Levels of Criticism: Handling Popperian Problems in a Popperian Way |
| |
Authors: | Ivor Grattan-Guinness |
| |
Institution: | (1) Middlesex University at Enfield, Middlesex, EN3 4SF, England;(2) Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, England |
| |
Abstract: | Popper emphasised both the problem-solving nature of human knowledge, and the need to criticise a scientific theory as strongly as possible. These aims seem to contradict each other, in that the former stresses the problems that motivate scientific theories while the one ignores the character of the problems that led to the formation of the theories against which the criticism is directed. A resolution is proposed in which problems as such are taken as prime in the search for knowledge, and subject to discussion. This approach is then applied to the problem of induction. Popper set great stake to his solution of it, but others doubted its legitimacy, in ways that are clarified by changing the form of the induction problem itself. That change draws upon logic, which is the subject of another application: namely, in contrast to Popper’s adhesion to classical logic as the only welcome form (because of the maximal strength of criticism that it dispenses), can other logics be used without abandoning his philosophy of criticism? |
| |
Keywords: | Testing theories Induction Popper Logics in science |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|