The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories |
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Authors: | Mark Colyvan |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia |
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Abstract: | In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects. |
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Keywords: | Inconsistency Inconsistent mathematics Inconsistent objects Inconsistent theories Ontology Scientific realism |
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