At the threshold of knowledge |
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Authors: | Daniel Rothschild Levi Spectre |
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Affiliation: | 1.University College London,London,United Kingdom;2.The Open University of Israel,Ra’anana,Israel |
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Abstract: | We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s (Philosophical Studies 170(2):277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins because it leads to a pervasive skepticism about knowledge of the future. We argue that the threshold view of evidence and knowledge gives independent grounds to reject fair coins. |
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