Agent-based Theories of Right Action |
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Authors: | Damian Cox |
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Institution: | (1) Discipline of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Bond University, Gold Coast, Queensland, 4229, Australia |
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Abstract: | In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle. |
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Keywords: | right action virtues moral evaluation moral deliberation |
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