| Abstract: | In this paper it is argued that enquiry concerning intelligence in the 20th century has been dominated by a particular theory which we call the ‘strength’ model of intelligence. After briefly considering the history of the strength model we argue that this dominance has severely distorted the logic of research programmes in the area of intelligence, resulting in the crisis of professional uncertainty and public confidence which we currently find ourselves in. Various illustrations of this distortion of logic are considered in three areas of research, (i) the construction of intelligence tests; (ii) enquiry into the ‘structure’ of intelligence; (iii) nature-nurture research. We go on to examine alternatives to the strength model, and then make a plea for a wider and deeper consideration of concept formation, and concept usage, as the basis of a ‘polyphenic’ cognitive system. Some of the implications of this consideration for the nature of future research programmes are also discussed. |
