Fetuses,corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity |
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| Authors: | Robert Francescotti |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy , University of the West of England , Bristol, UK;2. Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities , University of Edinburgh , Edinburgh, UK davidwall0@gmail.com |
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| Abstract: | Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory. |
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| Keywords: | akrasia D. Davidson desires evaluation A. Mele practical rationality weakness of will self-control |
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