Straw Men,Iron Men,and Argumentative Virtue |
| |
Authors: | Scott F. Aikin John P. Casey |
| |
Affiliation: | 1.Department of Philosophy,Vanderbilt University,Nashville,USA;2.Department of Philosophy,Northeastern Illinois University,Chicago,USA |
| |
Abstract: | The straw man fallacy consists in inappropriately constructing or selecting weak (or comparatively weaker) versions of the opposition’s arguments. We will survey the three forms of straw men recognized in the literature, the straw, weak, and hollow man. We will then make the case that there are examples of inappropriately reconstructing stronger versions of the opposition’s arguments. Such cases we will call iron man fallacies. The difference between appropriate and inappropriate iron manning clarifies the limits of the virtue of open-mindedness. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|