Propensities and Transcendental Assumptions |
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Authors: | Thomas Bartelborth |
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Institution: | (1) Institut f?r Philosophie—Abteilung Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie, Universit?t Leipzig, Beethovenstra?e 15, 04107 Leipzig, Germany |
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Abstract: | In order to comprehend the world around us and construct explaining theories for this purpose, we need a conception of physical
probability, since we come across many (apparently) probabilistic phenomena in our world. But how should we understand objective
probability claims? Since pure frequency approaches of probability are not appropriate, we have to use a single case propensity
interpretation. Unfortunately, many philosophers believe that this understanding of probability is burdened with significant
difficulties. My main aim is to show that we can treat propensity as a theoretical concept that exhibits many similarities
to other theoretical concepts, and its difficulties are not insuperable if we make explicit some general presuppositions of
scientific practice and apply them to propensities. At least this is true if we formulate the right bridge principle for propensity
and rely on further methodological rules in dealing with propensity assertions to make them empirically testable. |
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Keywords: | |
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