The role of all things considered judgements in practical deliberation |
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Authors: | Edmund Henden |
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Institution: | Department of Philosophy , University of Oslo , P.O. Box 1020 Blindern, 0315, Oslo, Norway E-mail: edmund.henden@ifikk.uio.no |
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Abstract: | Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, ‘all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)’ where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections. |
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Keywords: | practical irrationality defeasibility second-order reasons Davidson |
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