PERCEIVED COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION IN UNION ACTION

Conflicts in organizations are often initiated by unions. The outcome of a conflict depends on the opportunities of the parties to use the power they have. Parties seldom use all of their resources, either because they are not willing to risk them or because they are not able to muster them. Resources have to be mobilized before they can be used. In this study the conditions under which union members were willing to support their union in a conflict were examined. It was hypothesized that readiness to support union action is a function of the individual's estimates of costs and benefits. One hundred and eight union members in a company where conflict was imminent were asked at two different points in time whether they would support union action. Various types of action were mentioned. The union attempted to mobilize support between the two measurements. Anticipated costs and benefits of a collective, social, and material nature accounted for the variance in willingness to give support, changes in this willingness, and preferences for certain types of action. These findings confirm the contention that a value-expectancy approach to the willingness to participate in union action can be useful. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.