A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism |
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Authors: | David Copp |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, CA, USAdcopp@ucdavis.edu |
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Abstract: | AbstractRecently, some philosophers have attempted to escape familiar challenges to orthodox nonnaturalist normative realism by abandoning the robust metaphysical commitments of the orthodox view. One such view is the ‘Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism’ or ‘Non-Realist Cognitivism’ proposed by Derek Parfit and a few others. The trouble is that, as it stands, Non-Realist Cognitivism seems unable to provide a substantive non-trivial account of the meaning and truth conditions of moral claims. The paper considers various strategies one might use to address the challenge. There is a rich field of views that are cognitivist and non-realist. But the paper is skeptical of the prospects of Non-Realist Cognitivism. |
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Keywords: | Non-realist cognitivism nonnaturalism non-metaphysical non-naturalism parfit normative non-realism avant-garde nonnaturalism normative naturalism moral semantics |
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