Skeptical theism and moral obligation |
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Authors: | Stephen Maitzen |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, Canada, B4P 2R6 |
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Abstract: | Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such
a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical
theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus
our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism
implies a degree of moral skepticism that even skeptical theists will find objectionable and that it undermines moral obligations
that even skeptical theists will want to preserve. I discuss a version of the first objection and defend a version of the
second. |
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Keywords: | Theism God Problem of evil Skeptical theism Moral skepticism Moral obligation Almeida Michael Bergmann Michael Oppy Graham Rea Michael |
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