The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far |
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Authors: | Moti Mizrahi |
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Affiliation: | 1. Philosophy Department, St. John’s University, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY, 11439, USA
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Abstract: | In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists. |
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