过探究E·H·Erikson心理社会发展理论的阶段性任务和危机,认为成人人格障碍形成的根源是个体在人格形成关键期由于不恰当的心理社会环境导致个体认知、情感和行为受到严重损害而无法完成阶段任务,遭遇阶段危机,从而导致人格障碍的形成。     

儿童推断他人知识状态的知识偏差和无知偏差

采用“看见-知道”任务考察了儿童对他人知识状态推断的特点和可能存在的偏差效应。被试为90名3-5岁儿童。结果表明,3-5岁儿童已经理解他人看见即知道的关系;5岁儿童已经能准确地推断他人的知识状态,不存在偏差;但3、4岁儿童对他人知识状态的推断受到自身知识的影响且表现出自我中心的倾向：既存在知识偏差即因为自己知道而高估他人的知识,也存在无知偏差即因为自己的无知而低估他人的知识。4岁儿童的知识偏差程度与3岁儿童无异,但无知偏差低于3岁儿童,且4岁儿童的知识偏差程度大于其无知偏差,儿童克服无知偏差的时间可能早于克服知识偏差的时间。     

老年人情绪记忆中的积极效应及其产生机制

有关情绪与记忆的研究发现, 老年人经常表现出积极效应, 即对积极刺激的记忆比对消极刺激的记忆更好。从动机层面来讲, 社会情绪选择理论认为老年人比年轻人更倾向于进行情绪调节。在记忆任务中, 这种情绪调节的动机使得老年人具有表现出积极效应的倾向, 但这种倾向只有在满足一定条件的情况下才能表现出来。情绪调节对记忆的影响可以通过注意选择、加工资源分配、情绪抑制、认知再评价等多种方式进行。未来研究需要进一步细分年龄段考察情绪的各维度如何影响老年人记忆的各个阶段。     

无法忍受不确定性与担忧：对记忆偏差与解释偏差的检验

旨在是探索记忆偏差与解释偏差在无法忍受不确定性(IU)与个体担忧之间的机制作用。实验1采用伴随学习任务范式,计算被试对中性词语和不确定词的回忆量。结果发现,IU对记忆偏差的预测不显著,记忆偏差在IU与担忧倾向之间的中介作用不显著。实验2采用情境评估任务范式收集被试在不确定情境下的担忧评分和解释倾向。结果发现,IU可以正向预测被试在不确定情境下的担忧评分,被试对情境的解释倾向在IU与担忧评分的关系中起到中介作用。概言之,高IU个体存在一定的信息加工偏差     

错误记忆成因的三种理论解释

关于错误记忆成因的解释主要有三种理论：建构主义理论、来源监控理论、模糊痕迹理论。建构主义理论认为对经验的记忆和对其解释的混合导致错误记忆产生;来源监控理论主张记忆来源的混淆或错误归因导致错误记忆发生;模糊痕迹理论断言当需要精确记忆却提取主旨记忆时或提取错误精确记忆时就会产生错误记忆。     

Underestimating the duration of future events: memory incorrectly used or memory bias?

People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their memories of how long past events have taken, but these memories are systematic underestimates of past duration. People appear to underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.     

Bias in memory predicts bias in estimation of future task duration

Both anecdotal accounts and experimental evidence suggest that people underestimate how long it will take them to complete future tasks. A possible reason for this tendency is that people remember tasks as taking less time than they actually did, with these biased memories causing a corresponding bias in prediction. Two experiments were performed to determine whether or not a systematic bias in memory could explain a similar systematic bias in prediction. In support, it was found that (1) the tendency to underestimate future duration disappears when the task is novel, (2) there is similar bias in estimation of both past and future durations, and (3) variables that affect memory of duration, such as level of experience with the task and duration of delay before estimation, affect prediction of duration in the same way. It appears that, at least in part, people underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.     

Correcting memory improves accuracy of predicted task duration

People are often inaccurate in predicting task duration. The memory bias explanation holds that this error is due to people having incorrect memories of how long previous tasks have taken, and these biased memories cause biased predictions. Therefore, the authors examined the effect on increasing predictive accuracy of correcting memory through supplying feedback for actual task duration. For Experiments 1 (paper-counting task) and 2 (essay-writing task), college students were supplied with duration information about their previous performance on a similar task before predicting task duration. For Experiment 3, participants were recruited at various locations, such as fast food restaurants and video arcades, and supplied with average task duration for others before predicting how long the task would take. In all 3 experiments, supplying feedback increased predictive accuracy. Overall, results indicate that, when predicting duration, people do well when they rely not on memory of past task duration but instead on measures of actual duration, whether their own or that of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005)

People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to out-predict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist.     

Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.     

Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of depressive episodes.

I propose that the ways people respond to their own symptoms of depression influence the duration of these symptoms. People who engage in ruminative responses to depression, focusing on their symptoms and the possible causes and consequences of their symptoms, will show longer depressions than people who take action to distract themselves from their symptoms. Ruminative responses prolong depression because they allow the depressed mood to negatively bias thinking and interfere with instrumental behavior and problem-solving. Laboratory and field studies directly testing this theory have supported its predictions. I discuss how response styles can explain the greater likelihood of depression in women than men. Then I intergrate this response styles theory with studies of coping with discrete events. The response styles theory is compared to other theories of the duration of depression. Finally, I suggest what may help a depressed person to stop engaging in ruminative responses and how response styles for depression may develop.     

Focalism and the underestimation of future emotion: when it's worse than imagined

People typically exaggerate the emotional impact of future events. This occurs because of focalism, the tendency to focus on one event and neglect to consider how emotion will be mitigated by the surrounding context. Neglecting context, however, should lead people to underestimate future emotion when context focuses attention on the event. In Study 1, participants underestimated the intensity of their future negative emotions when they reported reactions to a romantic break-up on Valentine's Day versus 1 week before. This relationship was mediated by how frequently they thought about the break-up. In Study 2, participants underestimated the emotional impact of a lost prize when the experimental context forced them to focus on the prize versus when the prize was less evident. Thus, failing to account for the extent to which context would focus attention on the event, a form of focalism, led to underestimation of emotional reactions to a negative event.     

The quality of suggested memories

Alarge number of studies have demonstrated that participants could be led to report suggested events that were never witnessed (Loftus & Palmer, 1974 ). The present study attempts to explore the quality of such suggested memories. Thirty‐six participants were exposed to a live event of brief duration (20 s). They were then misled about certain aspects of the event. Memory was assessed using a forced‐choice recognition test. The participants were also required to give remember/know/guess responses, together with confidence ratings, and also to indicate how they came to remember the item. Thirty‐six per cent of the suggested memories were “know” responses, while 43% were “remember” responses. Moreover, whenever the participants had a remember experience they always recalled a wealth of visual information. With regards to the confidence level of the suggested memories, it was observed that the suggested memories were as confidently held as accurate memories. The results indicate that suggestions may become integrated with other kinds of information and that these falsely remembered memories are often accompanied with varied kinds of information; predominant among them seems to be visual imagery and past associations. For accurate memories, too, visual imagery was recalled the most, followed by other kinds of information (e.g., past associations, emotional, auditory, and inferential). The study points to the difficulties of differentiating between true recollections of actual events and false recollections of events that did not occur.     

Strategies for verifying false autobiographical memories

This study examined the types of strategies people use to verify putative childhood memories and the degree to which their preferred strategies are restricted in typical memory implantation studies. We asked subjects to describe a situation in which they recalled a false childhood experience and a hypothetical situation in which they pretended to have developed a false memory after taking part in a memory implantation study. We also asked them how they did (or would) determine the source of the event. We found that subjects relied primarily on other people and cognitive strategies to verify their experiences. These results suggest that laboratory situations cultivate false memories in part because they prevent people from talking to others about the false event, which causes them to rely on less optimal strategies.     

DO FALLIBILIST ACCOUNTS OF THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE UNDERESTIMATE AND ENDANGER SCIENCE?

All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo‐science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even “facts” are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively secure establishment of facts can be accounted for with a fallibilist view. After theories have been honed through sharp criticism, there is often no reason to doubt some aspects of them. These aspects are what we regard to be factual knowledge, even though these facts are also provisionally accepted as such. We then explain the newly won factual knowledge with deeper theories, which often correct our factual knowledge in spite of its apparent security. Theories of justification add nothing useful to the fallibilists' observation that science finds the best theories because it has the highest standards of criticism. Fallibilist theories today give the best account and defence of science. We may abandon the quest for some kind of assurance that goes beyond the determination that some theory can answer all known objections to it and take up more interesting problems, such as how we can find new objections and how criticism may be improved and made institutionally secure. ¹ 1 I am grateful to Joseph Agassi and an anonymous referee of this journal for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.