| Abstract: | Evolutionary debunking arguments aim to undercut the epistemological status of our evaluative beliefs on the basis of the genesis of our belief‐forming tendencies. This paper addresses the issue whether responses to these arguments must be question‐begging. It argues for a pragmatic understanding of question‐beggingness, according to which whether an argument is question‐begging depends on the argumentative context. After laying out the debunking argument, the paper considers a variety of responses. It asks whether metaethical responses, such as Sharon Street’s response that relies on a version of antirealism, can avoid begging the question. It argues that so‐called ‘third‐factor’ responses, which rely on substantive evaluative views, are not question‐begging in all contexts. Similarly, it argues, my own ‘quasi‐tracking’ response is not question‐begging in all contexts. Finally, the paper asks whether responses to the debunking argument can avoid begging the question against someone who is convinced at the outset that the argument is sound. |
