Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions |
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Authors: | Alfred Mele |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, Florida State University , Tallahassee, USA almele@fsu.edu |
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Abstract: | I will argue that a desert-based justification for treating a person in a certain way is a justification that holds this treatment to be justified simply by what the person is like and what he or she has done, independent of (1) the fact that treating the person in this way will have good effects (or that treating people like him or her in this way will have such effects); (2) the fact that this treatment is called for by some (justified) institution or practice; or (3) the fact that the person could have avoided being subject to this treatment by choosing appropriately, and therefore cannot complain of it. I will explore the implications of this understanding of desert for the role of desert-based justifications of blame, punishment, and economic reward. |
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Keywords: | action action theory free will moral responsibility |
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