The role of belief veracity in understanding intentions-in-action: Preschool children's performance on the transparent intentions task |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Experimental Psychology, Cambridge University, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 2EB, UK;2. Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK;3. Department of Psychology, University of Middlesex, Enfield, UK;1. School of Linguistic Sciences and Arts, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou, 221009, China;2. Collaborative Innovation Center for Language Competence, Xuzhou, 221009, China;3. Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Language and Cognitive Neuroscience, Xuzhou, 221009, China;1. Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA;2. Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53706, USA;3. Center for Human Growth and Development, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, USA;1. Department of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery (Head: Prof. Dr. F.K.L. Spijkervet), University of Groningen, University Medical Center Groningen, P.O. Box 30.001, NL-9700 RB Groningen, The Netherlands;2. Department of Neurosurgery, University of Groningen, University Medical Center Groningen, P.O. Box 30.001, NL-9700 RB Groningen, The Netherlands;3. Department of Fixed and Removable Prosthodontics, University of Groningen, University Medical Center Groningen, A. Deusinglaan 1, 9713AV Groningen, The Netherlands;1. Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Waterhouse Building, Block B, 2nd Floor, L69 3BX, United Kingdom;2. Institute of Translational Medicine, Whelan Building, The Quadrangle, Brownlow Hill, Liverpool L69 3 GB, United Kingdom |
| |
| Abstract: | It is possible to have either true or false beliefs about what one is currently doing (an ‘intention-in-action’; Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: an essay in the philosophy of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.]). The theory-theory account of the development of ‘mentalising’ skills between 3 and 4 years of age predicts that younger children should find false intentions-in-action more difficult to report than true intentions-in-action. In contrast, an executive theory of development at 3 and 4 years of age would predict that the perceived outcome of the action at the time of questioning should determine the younger child's answer, with the truth-value of the past belief playing no role. We presented 3- and 4-year-old children with a novel drawing task—the transparent intentions task—in order to pit these two accounts against each other. The truth-value of the child's (or a puppet's) intention-in-action played no role in performance. Incorrect answers referred to the unexpected final outcome of the drawing. This result supports the executive theory. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
