Defending the Possibility of Knowledge |
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Authors: | Neil Kennedy |
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Affiliation: | 1. MIT – Linguistics and Philosophy, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA, 2139-4307, USA
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Abstract: | In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means. Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true. |
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