Greater dependence on working memory and restricted familiarity in orangutans compared with rhesus monkeys

The prefrontal cortex is larger than would be predicted by body size or visual cortex volume in great apes compared with monkeys. Because prefrontal cortex is critical for working memory, we hypothesized that recognition memory tests would engage working memory in orangutans more robustly than in rhesus monkeys. In contrast to working memory, the familiarity response that results from repetition of an image is less cognitively taxing and has been associated with nonfrontal brain regions. Across three experiments, we observed a striking species difference in the control of behavior by these two types of memory. First, we found that recognition memory performance in orangutans was controlled by working memory under conditions in which this memory system plays little role in rhesus monkeys. Second, we found that unlike the case in monkeys, familiarity was not involved in recognition memory performance in orangutans, shown by differences with monkeys across three different measures. Memory in orangutans was not improved by use of novel images, was always impaired by a concurrent cognitive load, and orangutans did not accurately identify images seen minutes ago. These results are surprising and puzzling, but do support the view that prefrontal expansion in great apes favored working memory. At least in orangutans, increased dependence on working memory may come at a cost in terms of the availability of familiarity.

The prefrontal cortex is critical for a suite of cognitive control processes that are conspicuous in human cognition (Miller 2000; Rougier et al. 2005; Braver et al. 2009). One such process is working memory, which actively maintains representations in a state of heightened access for further processing (Baddeley and Hitch 1974; Engle 2010). Working memory and cognitive control are positively correlated with measures of general intelligence in humans, implicating the prefrontal cortex as a key neural structure in the evolution of human cognition (Gray et al. 2003; Unsworth and Engle 2007; Cole et al. 2012). Some neuroanatomical studies have found that the prefrontal cortex is larger than would be predicted based on body size and visual cortex volume in apes compared with monkeys (Rilling 2006; Passingham and Smaers 2014). These findings suggest that the prefrontal cortex expanded disproportionately in great apes during primate evolution. Disproportionate expansion of the prefrontal cortex in great apes may have resulted in greater capacity for cognitive control functions, such as working memory, compared with monkeys. Thus, studies directly comparing working memory in monkeys and apes are critical to understanding the evolution of intelligence in primates.The role of cognitive control, and thus the prefrontal cortex, varies among memory systems. For instance, working memory relies heavily on cognitive control, consuming substantial cognitive resources, and is known to depend on frontal brain areas (Goldman-Rakic 1995; Fuster 1997). In contrast, familiarity, which is a strength-based memory signal that codes for whether or not a percept has previously been experienced (Kelley and Jacoby 1998; Yonelinas 2002), relies substantially less on cognitive control, consumes fewer cognitive resources, and has been mostly associated with nonfrontal areas of the brain such as the perirhinal cortex (Bachevalier and Mishkin 1986; Brown and Aggleton 2001; Haskins et al. 2008; Tu et al. 2011; O''Neil et al. 2012). Thus, working memory and familiarity vary in the degree to which they rely on cognitive control, and the degree to which they rely on prefrontal areas of the brain.If a relatively large prefrontal cortex enhances cognitive control and working memory, then we should expect recognition memory tests to engage working memory relatively more in apes than in monkeys. We evaluated this hypothesis by comparing the contributions of working memory and familiarity with recognition memory performance in orangutans and rhesus monkeys. Because the orangutans and monkeys here compared have different experience with cognitive testing, we aimed to compare the relative contributions of working memory and familiarity in each species, rather than the absolute accuracy of the two species in a particular memory test. This follows a logic similar to that used in many comparative anatomical studies; for example, those cited here that found the prefrontal cortex is larger in apes relative to body weight or visual cortex volume, rather than simply absolute volume.The relative contributions of working memory and familiarity to behavior can be measured in visual recognition memory tests. In these tests subjects study a sample image at the beginning of each trial and after a delay they are presented with a test consisting of the recently seen sample image among distractors (Fig. 1). The images used in these tests can either be repeated, such that the subject''s job is to determine which image in a set of familiar images was seen most recently, or the images can be trial unique, such that at test subjects need to discriminate a previously seen image from novel distractors. Working memory is critical for solving tests with repeating images, but much less so for tests using trial unique images, where familiarity plays a much greater role (Brady and Hampton 2018a). Monkeys (Jitsumori et al. 1988; Basile and Hampton 2013a) and apes (Harlow 1944; Hayes and Thompson 1953) are more accurate and better tolerate long delay intervals in tests with trial-unique stimuli, when familiarity can support performance. Experimentally naïve monkeys require comparatively little training to demonstrate proficient use of familiarity as a mnemonic cue, compared with the training required to become proficient in using working memory (Mishkin and Delacour 1975). Active working memory and passive familiarity are independent mnemonic processes that can be doubly dissociated. Working memory is impaired by a concurrent cognitive load imposed during the memory interval, while familiarity is not affected (Logie 1986; Jacoby et al. 1989; Basile and Hampton 2013a; Brady and Hampton 2018a). Completing the double dissociation, equating the familiarity of the sample and distractor images during study impairs choice based on familiarity, but not working memory (Brady and Hampton 2018a). Thus, recognition memory tests may allow us to compare the relative contributions of these two memory processes with recognition performance across species.Open in a separate windowFigure 1.Recognition memory tests with repeating and trial-unique images. (A) In tests with trial-unique images, each image was only used once as a sample or a distractor within a session. (B) When tested with repeating images, the images were the same on each trial. The sample image was pseudorandomly selected each trial such that each image appeared equally often as the sample or as a distractor.One might expect orangutans to show greater dependence on working memory compared with rhesus monkeys for at least two reasons. First, working memory is highly refined in humans and orangutans are more closely related to humans phylogenetically, sharing a common ancestor 13 million to 14 million years ago (Stewart and Disotell 1998), whereas rhesus monkeys and humans shared a common ancestor ∼32 million years ago (Roos and Zinner 2015). Second, orangutans have a relatively larger prefrontal cortex compared with monkeys (Rilling 2006; Passingham and Smaers 2014). We compared the ability of rhesus monkeys and orangutans to maintain images from different sets in working memory. We also determined the extent to which familiarity contributed to recognition memory performance. Across three experiments, we observed striking species differences. We found that in orangutans, recognition memory performance for both repeating and trial-unique images was controlled by working memory. In contrast, monkeys relied on working memory for repeating images, and on familiarity for trial-unique images. Furthermore, monkeys dramatically outperformed orangutans in tests that exceeded the capacity and duration of working memory, and thus depended on familiarity.