When violations of perfect duties do not cause strong trait attributions

It is well documented that violations of perfect duties (duties that can never be violated by moral agents) cause strong trait attributions. Brown, Trafimow, and Gregory (2005) found an exception to this general principle when the violation is performed under extreme circumstances. In the present research, we hypothesized that extreme circumstances are not necessary to weaken the attributional effect of violations of perfect duties provided that the violations were performed to help another person. Two experiments were performed in which target people violated perfect or imperfect duties for an unspecified reason or to help a third party. As expected, perfect duty violations did not result in strong trait attributions when they were performed to help someone, although they did result in strong trait attributions otherwise. Thus, the data support that the motive to help is sufficient to eliminate correspondent inferences to perfect duty violations.     

Attitudes toward Women in Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT

Previous research has shown that priming the individual self can increase the accessibility of individual self-cognitions. In turn, we hypothesized that blame for immoral behaviors also would increase, leading to higher assignments of punishment, but that the size of this effect would depend on whether the behaviors violated perfect or imperfect duties. To test these hypotheses, participants assigned yearly bonus penalties to employees who had performed dishonest, disloyal, unfriendly, or uncharitable acts. As expected, the individual prime increased punishments, and this effect was accentuated for violations of perfect duties relative to violations of imperfect duties.     

Using potential performance theory to test five hypotheses about meta-attribution

Based on I. Kant's (1991) distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and the attribution literature pertaining to that distinction, the authors proposed and tested 5 hypotheses about meta-attribution. More specifically, violations of perfect duties have been shown to arouse both more negative affect and stronger correspondent inferences than do violations of imperfect duties (e.g., D. Trafimow, I. K. Bromgard, K. A. Finlay, & T. Ketelaar, 2005). But when it comes to making meta-attributions-that is, guessing the attributions others would make-is the affect differential an advantage or a disadvantage? In addition to the null hypothesis of no effect, the authors proposed and tested additional hypotheses about how negative affect might increase or decrease the effectiveness of people's meta-attribution strategies and how even if there is no effect on strategy effectiveness, negative affect could increase or decrease the consistencies with which these strategies could be used.     

Can priming your self lead to punishing others?

Previous research has shown that priming the individual self can increase the accessibility of individual self-cognitions. In turn, we hypothesized that blame for immoral behaviors also would increase, leading to higher assignments of punishment, but that the size of this effect would depend on whether the behaviors violated perfect or imperfect duties. To test these hypotheses, participants assigned yearly bonus penalties to employees who had performed dishonest, disloyal, unfriendly, or uncharitable acts. As expected, the individual prime increased punishments, and this effect was accentuated for violations of perfect duties relative to violations of imperfect duties.     

Positive morality and the realization of freedom in Kant's moral philosophy

This paper argues that recent accounts of Kantian virtue as “strengthened” inner freedom apply much more clearly to the avoidance of violations of perfect duties than to the fulfillment of imperfect duties, leaving us with the question of how inadequate commitment to morally required ends impacts the exercise of inner freedom. The question is answered through the development of a model of inner freedom that emphasizes the relationship between moral self‐governance and participation in an ethical community.     

Intentionality Attributions About Perfect and Imperfect Duty Violations

Abstract

Intentionality attributions were explored by drawing on the distinction between perfect and imperfect moral duties. Previous research has shown that perfect duty violations carry greater attributional weight than imperfect duty violations (Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999 Trafimow, D. and Trafimow, S. 1999. Mapping imperfect and perfect duties on to hierarchically and partially restrictive trait dimensions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25: 686–695. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & Ketelaar, 2005 Trafimow, D., Bromgard, I. K., Finlay, K. A. and Ketelaar, T. 2005. The role of affect in determining the attributional weight of immoral behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31: 935–948. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In Studies 1 and 2, the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties was replicated with intentionality judgments, and perfect duty violations received higher intentionality attributions than imperfect duty violations. In Study 3 this effect was reversed by manipulating information about an agent's mental intentions or plans to perform a behavior. That is, participants attributed less intentionality to perfect duty violations compared to imperfect duty violations when a mental intention to perform the behavior was absent.     

Prima facie and seeming duties

Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, wwhich attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty proper. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for such principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us to find out what we ought to do.After formalizing general prima facie principles as universally quantified conditionals I will show how seeming duties can be detached from them. There will be examples involving lies, burnt offerings and the question of whether to have a napkin on your lap while eating asparagus. They will illustrate the defeasibility of this detachment, how it can lead into dilemmas, and how general prima facie principles are overridden by more specific ones.I've been lucky to discuss parts of this project with among others Jeff Horty, Paul McNamara, Alasdair MacIntyre, Wlodek Rabinowicz and Michael Slote. Thanks, too, to Henry Prakken and the reviewers for Studia Logica     

Specifying the human body configuration

Three experiments investigated the specific spatial relations that define the human body configuration. In Experiment 1, participants searched for scrambled bodies amongst normal distractors. In Experiments 2 and 3 participants were asked to identify whether single body images (upright or inverted) were scrambled or normal. Scrambled bodies had head or limbs displaced to either symmetrical or asymmetrical positions. Experiment 1 showed that asymmetrical violations are recognized faster than symmetrical violations. All three experiments revealed that when the number of structural violations is held constant, head violations are recognized faster than limb violations. Experiment 3 also showed a greater inversion effect for scrambled bodies that maintained head on top and vertical symmetry, providing evidence that these are key spatial relations in the human body configuration. Overall, the results supported our hypothesis that the human body configuration is defined primarily by a head at the apex of a vertically symmetrical body.     

The Duty to Object

We have the duty to object to things that people say. If you report something that I take to be false, unwarranted, or harmful, I may be required to say as much. In this paper, I explore how to best understand the distinctively epistemic dimension of this duty. I begin by highlighting two central features of this duty that distinguish it from others, such as believing in accordance with the evidence or promise-keeping. In particular, I argue that whether we are obligated to object is directly influenced not only by what other relevant members of the conversational context or community do, but also by the social status of the agent in question. I then show that these features are shared by the duty to be charitable, and the similarities between these two duties point to a potentially deeper explanation: while promise-keeping is regarded as a classic perfect duty, charity is an imperfect one. I then argue that the duty to object can be modeled on a particular conception of imperfect duties, one that takes the duty to belong to communities and other collectives, rather than to individuals. I conclude by showing that this framework provides us with reason for accepting that there are imperfect epistemic duties in general.     

Artificial grammar learning by 1-year-olds leads to specific and abstract knowledge.

Four experiments used the head-turn preference procedure to assess whether infants could extract and remember information from auditory strings produced by a miniature artificial grammar. In all four experiments, infants generalized to new structure by discriminating new grammatical strings from ungrammatical ones after less than 2 min exposure to the grammar. Infants acquired specific information about the grammar as demonstrated by the ability to discriminate new grammatical strings from those with illegal endpoints (Experiment 1). Infants also discriminated new grammatical strings from those with string-internal pairwise violations (Experiments 2 and 3). Infants in Experiment 4 abstracted beyond specific word order as demonstrated by the ability to discriminate new strings produced by their training grammar from strings produced by another grammar despite a change in vocabulary between training and test. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of language acquisition.     

Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots

Ethical theories normally make room both for global duties to human beings everywhere and special duties to those we are attached to in some way. Such a split-level view requires us to specify the kind of attachment that can ground special duties, and to explain the comparative force of the two kinds of duties in cases of conflict. Special duties are generated within groups that are intrinsically valuable and not inherently unjust, where the duties can be shown to be integral to relationships within the group. Since nations can be shown to meet these conditions, acknowledging special obligations towards compatriots is justified. However for such partiality to be reasonable, it must be balanced against recognition of duties of global justice. These duties include duties to respect human rights and duties of fairness towards non-nationals. Weighing such duties against domestic duties of social justice is not a simple task, and the outcome should depend on the precise specification of the duty at stake. In particular, the duty to respect human rights fragments into four sub-duties whose force when set against local duties is markedly different.     

Cognitive templates for religious concepts: cross-cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations

Presents results of free-recall experiments conducted in France, Gabon and Nepal, to test predictions of a cognitive model of religious concepts. The world over, these concepts include violations of conceptual expectations at the level of domain knowledge (e.g., about 'animal' or 'artifact' or 'person') rather than at the basic level. In five studies we used narratives to test the hypothesis that domain-level violations are recalled better than other conceptual associations. These studies used material constructed in the same way as religious concepts, but not used in religions familiar to the subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed a distinctiveness effect for such material. Experiment 3 shows that recall also depends on the possibility to generate inferences from violations of domain expectations. Replications in Gabon (Exp. 4) and Nepal (Exp. 5) showed that recall for domain-level violations is better than for violations of basic-level expectations. Overall sensitivity to violations is similar in different cultures and produces similar recall effects, despite differences in commitment to religious belief, in the range of local religious concepts or in their mode of transmission. However, differences between Gabon and Nepal results suggest that familiarity with some types of domain-level violations may paradoxically make other types more salient. These results suggest that recall effects may account for the recurrent features found in religious concepts from different cultures.     

Violating equality in social dilemmas: emotional and retributive reactions as a function of trust, attribution, and honesty

In social dilemmas, equality is an important coordination rule. When equality is violated, people seek explanations. In Experiment 1, the authors assessed dispositional trust and found that especially high trusters were affected by the given explanation. High trusters reacted less negatively to external than internal explanations. Experiment 2, using a manipulation of trust in others, revealed a similar pattern across a wider range of negative emotions. In Experiment 3, the authors only induced high trust and showed that when the external explanation turned out to be a lie, emotional and retributive reactions became more negative. Moreover, attribution information did not influence reactions when participants realized that the information was dishonest.     

Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors

Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harmfree violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust. In Experiment 1, participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo violations, even in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this presumption was predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo violation and included a cognitive load task to clarify the post hoc nature of presumption of harm. Experiment 3 was similar but more accurately measured presumed harm. In Experiments 2 and 3, only without load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post hoc function to justify moral anger, which was not affected by load. In general, manipulations of harmfulness to others predicted moral anger better than moral disgust, whereas manipulations of taboo predicted disgust better. The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic rather than actual harm when a choice existed. These studies clarify understanding of the relationship between emotions and their justification when people consider victimless, offensive acts.     

World Poverty as a Problem of Justice? A Critical Comparison of Three Approaches

With regard to the problem of world poverty, libertarian theories of corrective justice emphasize negative duties and the idea of responsibility whereas utilitarian theories of help concentrate on positive duties based on the capacity of the helper. Thomas Pogge has developed a revised model of compensation that entails positive obligations that are generated by negative duties. He intends to show that the affluent are violating their negative duties to ensure that their conduct will not harm others: They are contributing to and profiting from an unjust global order. But the claim that negative duty generated positive obligations are more acceptable than positive duties is contestable. I examine whether Henry Shue’s model that is integrating negative duties and positive duties is more convincing concerning the foundation of positive duties to protect others. I defend the idea that there are positive duties of justice. This approach can integrate an allocation of positive duties via responsibility and maintain the advantage of an independent foundation of positive duties.

Preschoolers' Magical Explanations for Violations of Physical,Social, and Mental Laws

In 2 experiments we explored young preschoolers' knowledge of constraints on human action by presenting them with violations of different types of law and asking whether the violations required magic. In Experiment 1, children responded that physical violations required magic more than did social violations. In Experiment 2, violations were presented in pairs and included violations of "mental law." Again, children's "magic" responses were higher for physical than for social violations. Older children also differentiated between mental and social violations. It is concluded that (a) young preschoolers realize that physical constraint is importantly different from social constraint, and (b) children understand that constraints on mental activities are also different from those that operate in the social realm; this understanding develops during the preschool years.     

Forgiveness and Moral Development

Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings.     

Subsistence Needs,Human Rights,and Imperfect Duties

I address the usefulness of thinking about a human right to subsistence within conceptions of human rights grounded in ordinary moral reasoning. I argue that that natural rights should be understood as rights in rem, with their dynamism constrained by the requirements of justification and their scope constrained by the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. I then suggest that many of the most pressing demands which the moral significance of subsistence needs create are plausibly imperfect duties, and so cannot correlate to a natural right to subsistence. This restricts the helpfulness of a human right to subsistence in our reasoning about what we owe to others.     

Internal clock processes and the filled-duration illusion

In 3 experiments, the authors compared duration judgments of filled stimuli (tones) with unfilled ones (intervals defined by clicks or gaps in tones). Temporal generalization procedures (Experiment 1) and verbal estimation procedures (Experiments 2 and 3) all showed that subjective durations of the tones were considerably longer than those of unfilled intervals defined either by clicks or gaps, with the unfilled intervals being judged as approximately 55%-65% of the duration of the filled ones when real duration was the same. Analyses derived from the pacemaker-switch-accumulator clock model incorporated into scalar timing theory suggested that the filled/unfilled difference in mean estimates was due to higher pacemaker speed in the former case, although conclusively ruling out alternative interpretations in terms of attention remains difficult.     

论权利与义务的关系

权利与义务的关系可以归结为两种相关性。一种是一个人的权利与他人的义务的关系:一个人的权利,必然是他人的义务;反之亦然。这是一个人的权利与他人的义务的必然的、客观的、事实如何的关系,亦即所谓“权利与义务的逻辑相关性”。另一种则是基于这种逻辑相关性的“权利义务道德相关性”,亦即一个人的权利应该是对他自己的义务的交换:一个人所享有的权利应该等于他所负有的义务;而他所行使的权利则应该至多等于他所履行的义务。