A reconception of meaning

Nelson Goodman's proposal for a reconception of meaning consists in replacing the absolute notion ofsameness of meaning by that oflikeness of meaning (with respect to pertinent contexts). According to this view, synonymy is a matter of degree (of interreplaceability) with identity of expression as a limiting case. Goodman's demonstration that no two expressions are exactly alike in meaning is shown to be unsuccessful. Although it does not make use of quotational contexts for the test of interreplaceability, it is tantamount to their acceptance. Goodman rejects quotational contexts; I argue that they should be accepted. This move offers two advantages.Firstly, and mainly, it allows interlinguistic comparison of meaning, something that has not been deemed possible in the received version of Goodman's account.Secondly, it restores the full scale of likeness of meaning damaged by the renunciation of those contexts that guarantee difference in meaning for diverse expressions.The problems [the paper On Likeness of Meaning] deals with do not seem to me to have quite the paramount importance that is commonly attached to them these days. (Goodman, 1954, p. 54)The subversive power of a radical reorganization of categories should not be underestimated. (Goodman, 1983, p. 2)²Thanks to Oliver R. Scholz and Lorenz Lorenz-Meyer for valuable discussions and advice. Thanks to Geoff Simmons for checking my English. Israel Scheffler and Rolf Eberle both read a preliminary version of this paper. My thanks for their criticism and encouragement.