Affirming the consequent |
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Authors: | George Bowles |
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Affiliation: | (1) 4466 Arlington Blvd., 22204-134066 Arlington, VA, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | The thesis of this paper is that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its premises at all favorably relevant to its conclusion. In support of this thesis I assume two premises and argue for a third. My two assumptions are these: (1) that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its conclusion certain relative to its premises (this is widely, if not universally, acknowledged by writers on logic), and (2) premises are favorably relevant to a conclusion only if it is certain or probable relative to them (I argued for this in an earlier paper). The premise I argue for in this paper is that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its conclusion probable relative to its premises. To establish this third premise, I first refute a defense of the contrary position (namely, that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent suffices to make its conclusion probable relative to its premises), then offer counterexamples to that position, and finally demonstrate the failure of several attempts to save it.An earlier draft of this paper was read at the meeting of the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Portland on March 27, 1992. I am indebted to Terry Parsons, John Woods, and this journal's anonymous referees for their comments. |
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Keywords: | Affirming the consequent hypothetico-deductive method formal fallacy fallacy |
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