西方哲学史撰作中的分期与标名问题

本文分引论、通论、分论和结论四部分。在“引论”中,作者首先介绍了康德和黑格尔对哲学史的看法,但作者认为两种看法都有一定问题,就是康德把哲学史看得太轻闲,而黑格尔则把哲学史订得太封闭。在“通论”中,为了探讨哲学史撰作的意义根本,作者列举了一些要目,作为反省的据点,其中包括：康德就“学院意义的哲学”与“世界意义的哲学”的区别、哲学活动的“处境”问题、哲学史撰作涉及的处境差距、哲学史的过去与未来导向、哲学史的主动性和进步问题、哲学史的分期和标名及种种有关的复杂性、哲学史的发展与脉络问题等等。在“分论”中,为了说明上述要目对哲学史的撰作和理解的深远影响,作者列举了西方哲学史各种最具代表性的分期和标名,以显出其中所可能涉及的种种复杂性,并作出初步的批判的反思。在“结论”中,作者带出“实质”和“虚灵”两种哲学史撰作风格的区别(前者为史实导向而后者为意义导向),并指出必须能于前者之上进一步发展后者,哲学史家才能于哲学史的撰作中取得方法上的主动和让哲学史的意义空间得到有创意的开拓。

Periodization and Nomenclature in the Historiography of Western Philosophy

This paper consists of four sections. In section one, it starts with a criticism of the Kantian and Hegelian views of the history of philosophy, which the author considers both problematic, as they render the historiography of philosophy an intellectual undertaking which is either too trivial or too rigid. In section two, in order to secure for the historiography of philosophy a more meaningful basis, a number of features pertinent to the issue were outlined, such as: Kant's own distinction between philosophy in scholastic sense and in cosmic sense, the problem of "situation", the discrepancies of situations in the historiography of philosophy, past and future orientations, the question of activeness and progress, simplicity and complexity in periodization and nomenclature, the notion of development and of context, etc. In the third section, to exemplify how these features merit our serious attention, the various phases or periods of the history of Western philosophy are discussed so that the complexities of their possible reinterpretation are exposed for critical reflection. In the last section, the paper concludes with a brief demarcation between the historiography of facts and the historiography of meaning, and suggests that only by developing the latter on top of and beyond the former can a more comprehensive programme be attempted, so that historiography of philosophy can become methodologically active on the one hand and thematically open to innovative reflections and reinterpretations on the other.