FREE WILL AND LUCK |
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Authors: | Alfred R. Mele |
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Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy , Florida State University , 288 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, FL, 32306–1500, USA E-mail: almele@mailer.fsu.edu |
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Abstract: | I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential. |
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Keywords: | knowledge of action perception practical reasoning visual attention non-inferential justification |
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