On the Argumentative Strength of Indirect Inferential Conditionals |
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Authors: | Sara Verbrugge Hans Smessaert |
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Institution: | (1) University of Leuven; Dutch, German and Computational Linguistics, Faculty of Arts, Blijde-Inkomststraat 21- bus 3308, 3000 Leuven, Belgium |
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Abstract: | Inferential or epistemic conditional sentences represent a blueprint of someone’s reasoning process from premise to conclusion.
Declerck and Reed (2001) make a distinction between a direct and an indirect type. In the latter type the direction of reasoning goes backwards,
from the blatant falsehood of the consequent to the falsehood of the antecedent. We first present a modal reinterpretation
in terms of Argumentation Schemes of indirect inferential conditionals (IIC’s) in Declerck and Reed (2001). We furthermore argue for a distinction between epistemic-modal strong and deontic-modal weak IIC’s. In addition, we extend
the category of the indirect inferential conditionals in order to include several other deontic-modal subtypes. On the basis
of the undesirability of the consequent the hearer in these cases infers that the antecedent is also undesirable. In this
way the rhetoric-argumentative strategy of Reductio ad Absurdum is extended from the realm of deductive reasoning to that
of practical reasoning. |
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